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Abstract 
Myth and Argument in Plato’s Phaedo 
 
Brooke McLane-Higginson, Ph.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation argues for reading the myth at the end of Plato’s Phaedo as part of the 
overall argumentative structure of the dialogue. Using the Toulmin method of argument analysis, 
I analyze each of Socrates’ proofs for the immortality of the soul, as well as the myth and the 
argument before the proofs. These analyses show that each of Socrates’ arguments rely on the 
hypothesis of the Forms, and that some of them also employ the hypothesis that the soul is 
immortal. I then analyze the demonstrative status of each argument, by which I mean how strongly 
or weakly Socrates claims to have ‘proven,’ ‘shown,’ etc. the conclusion of the argument. The 
result of this analysis is that the arguments that do not use the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality 
all have a higher demonstrative status than those that do, suggesting that the hypothesis of 
immortality leads to somewhat less sure conclusions than the hypothesis of the Forms. I then argue 
that we should read the argumentative structure of the dialogue as an example of the method of 
hypothesis as Socrates characterizes it in Phaedo: the hypothesis of the Forms is a higher 
hypothesis while the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality is a lower hypothesis, and the 
progression of arguments in the dialogue (including the myth) first ascends from the lower 
hypothesis used in the preliminary argument to the higher hypothesis used in the proofs of 
immortality, then descends to the lower hypothesis again through the myth. Finally, I argue that 
the myth has both a rational persuasive function and a non-rational one. Its rational persuasive 
function is to show the consequences of the hypothesis of immortality, which should give us 
 v 
greater confidence in that hypothesis. Its non-rational persuasive function is to charm away the 
fear of death and draw its hearers toward a philosophical life. I conclude by identifying several 
structural and thematic elements of the Phaedo myth that are present also in the myths of Phaedrus 
and Republic, suggesting that Socrates’ eschatological myths have some structural and thematic 
consistency across dialogues. 
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Chapter 1 
Many people, even scholars of Classics and philosophy, know not what to do when they 
encounter one of Plato’s myths. Often they gloss over these myths with little commentary, 
particularly when they are familiar with Plato’s so-called critique of myth in Republic: why should 
we take Plato’s myths seriously, when this same author mounts such a scathing attack on traditional 
mythology and poetry? It is tempting to focus on the attitude toward mythology expressed in 
Republic because it is relatively easy to understand, whereas it is much more difficult to understand 
why an author seemingly so focused on argumentation in the form of dialectic would suddenly 
‘resort to myth’ to make a point, particularly when that same author seems to tell us to be skeptical 
of mythology. The fundamental aim of this dissertation is to show that a certain class of myth 
Socrates tells in the Platonic dialogues—eschatological myths—are meant to be neither playful 
nor unserious. They are, rather, integral parts of the dialogues that both expand on the 
argumentative structures of the dialogues as well as impart their own persuasive function. 
My focus here will be on Plato’s Phaedo, and in particular how its myth is a part of the 
dialogue’s overall argumentative structure. The argumentative structure of Phaedo is generally 
thought to be four arguments for the immortality of the soul (70c-107a), followed by a myth about 
the geography and character of the earth and underworld and the fate of the soul after death (107c-
115a). This makes the Phaedo a particularly good dialogue for comparing the role of myth with 
the role of argument, because Phaedo contains four discrete and clearly delineated arguments, as 
well as a myth, in more or less rapid succession. However, I argue that this common 
characterization of the structure of the dialogue is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, 
this view of the dialogue’s structure completely ignores the ‘preliminary’ arguments Socrates 
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makes before giving the four arguments for the immortality of the soul, as well as their role in the 
overall argumentative structure of the dialogue. These ‘preliminary’ arguments are often ignored 
because they do not argue for the immortality of the soul, but rather assume that the soul is 
immortal. But it is only because Socrates’ interlocutors object to these arguments, thinking that 
the soul may be mortal, that Socrates gives his four arguments for immortality. These ‘preliminary’ 
arguments are thus integral to the overall argumentative structure of the dialogue, because they 
question the hypothesis that the soul is immortal. 
A second reason for finding the common interpretation of the structure of the dialogue to 
be unsatisfactory is that it is unable to make sense of the Method of Hypothesis that Socrates uses 
in his Final Argument for the immortality of the soul.1 Socrates explains the Method of Hypothesis 
as a process of ascent and descent to higher and lower hypotheses, as the inquiry demands. We 
must descend to lower hypotheses in order to examine the consequences of a higher hypothesis, 
but in order to justify any hypothesis, one must ascend to a higher one. The common interpretation 
of this process takes the Hypothesis of the Forms to be a lower Hypothesis,2 one from which 
someone might ascend to a higher one. However, scholars have been at a loss to give a compelling 
account of what such a higher Hypothesis might be. The solution to this, I argue, is to understand 
the Hypothesis of the Forms as Socrates’ highest hypothesis. The lower Hypothesis Socrates 
references is, rather, the Hypothesis that the soul is immortal, and this is why the dialogue begins 
by ascending to the hypothesis of the Forms (in the shift from the preliminary arguments to the 
arguments for immortality, which are all based on the hypothesis of the Forms), and concludes its 
                                                 
1 In this argument, Socrates says that because Forms do not admit their opposites, nor do things that have an opposite 
because of their nature or Form (i.e., snow is by nature cold, so it cannot admit heat), and because soul is the source 
of life, and life is the opposite of death, soul cannot admit death. 
2 There is, however, no textual evidence for this interpretation, which I discuss at length in Chapters 2.3 and 3.2. 
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overall argument by descending to a lower hypothesis (in the shift from the arguments for 
immortality to the myth, which is based on the hypothesis that the soul is immortal). The 
argumentative structure of Phaedo as a whole then comes into focus as an example of precisely 
the ascent and descent to higher and lower hypotheses that Socrates describes—but only if we take 
a broader view of the argumentative structure than is commonly held, one that includes both the 
preliminary arguments and the myth. 
My analysis requires that we view the myth in Phaedo as an argument in itself, related to 
but distinct from the other arguments in the dialogue. The question then arises as to what 
persuasive function the myth might have that could not be performed by a propositional argument. 
I argue that the persuasive nature of a myth need not be fully rational or fully non-rational. The 
Phaedo myth persuades in a rational way because it examines the consequences of the hypothesis 
of immortality, and in so doing, gives us greater credence in that hypothesis. But it also persuades 
in a non-rational way by working to, as Socrates says, “charm away” the “fears” of its hearers—a 
function that the propositional arguments cannot perform. The myth thus relates to the 
propositional arguments in the dialogue in a rational way because it examines the consequences of 
those arguments, strengthening our trust in the hypothesis of immortality; however, the myth also 
has a unique role to play in the dialogue—one that the propositional arguments cannot play—
because it “charms” its hearers in a non-rational way. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I outline three thematic features and six argumentative features of 
the myth in Phaedo in order to argue that these features can be seen either in whole or for the most 
part in other dialogues that contain eschatological myths. The myths of Phaedrus and Republic 
have a striking resemblance to the myth in Phaedo, both in their thematic elements and in their 
relationship to propositional arguments in the dialogues. Because of this, I argue, Socrates can be 
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seen to have a more consistent view across dialogues of the afterlife, and its accompanying ethical 
imperatives, than it may first seem. In relief to these three myths that are quite consistent in their 
thematic and argumentative features, I briefly examine also the myth in Gorgias, and suggest that 
this myth does not have as many of the thematic and argumentative features as the other dialogues 
because of the context in which the dialogue takes place, namely, because of the antagonistic and 
stubbornly incredulous attitude of his interlocutors. Finally, I suggest that future study on the role 
of eschatological myth in Plato’s dialogues focus on their argumentative and rationally persuasive 
functions, and in particular how they use the hypothesis of the Forms, or other hypotheses Socrates 
puts forth in the dialogues, in order to make their arguments. 
 
1.1 A General Review of the Current Literature on Myth in Plato 
1.1.1  A Brief History of Muthos 
Prior to the late twentieth century, many scholars of Plato and of the ancient world 
generally tended to assume a stark contrast between μῦθος and λόγος.3 Their narrative, re-
popularized by Nestle’s 1940 Vom Mythos Zum Logos, claimed that between approximately the 
sixth and fourth centuries BCE, a great intellectual shift took place in which the prior trust in μῦθος 
came to be replaced by trust in λόγος. Before, in archaic Greece, traditional μῦθοι were passed on 
                                                 
3 Reviews of such literature can be found in Buxton’s (1999) Introduction to a volume he edited, From Myth to 
Reason?, as well as in Chapter 1 of Morgan’s (2000) Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato. Two great 
exceptions to this general view were Thiemann (1892) and Döring (1893), the latter of whom, Moors wrote in 1982, 
held still a great influence on the study of Plato’s eschatological myths in particular. 
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through generations, often in the form of poetry, in order to explain various aspects of the world 
and of the human condition. These μῦθοι relied heavily on anthropomorphized gods, as 
exemplified by the poems of Homer and Hesiod. However, the time between the sixth and fourth 
centuries BCE saw a new form of explanation that was naturalist and materialist, as exemplified 
by the Presocratics, as well as by Herodotus and Thucydides. This shift was then characterized by 
Nestle and others, a bit too swiftly and over-tidily, as one from μῦθος to λόγος. 
In their defense, Nestle and others were following the ancients’ own characterization of 
themselves in claiming a fundamental shift from μῦθος to λόγος. As Morgan puts it, “why is the 
Greek miracle the freedom of logos from myth? Because that is what the Greek philosophers tell 
us to think” ([2000], 33). 4 When it came to Plato in particular, the ancient rationalists had so little 
faith in μῦθος that they found in his myths evidence that “he was willing to revert to old 
superstitions.”5 The Neoplatonists, attempting to come to Plato’s defense, argued that his μῦθοι 
were to be understood allegorically in order to discover their underlying philosophical truths—that 
is, in order to discover their hidden λόγοι.6 By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
emphasis of scholarship on Platonic myth came to focus generally on its more ‘rational’ aspects: 
their structure, and their reliance on and adaptation of traditional myths.7 In the late nineteenth 
century, scholars were coming to see Plato’s myths as an integral part of the structure of Platonic 
dialogues, helping to bridge the gap between “the domain of opinion and the domain of 
philosophy,”8 but it was not until Stewart’s (1906) The Myths of Plato that myth came to be seen 
                                                 
4 Cf. Morgan 2000, 31 and Wians 2009, 3. 
5 Edelstein 1949, 463. 
6 Edelstein 1949, 464. 
7 Moors 1982, 3-5. 
8 Moors 1982, 6. 
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as possibly philosophic, an idea furthered by Frutiger and Friedländer.9 The insight that Plato’s 
myths could be regarded as philosophic and not merely poetic made space for Edelstein to argue 
in 1949 that Plato’s eschatological myths in particular were constructed in a rational way and had 
ethical implications, and for Pieper to argue in 1962 and 1965 that Plato’s myths could even be 
called ‘true.’ Still, it wasn’t until the mid- and late twentieth century that scholars began to reject 
the opposition between, and the supposed historical shift from, μῦθος to λόγος.  
As many recent scholars have pointed out,10 there are both myriad elements of the 
mythological in early philosophy, and myriad elements of the rational in early mythology.11 
Playwrights of Classical Athens seemed to have a similar understanding: they composed plays 
based on traditional myths not because they had not noticed that it was then λόγος, not μῦθος, that 
was intellectually en vogue, but because they, like some early philosophers, understood that μῦθοι 
are effective at eliciting certain intellectual and emotional reactions in their audiences.12 It seems 
more accurate, then, to say not that λόγος replaced μῦθος in the Greek intellectual arena, but rather 
that μῦθος came to hold a different function between the fourth and sixth centuries: the use of myth 
expanded from its former role as a tool for explaining the world and the role of humanity in it to 
include an intentional, rhetorical, persuasive use in philosophical, tragic, and other contexts. As 
Morgan (2000) puts it, “while some early philosophers were eager to condemn and displace their 
poetic predecessors, they were by no means averse to employing myth themselves. What 
distinguishes them is that their use of myth is self-conscious and designed to raise second-order 
                                                 
9 Moors 1982, 6-9. 
10 See esp. Morgan 2000, 30-7; Partenie’s 2009 Introduction to Plato’s Myths; Wians’ 2009 Introduction to Logos and 
Muthos; and Collobert et al.’s 2012 Introduction to Plato and Myth. 
11 In defense of Nestle, he did note the latter point (24-48). 
12 Cf. Wians 2009: “The continued deployment of myth by the poets was a decision arrived at rationally, not an 
unreflective perpetuation of a primitive mentality” (4). 
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questions about the use of language” (35).13 Indeed, many of the ancient critiques of μῦθος are 
now understood to be attacking not so much μῦθος itself, but an unreflective or inappropriate use 
of μῦθος in particular.14 
The idea that μῦθος and λόγος were opposed to each other, and that Greek thought shifted 
its focus from one to the other, was a prevailing viewpoint even as recently as fifty years ago, and 
so has had a great influence on scholarship about ancient myths, and about Plato’s use of myth in 
particular. Because the terms “μῦθος” and “λόγος” cover what seems to be a wide range of 
discourses,15 many scholars of the last century came to define and characterize them in opposition 
to one another. Morgan sums up the view of Nestle and others nicely: “Mythos is symbolic and 
pictorial, characterized by a lack of scrutiny, totally non-rational, while logos, of course, embodies 
the opposite qualities” (31). The supposed “lack of scrutiny” and “non-rationality” of μῦθος led 
scholars to widely believe it was also non-argumentative and non-falsifiable discourse, meaning 
that μῦθοι were incapable of making an argument, and incapable of being shown to be true or false, 
respectively.16 Thus μῦθος was viewed as a discourse far less appropriate to philosophy than λόγος, 
so the mythological elements in Plato and other authors were relegated to the status of ‘holdovers’ 
from the old way of thinking, or (merely) rhetorical appeals, or simply flowery ways of repeating 
what had already been established through λόγος.17  
                                                 
13 Collobert et al. (2012) hold a similar view, expressed in the Introduction to their edited volume: “Not only did Plato 
write dialogues, but he also created myths whose ambiguous epistemological status reflects the ambiguity of the 
relation between philosophy and literature itself” (1). Cf. Brill 2011, 92. 
14 Lloyd 1990, 44-6; Wians 2009, 3; Buxton 1999, 5. 
15 A particularly cogent characterization of Plato’s use of μῦθος is given by Partenie 2009 (1-6). The most thorough 
is Moors’ 1982 catalogue. 
16 Although current scholarship has, over the last twenty to thirty years, mostly abandoned the idea that Plato’s myths 
are non-rational, many still maintain that his myths are non-argumentative (e.g., Partenie 2009; Brisson 1994 [1998], 
2012). This particular point is discussed at length in section 1.1.5 of this Chapter. 
17 An interesting exception to this view is given in Stewart’s (1905) The Myths of Plato, which argues that myths and 
other poetry are aimed to produce a “Transcendental Feeling,” because they “appeal to that major part of man’s nature 
which is not articulate and logical, but feels, and wills, and acts…and expresses itself, not scientifically…but 
practically in ‘value-judgments’—or rather ‘value-feelings’” (44, cf. 45-64). 
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Now, however, that the supposed progression “’from muthos to logos’ has itself been 
revealed to be a myth,”18 scholars have in general become much more amenable to viewing μῦθος 
in ways that do not oppose it to λόγος. These two forms of discourse are now thought to be, under 
various views, “complementary”19 and simultaneously intrinsic to ancient philosophy.20 Collobert 
et al. (2012) claim that in the Platonic corpus in particular, “myth in its relation to logos, defined 
as reasoned discourse, appears at once both same and other… Plato blurs the boundaries and the 
difference becomes less pronounced: myth becomes an integral and constitutive part of 
philosophical discourse” (1). Modern scholars now generally find Platonic myth to be not only 
persuasive,21 but also didactic22 precisely because it is philosophical.23 The idea that myth is non-
rational has been rather well challenged,24 making way for scholars like Rowe (2009, 2012) and 
myself to envisage myth as not only rational, but evaluable as true or false discourse and even as 
argumentative discourse. 
The rest of this Chapter provides a more in-depth and nuanced discussion of some of the 
major topics in the current literature on Platonic myth and argument. After giving a preliminary 
characterization of myth in Plato, in order to define the scope and limits of the current study (1.1.2), 
I discuss various approaches to viewing myth as verifiable (otherwise known as “falsifiable,” 
1.1.3), as truth-evaluable (1.1.4), and as argumentative (1.1.5). Section 2 of this Chapter reviews 
current thinking on the argumentative structure of Phaedo, including the delineation of the 
                                                 
18 Wians 2009, 3. For a lively and in-depth argument that scholarship has most recently rejected this dichotomy too 
much, Fowler’s (2011) Mythos and Logos is helpful. 
19 Mattéi 1988, 68. 
20 Morgan 2000, 272-4. 
21 E.g., Partenie 2009, 6-8; Edelstein 1949, 466, 468. 
22 E.g., Edelstein 1949, 465; Smith 1982; Partenie 2009, 8-11; Tecusan 1992, 69; Rowe 1999, 278 n. 37; Fowler 2011, 
64. 
23 E.g., Annas 1982; Sedley 1990, 381; Rowe 1999, 265; Partenie 2009, 19. 
24 E.g., Rowe 2009. 
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arguments (1.2.1), issues raised by the arguments (1.2.2), and the relationship between the 
arguments and the myth (1.2.3). 
1.1.2  Types of Myth in Plato 
Although the focus of this dissertation is the role of the myth in Phaedo in particular, I 
begin here with a broader discussion of various interpretations of myth throughout the Platonic 
corpus. This will not only give some context for the ensuing interpretation of Phaedo, but also 
help to show more precisely how my interpretation has implications for other dialogues. 
It may be helpful to clarify from the outset that what I will refer to as “myth” does not have 
complete correspondence with what Plato refers to as a “μῦθος.” Some of what modern scholars 
fairly unanimously refer to as “myths” are never called “μῦθος” by Socrates. In addition, Plato 
seems to intentionally confound whatever distinctions we might be tempted to make between 
μῦθος and λόγος by, for instance, combining the concepts into a single verb,25 or having Socrates 
say in Gorgias that his account of the fate of the soul is meant as a λόγος even though it will be 
thought a μῦθος.26 And since Plato neither defines “μῦθος” himself nor has any of his characters 
do so, we are left to either understand as myths only those things which one of Plato’s characters 
explicitly calls such,27 or, what is the prevailing method,28 to understand that what is generally 
                                                 
25 Most 2012 elaborates: “A number of invented compound words, without which we ourselves can no longer even 
imagine conceptualizing the problem, are attested for the first time in Plato’s works, and indeed were most likely 
coined by him: muthologia appears eight times in his writings, muthologêma twice, muthologikos once, muthologeô 
as many as seventeen times” (13). 
26 Morgan 2000 believes this intentional confusing of the terms is intended to make Plato’s readers perform their own 
philosophical investigations: “When we ask what is and is not a myth, and ponder the criteria by which we would 
answer the question, we are engaging in philosophy. …[W]hen referring to such narratives, Plato often underlines 
issues of truth status” (157). 
27 An approach, popularized by Couturat in 1896, that was suggested as late as 1981 by Zaslavsky (12). 
28 Brill 2011 explains the motivation for this: “if we discern the influence of myth broadly to include not only those 
passages explicitly called a μῦθος, but also the use of mythic imagery, we find the dialogues so permeated by mythic 
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taken to be a myth and what Plato labels a “μῦθος” lack one-to-one correspondence. Setting aside 
traditional myths29—those that Plato reports in some form but originated elsewhere—there are two 
characteristics generally thought to characterize the myths of Plato’s own invention: (1) the 
subject-matter of Platonic myth is generally metaphysical, regarding the gods, the nature of the 
soul, the origin of the universe, or the like; and (2) these myths describe these things in nonliteral 
or not entirely literal ways. Within this last characteristic we might note also that Plato’s myths 
provide an image or likeness of what they are representing.30  
At times, Plato depicts traditional myth in unfavorable ways. For instance, in Republic, 
Socrates rejects many of the myths of Homer and Hesiod (377 ff.), and in Phaedrus, he is 
uninterested in examining the myth of Boreas abducting Orethuia because he would rather spend 
his time inquiring into himself (229c ff.). At other times, however, Socrates references traditional 
myth with either outright or implied approbation, such as the myths of Eros’ birth (Symposium 
201d ff.), of Gyges’ ring (Republic 359a ff.), and of Boreas (Phaedrus 229b ff.). One difference 
between these traditional myths and those invented by Plato,31 then, is that Socrates’ approval of 
traditional myth may differ depending on the context, yet the myths of Plato’s own invention are 
generally not disparaged by Plato’s characters. But even this division doesn’t seem to fully 
accommodate the range of Platonic myth, which is why many scholars tend to further subdivide 
                                                 
content as to place scholarly consternation about the significance of myth for philosophy already at some remove from 
Plato’s work” (86). Cf. Morgan 2000, 30-7.  
29 Plato’s incorporation and adaptation of traditional myths is both outside the scope of the current study, and already 
well-documented by previous scholars. See esp. Moors 1982. 
30 Among these images or likenesses are the image of the soul as a charioteer and two horses in Phaedrus, the image 
of the colorful earth and geography of the underworld in Phaedo. Many scholars agree that a defining characteristic 
of myth, as distinguished from allegory in particular, is that myths provide an image or story (e.g., Werner 2012, 30-
35; Morgan 2000, 237; Brill 2011, 86; cp. Rowe 2000, 135). 
31 Even this distinction can be difficult to make. The extant evidence in some cases may not be enough for us to make 
a determination, and in addition, some of the myths in the Platonic corpus may have been adapted by Plato in such 
ways as to make distinguishing between ‘his’ myths and ‘traditional’ myths a matter of interpretation. 
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the myths of Plato’s own invention. Morgan, for instance, distinguishes between “educational 
myths that are intended to exercise social control [like the Myth of the Metals in Republic], and 
philosophical myths, which are tied to logical analysis” (162). Much attention has also been paid 
to what we might call Plato’s ‘historical’ myths, 32 those that describe a particular event, such as 
the myth in Timaeus that describes the creation of the universe or the myth in Symposium that 
describes Zeus splitting human beings in half.33 These ‘historical’ myths are thought to differ from 
other types of myth because they describe an event that changed (or created) the world or humanity 
in some significant way; after the time such ‘historical’ myths take place (even though the time is 
unspecified), things are never the same again. Moors’ catalogue of “μῦθος” and related 
terminology uses even more distinctions, finding eight different (though sometimes overlapping) 
categories including traditional myth, historical myth, philosophical myth, myth’s relationship to 
education, and myth’s relationship to poetry (59-66). 34 However, since the main focus of this study 
is only one of Plato’s myths, a precise categorization of all of Plato’s myths will be unnecessary 
here. Instead, I wish only to note that the myth of the Phaedo could be categorized as philosophical, 
a myth of the soul, an eschatological myth, and the like, but it is decidedly not traditional or 
historical.35 Many of the characterizations and critiques that apply to other types of myth, which I 
discuss in the following sections (1.1.3-1.1.5), will thus not apply to the myth in Phaedo, nor to 
the other eschatological myths from Phaedrus and Republic that I discuss in Chapter 5.  
                                                 
32 Cf. Edelstein (1949) 469. 
33 Timaeus 27c ff.; Symposium 189 ff. 
34 Moors’ categories are: Presented Myths (i.e., presented for philosophical consideration); Traditional Myths; Mytho-
Historical Usages; Terms Associated with Lacadaemonians/Spartans; Myth as a Subject and Poetry; Myth as a 
Subject, Education, and the Young; Myth and Philosophic Subjects; and Myth and the Soul (1982, 59-66). 
35 Nor would it be an educational myth in Morgan’s sense of the term (those “intended to exercise social control”), 
though it could certainly be considered educational in some other sense. 
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Many of the current controversies surrounding myths of Plato’s own invention are those 
raised by Luc Brisson in his 1994 Plato the Myth-Maker, namely, whether myths can provide any 
form of knowledge or truth, and whether myth is even a type of discourse whose truth-value can 
be determined.36 Since many scholars have adopted Brisson’s stance that the unfalsifiability of 
myth requires it also to be nonargumentative, very few scholars have taken up the task of 
attempting to understand myth as argumentative.37 It tends to be seen instead as something 
complementary to argumentative discourse.38 In what follows I will begin to argue that even 
though discourse about the soul such as that in the Phaedo myth is beyond the realm of human 
knowledge,39 it is still both truth-evaluable40 and has the capacity to be argumentative. 
 
 
 
1.1.3  Myth as Verifiable 
Brisson looks to a passage from the Sophist (259d-264b) in which he claims that “Plato 
defines logos as ‘verifiable discourse,’” and in so doing, Brisson argues, Plato also defines 
                                                 
36 Discourse that has a truth-value is generally called “truth-evaluable”; discourse that does not is referred to as “non-
truth-evaluable.” This simply means that the statement, proposition, sentence, etc., can be rightly called “true” or 
“false.” For the sake of brevity, I will use the terms “truth-evaluable” and “non-truth-evaluable” in what follows. 
37 One exception to this may be Burnyeat, although defending the thesis that myth can be an argument is not the focus 
of his study. See, in this Chapter, Section 1.1.5: Myth as Argument, and the accompanying footnotes. 
38 See section 1.1.5. 
39 There is some question as to whether Socrates believes that this is beyond the realm of human knowledge. He often 
speaks as though humans can know (and “prove” to one another) that the soul is immortal, but any further claims 
about what the soul experiences after death cannot be known. This is discussed at length in section 3.2. 
40 By “truth-evaluable,” I mean only that the proposition ‘the soul is immortal’ is either true or false. The fact of the 
matter—whether the soul is indeed immortal or not—is in no way affected by our inability to know the fact. See 
Section 1.1.4 of this chapter. 
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“unverifiable discourse.”41 Verifiable discourse,42 Brisson claims, is discourse whose referent can 
be shown to correspond (or not) with facts either present in the sensible world or about the world 
of Forms; in other words, its referent “is accessible either to the intellect or to the senses” (24). For 
instance, the proposition that “Plato is currently writing a dialogue” can be verified (or not) by 
looking to whether he is currently writing a dialogue or currently dining with friends, while the 
proposition that “virtue is good” can be verified (or not) through an intellectual investigation into 
whether virtue belongs among good things. However, Brisson argues that the language of myth 
speaks neither of the sensible world nor of the world of Forms, since its referents are “gods, 
daemons, heroes, …an immortal part of the human soul,” or “facts dating back to a very distant 
past” that would once have been but are no longer verifiable (24). Thus, Brisson concludes that 
“myth is unverifiable discourse because its referent is located either at a level of reality inaccessible 
both to the intellect and to the senses [i.e., when the subject of the myth is the soul], or at the level 
of sensible things, but in a past of which the speaker of the discourse can have no direct or indirect 
experience [i.e., when the subject of the myth is the origins of the universe].”43  
Because myth is beyond verifiability, Brisson claims, “myth should be situated beyond 
truth and falsehood; yet this does not seem to be the case since Plato presents myth at times as a 
false discourse and at times as a true one” (24). Thus the method of assessing the “adequacy” of a 
myth (20), says Brisson, requires “a change in perspective”: 
Truth and error no longer depend on the correspondence of a discourse with its 
supposed referent but on the correspondence of a discourse, in this case myth, with 
                                                 
41 This quotation is from Brisson’s 1996 (published in English in 2004) How Philosophers Saved Myths (20). This 
text contains a revised version of the argument presented in his 1994 (published in English in 1998) Plato the Myth-
Maker. I refer to the revised version of the essay (1996 [2004]) in what follows unless otherwise noted. 
42 In his earlier articulation of the same argument (see previous fn. 41), Brisson uses the term “falsifiable” in the same 
way he uses “verifiable” in his later version. It is unclear whether, in shifting his language to that of “verifiability,” 
Brisson wished to separate this concept from the concept of “falsifiability” used in philosophy of science, as 
popularized by Karl Popper. 
43 Brisson 2004 (1996), 23; cf. Brisson 2012, 375. 
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another discourse that can be held up as [a] norm. …The truth of a myth thus 
depends, in the final analysis, on its conformity with the philosopher’s discourse on 
the intelligible forms in which the individual entities that are the subjects of this 
myth participate. (25) 
 
According to Brisson, myths cannot be said to be “true” or “false” in themselves, but only in 
relation to rational discourse on the Forms, or “the discourse which proposes an explanatory model 
in the realm of cosmology.”44 And this is because their subject-matter—either non-sensible entities 
like gods and the soul or sensible matters from the distant past—cannot be perceived with either 
the intellect or the senses. 
Brisson is by no means alone in this concern, as many scholars have pointed out that the 
topics of many of Plato’s myths are unverifiable.45 But even this claim requires a bit of unpacking. 
Brisson’s argument seems to rest on the idea that myth is unverifiable because of its subject-matter 
(what he calls its ‘referents’). Because these subjects or referents cannot be perceived by the 
intellect or by the senses, there is no way for a human being to access knowledge of them. Still, 
Brisson maintains, myths can be evaluated by their conformity with rational discourse on the 
Forms—and it is difficult to see how any rational discourse about the Forms would hold bearing 
for any mythological discourse unless the subject-matter of the two were the same or at least 
                                                 
44 Brisson (1998 [1994]), 110. For examples of this, Brisson cites four myths: Atreus and Thyestes, the age of Kronos, 
and the earthborn race—all from Statesman—and the myth of Phaethon in Timaeus. The myths of Statesman are “all 
presented as resulting from the same phenomenon,” so Brisson covers all three with one quotation from the Stranger: 
All these facts originate from the same event in cosmic history… However, as this great event took 
place so long ago, some of them have faded from man’s memory; others survive but they have 
become scattered and have come to be told in a way which obscures their real connection with one 
another. (Pol. 269b5-c3). 
Brisson then swiftly concludes only that “this cosmological phenomenon is explained by reference to a mechanical 
model” (1998 [1994]), 110. And for the Phaethon passage from Timaeus, Brisson translates Solon’s explanation: 
“…Now this [story of Phaethon] has the form of a myth, but really signifies a parallax of the bodies moving in the 
heavens around the earth…” (Tim. 22c3-d3). It is notable that Brisson’s examples here are not myths of Plato’s own 
invention, and also that they both concern cosmology rather than the Forms. One is left questioning whether Brisson’s 
conclusions hold regarding myths about the Forms or eschatological myths—and I argue throughout this and the 
following sections that they do not. 
45 E.g., Burnyeat (2009) 177, Most (2012) 17, Collobert et al. (2012) 1. 
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related. A return to the division of topics of myths, which I referenced in the previous section, is 
thus required. When it comes to historical myths, those that are said to have taken place in the 
distant past, it seems clear that Brisson’s argument is correct: there can be no form of verification 
of such myths. Similarly, when it comes to gods, daemons, and heroes,46 these are topics outside 
of the realm of human knowledge. However, there does not seem to be as clear a reason for making 
the same claim about the Forms or about the immortal soul. Certainly, whatever the immortal soul 
might experience while not in a human body would be outside the realm of human experience—
by definition. But this does not necessarily mean that the mere fact that the soul is immortal would 
be outside the realm of human knowledge, at least for Socrates, because the immortality of the 
soul may be accessible to the intellect in the same way that knowledge of the Forms is. 
Even if such knowledge is not attainable, a new issue arises to challenge Brisson’s 
argument: if knowledge that the soul is immortal is not attainable, then how could any discourse 
about the immortality of the soul produce such knowledge? It would seem that if a myth about the 
immortality of the soul is unverifiable discourse, then a propositional argument about the 
immortality of the soul will also be unverifiable discourse. For the moment, we can remain 
agnostic as to which of these perspectives it will be best to adopt. I will argue throughout this 
dissertation that Plato believes that knowledge of the mere fact that the soul is immortal is 
accessible to human beings,47 even though knowledge of the experiences of a discarnate soul is 
                                                 
46 Here Brisson makes clear that although he himself is referring to these entities by classification for the ease of 
understanding, each of Plato’s references are to “proper names… Hence they do not refer to concepts (‘gods, heroes, 
etc.’) but to individuals (‘Zeus, Oedipus, etc.’)” (22). 
47 This is suggested not only in Phaedo, when Socrates claims to have “proven” the immortality of the soul in both 
the Cyclical/Recollection Argument and the Final Argument (77c6-7, 77d5), but also in Phaedrus, where Socrates 
gives a “proof” (ἀπόδειξις) of the immortality of the soul (245c5-246a2). Presumably, if the immortality of the soul 
can be proven by a human being, it can also be known by a human being. 
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not accessible to human beings.48 For now, however, I wish only to point out that if what makes 
discourse on a topic unverifiable is its subject-matter’s relationship to human cognitive ability, 
then we must understand that any discourse on a given topic, whether in mythological or 
propositional language, will have the same verifiable or unverifiable status.49 
 
1.1.4  Myth as Truth-Evaluable 
Regardless of whether Plato believes that the soul’s immortality is within the realm of 
knowledge available to human beings, there must still be a fact about the matter: the soul either is 
immortal, or it is not. And the fact that the soul is immortal—or, perhaps, the fact that the soul is 
not immortal—is in no way affected by the human cognitive ability to apprehend it—or not. This 
is the distinction that I believe Brisson and others have overlooked: ‘the soul is immortal’ is not a 
verifiable proposition because human beings cannot verify it; however ‘the soul is immortal’ is a 
truth-evaluable proposition because there is a true fact of the matter, even though human beings 
cannot know the fact. Brisson’s argument that myth is unverifiable is an epistemological one, 
wholly separate from the ontological fact of the soul’s immortality. It is thus critical to note that 
even if we believe the proposition ‘the soul is immortal’ to be unverifiable—and again, it is not 
clear that Socrates believes it to be unverifiable—there is still a fact that determines the truth or 
                                                 
48 This assertion may not be as opposed to Brisson’s argument as it may seem, although he is silent on the subject. His 
claim that “there cannot be a definitive description of the soul in all its immortality” (24) may leave open the possibility 
that he thinks there can be a definitive description of the soul—full stop—which would include at least the mere fact 
of its immortality. 
49 Because this principle holds for all types of discourse, it holds for all types of myth. ‘Historical’ and ‘traditional’ 
myths will be verifiable or unverifiable based on their subject-matter, not based on their mythological language. 
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falsity of this proposition. And the existence of that fact makes the proposition ‘the soul is 
immortal’ truth-evaluable.50 
There are many instances in which Socrates claims that his myths are true,51 and scholars 
have gone to great lengths in order to understand what Socrates means by such claims. Scholars 
like Smith are willing to accept Socrates’ characterization of some myths as ‘true,’ arguing that by 
this, Socrates means that a good myth-maker makes his myths “as closely in accord with the truth 
as possible.”52 Trabattoni makes an even stronger claim, since he believes that Socrates uses myth 
to express what might not be able to be expressed in literal, propositional language: “If ‘telling the 
truth’ means, as in the abovementioned passage ([Phdr.] 247c), ‘speaking about truth’, i.e., 
somehow describing the world above us, and whose realities are true, then the hierarchy between 
myth and logos must be reversed, and this time the myth is set to gain the upper hand” (312-3). 
Others such as Burnyeat think the question of whether such myths are true is somewhat 
nonsensical, claiming that we are “able to judge (krinai) not whether what the speaker says is true, 
but whether they are using the appropriate methods of inquiry and giving the right sorts of 
explanation” (177, ital. in original). Burnyeat takes a view closer to Brisson’s, on which the only 
way to understand Plato’s myths as being true is to understand the word “true” to have some sort 
of alternate meaning. 
These authors have articulated some limitations of many types of Plato’s myths: when 
confronted with a historical myth, we can judge it only by whether it seems to ‘accord with the 
                                                 
50 The concept of truth-evaluability is generally taken to rely on the idea of a hypothetical ‘perfect knower’ or 
something similar. Humanity has never seen a perfect knower, so the concept of truth-evaluability is in no way tied 
up with human cognitive ability. An omniscient god, for instance, would be a perfect knower, and so would be able 
to determine the truth or falsity of the proposition ‘the soul is immortal.’ 
51 E.g., Gorgias 523a, 524a-b; Phaedrus 245c, 247c. 
52 1986, 33. 
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truth as much as possible,’ and when confronted with discourse about what is beyond the realm of 
human knowledge, we can judge it only by the appropriateness of its methods and explanations. 
However, the question remains as to whether the immortality of the soul falls into the latter 
category for Plato. In Chapter 2, I will argue that the immortality of the soul is not beyond the 
realm of human knowledge for Plato, even though the details about what the soul experiences after 
death are. Any discourse about the experiences of the discarnate soul, then, cannot be expected to 
be accompanied by complete certainty. Such discourse can, however, as Brisson and Burnyeat 
suggest, be subject to some kind of evaluation based on whether it gives “the right sorts of 
explanation” (Burnyeat), and on whether it is in “conformity with the philosopher’s discourse on 
the intelligible forms” (Brisson 1996 [2004], 25). I would like to note once again that Brisson and 
Burnyeat’s explanations for what kinds of truth can be found in myth would apply equally to any 
other type of discourse on an unknowable topic.53 However, they have also pointed to a way that 
the subject-matter of some myths might be found to be knowable and therefore verifiable. If a 
myth about the soul is supported by “the philosopher’s discourse on the intelligible forms”—that 
is, on what Socrates calls in Phaedo the surest and highest principles54—then there will be a 
method for evaluating the truth of the myth even for those who do not accept the myth as true by 
itself. The intellectual support provided by knowledge of the Forms is a firm enough foundation 
for declaring a myth to be ‘true,’ even for those who think that the truth of a myth cannot be 
evaluated in a more traditional manner. 
While those like Brisson and Burnyeat hesitate to say myths have a truth-value because of 
their subject-matters, others hesitate because they view myth as non-literal discourse, and they 
                                                 
53 They would also hold for other types of myth, such as ‘historial’ or ‘traditional’ myths. 
54 I discuss this at length in Chapters 2.3 and 3.2. 
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believe it is difficult or impossible to classify non-literal discourse as true or false. Two points of 
interpretation motivate this concern: the claim that myth is indeed allegorical or at least non-literal, 
and the claim that non-literal language lacks a truth-value. As to the first of these, many scholars 
reject the idea that Plato intends his myths to be taken allegorically,55 and Plato himself gives us 
good reason to think this in both Phaedrus and Republic. When Phaedrus asks Socrates whether 
he has been persuaded that the Boreas myth is true (σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθῃ ἀληθὲς εἶναι; 
229c5)—that is, whether the traditional myth can be taken at its word—Socrates replies that it 
would be a waste of time to disbelive the traditional myth (ἀπιστέω, 229c6) and to look for an 
allegorical explanation, because he would need to do so for everything else: “if someone, 
disbelieving these things, brings each nearer to what is likely, as if consulting some rustic wisdom, 
there will be need for him to have a lot of leisure” (αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς 
ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει, 229e2-4).56 Instead, he 
thinks it best to be persuaded by the traditional, literal interpretation (πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ 
περὶ αὐτῶν, 230a2) and to instead look into his own nature (σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ᾽ ἐμαυτόν, 230a3). 
Here Socrates seems to indicate that it is a waste of time to seek allegorical interpretations of 
traditional myths, at least until we know ourselves (where ‘knowing oneself’ must mean something 
like knowing one’s own nature as a soul that happens to currently be embodied). Since Socrates 
believes we should not look for allegorical interpretations of myths that he will not call true, there 
is even less reason for thinking we should look for allegorical interpretations of myths that Socrates 
claims are true. Socrates takes a similar attitude toward traditional myths in Republic, where he 
                                                 
55 E.g., Edelstein (1949) 481, Pieper (2011 [1965]), Stewart (1960), Naddaf (2009), Dixsaut (2012). 
56 Cf. 229d: “I believe such [allegorical interpretations] are neat in other ways, but they are for a man [who is] overly 
clever and toilsome and not entirely fortunate” (ἐγὼ δέ … ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ 
ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός, Phdr. 229d2-4) 
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rejects many traditional myths because they tell lies about the gods and heroic men. Here again we 
see Socrates taking a literal interpretation of myth, and in so doing, rejecting any non-literal 
interpretations that might make these myths seem allegorical instead of blasphemous.57 
Despite these instances where Socrates rejects allegorical interpretations of traditional 
myths, we might still think he would allow for allegorical interpretations of the myths he creates 
himself. But this depends entirely on what we take ‘allegorical’ to mean. It may be of note that 
there are many passages in Plato that are widely accepted by today’s scholars as ‘myths,’ and only 
one passage that is widely accepted as an ‘allegory’: the so-called Allegory of the Cave at Republic 
514a-18b. In this passage, Socrates describes human beings at various stages of developing the 
ability to gaze at the sun, which he explicitly explains is an allegory for the average human being’s 
lack of ability to contemplate and apprehend the truth. Plato, however, does not refer to this image 
of people in a cave as an “ἀλληγορία,” nor does he use the term anywhere else in the Platonic 
corpus,58 so we might wonder what features this ‘allegory’ has that make us want to distinguish it 
from Plato’s myths. The general consensus among today’s scholars is that the meaning of an 
allegory is not conveyed literally, but must be interpreted as having a referent that is not directly 
stated. As G. Naddaf explains, “to compose allegorically is to construct a work so that its apparent 
sense refers to an ‘other’ sense. To interpret allegorically…is to explain a work as if there is an 
                                                 
57 Another concern for Socrates in this discussion, of course, is that such stories set a poor example for young or 
uneducated people: “For this reason one must stop such myths, lest they produce a great proneness toward vice in our 
youths” (ἕνεκα παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις πονηρίας, Rep. 
391e12-92a1). This is in part because young people are impressionable and not yet able to determine whether a myth 
might be better interpreted in a non-literal way: “a young person is not able to judge that [a myth has] a deeper meaning 
or not” (ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, 378d7-8). However, the overriding concern at this 
moment seems to be that the citizens of the Kallipolis do not wind up with a “true lie” (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, 382a) in their 
soul—the type of lie that gives one a fundamental misconception about what truly is, rather than the type that, e.g., 
leads them to believe their people are autochthonous—which a young person would wind up with if they are taught 
to believe that the best beings are not virtuous.  
58 Brandwood’s A Word Index to Plato (1976) confirms this. 
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‘other’ sense to it.”59 An allegory, then, displays a mis-match between its literal wording and the 
meaning it is intended to convey; what it means is something other than what it says. A myth, on 
the other hand, may not be literally true, particularly in its details, but its meaning is conveyed in 
what it says: “the strictly mythical story…does not refer to anything else; it concerns itself 
exclusively with something expressed directly in the story itself—no matter how unattainable and 
unfathomable this may be for human reason.”60 Myth says what it means; allegory means 
something else in what it says. So to take an allegorical interpretation of a myth by searching for 
meaning outside of what the myth actually says would be to misunderstand the meaning of the 
myth. 
This is not to say that every single detail of a myth should be taken literally, and Socrates 
cautions us against doing so just after telling the Phaedo myth. Socrates’ myth begins with an 
explanation of the shape, regions, and characteristics of the earth, including the geography of 
Hades, with its various lakes, rivers, and plains. The latter part of the myth explains how the souls 
of those who have died are judged and travel to various places in Hades to receive punishments 
and purifications in preparation for their next reincarnation. After explaining all this in a rather 
detailed way, Socrates concludes: 
To affirm these things confidently in exactly the way I have explained is not proper 
to a man having reason; but indeed [to affirm] these things or such things about our 
souls… seems proper to me. 
τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν 
ἔχοντι ἀνδρί: ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν… τοῦτο 
καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ. (114d1-3, 4-5) 
 
A full analysis of this passage and its implications will be given in section 3.1.5, so for now, some 
preliminary remarks must suffice. Socrates says here that he cannot affirm that what he has said in 
                                                 
59 111. 
60 Pieper 2011 [1965], 15 
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the myth is exactly correct; still, something along the lines of what he has said—"these things or 
such things”—is proper to believe. The implication is that Socrates will not affirm the details of 
the myth, such as the exact geography of Hades or the exact amount of time a soul might spend 
being purified, but that in broad strokes, what Socrates has said is true. Socrates is confident that, 
if nothing else, vicious or slightly corrupted souls are treated differently than pure, philosophical 
souls, and that pure, philosophical souls have a chance at a blessed existence full of communion 
with the gods, contemplation, and knowledge. In essence, the truth of the myth lies not in its details 
but in its underlying structure.61 It doesn’t matter whether the myth gets the geography of Hades 
correct as long as it conveys the point that different souls fare different fates in Hades. The myth 
is still not meant to be understood allegorically, because its literal subject-matter—the fate of the 
soul after death—is also its true subject-matter. However, some interpretation is required because 
Socrates is attempting to describe in material terms what an immaterial soul experiences. 
While allegorical or non-literal statements such as myth are not truth-evaluable in exactly 
the same way as literal statements, non-literal discourse can still make true or false claims by 
providing an accurate (or not) comparison, allegory, image, etc. of its subject-matter.62 This is 
easiest to see in terms of a basic metaphor: ‘the heart is a pump’ is true in a way that ‘the heart is 
a hammer’ is not. Similarly, a myth can be a true likeness of its subject-matter, or it can be a false 
(inaccurate) likeness.63 For instance, in Republic, Socrates condemns many traditional myths as 
                                                 
61 I will argue in sections 2.4 and 3.1.5 that the details of the myth are not essential to the myth in the sense that they 
could be replaced by different details without changing the truth-value or the underlying structure of the myth. Still, 
some details—even if they are interchangeable with other details—are necessary in order for the myth to keep its 
mythological character, as I argue in sections 4.4 and 5.1. 
62 Cf. Smith 1985; Burnyeat 2009; Fowler 2011; Collobert et al. 2012; Trabbatoni 2012. 
63 Even Brisson seems open to this idea: if, as he says, “false discourse gives an unfaithful image of the reality which 
it claims to depict,” then, presumably, true discourse gives a faithful image (2004 [1996] 21). Cf. Gottfried (1993): 
“myths, like the objects of sense perceptions, can be either more or less accurate copies of the divine truth which they 
imitate” (195). 
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false stories (μῦθοι ψευδεῖς), by which he means “whenever someone makes an image badly in 
speech of what is—what sorts of things gods and heroes are—just as if a painter painted likenesses 
not at all like the things he wished to paint” (ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ, περὶ θεῶν τε 
καὶ ἡρώων οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι, 377e1-
3). And in Phaedrus, Socrates indicates that giving an image of what something is like is a form 
of explanation particularly appropriate for human beings—that is, for those of us whose cognitive 
abilities are limited by our human capacities: 
About its deathlessness, enough; regarding the form of [the soul] it is to be said in 
this way: what sort of thing it is would be entirely and in every way divine and a 
long exposition, but [to say] to what it is like [would be] within human capability 
and shorter. Let us then speak in this way. Let it be like the combined power of a 
charioteer and yoke of winged horses.  
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς: περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς ὧδε λεκτέον. οἷον 
μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν,64 
ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος: ταύτῃ οὖν λέγωμεν. ἐοικέτω δὴ συμφύτῳ δυνάμει 
ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. (246a3-7)  
 
Discourse that gives an image of its subject-matter, whether an accurate or inaccurate image, does 
seem to be truth-evaluable, both in contemporary thought and for Socrates. And if such discourse 
gives an accurate image, the discourse can be said to be true, even if it is non-literal discourse. As 
Collobert et al. write, “myth possesses a truth content that makes it an object of interpretation.”65 
And considering that Socrates sometimes says either that his myths are true or that he believes 
                                                 
64 Many readers will immediately think of the εἰκώς μῦθος and εἰκώς λόγος of Timaeus. While the εἰκώς of the 
Timaeus and the ἔοικα used here are linguistically connected—εἰκώς being a participial form of ἔοικα—we do not 
necessarily have reason to import the complications of Timaeus into this passage. The distinction (or connection) 
Socrates draws here is not between μῦθος and λόγος, nor between what is (merely) likely and what can be proven, but 
between ways of attempting to speak about the soul. Socrates does not think he can describe the Form of the Soul, but 
he does believe he can say “to what it is like,” i.e., he can give a likeness of the soul in an image. See Burnyeat (2009) 
for a particularly comprehensive discussion of how to interpret εἰκώς in Timaeus. 
65 (1). 
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them to be true,66 there seem to be many good reasons to understand his mythological discourse 
as truth-evaluable. 
 
 
1.1.5  Myth as Argument 
Returning to the characterization of myth popularized by Brisson, we should note that his 
argument overlooks the idea that myth can be truth-evaluable even if it is not verifiable. He instead 
moves directly from the claim that myth is unverifiable to the claim that myth is therefore “non[-
]argumentative discourse” (2004 [1996], 25). He takes myth to be “a narrative” (or “narrative 
discourse”), as opposed to “argumentative discourse,” that “relates events as they are supposed to 
have happened,” and whose “sole aim, at least on the surface is to realize, through the intermediary 
of the story maker or teller an emotive fusion between the intended audience and the hero of the 
narrative” (2004 [1996], 25). While this characterization of myth as a plot-driven narrative seems 
to describe many of the traditional myths of Plato’s time, and even the ‘historical’ myths of Plato’s 
own invention such as that in Timaeus, it does not seem at all an apt description Socrates’ 
eschatological myths. Brisson notes specifically that this opposition between narrative and 
argument makes sense only in a “philosophical context,” yet it seems rather that in the context of 
Plato’s philosophy, this distinction breaks down quite quickly. Eschatological myths such as those 
in Phaedo and Phaedrus do not “relate events as they are supposed to have happened” or aim to 
create an “emotive fusion” between their hero and the audience. They are in some sense ‘timeless’ 
                                                 
66 E.g., Gorgias 523a, 524a-b; Phaedrus 245c, 247c. 
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myths, where the precise point of the myth is not that there is some one hero, but that everyone 
will be in the position of the soul described in the myth when the body dies. In fact, as I will argue 
in Chapter 2.4, Socrates’ eschatological myths sound much more like a form of how Brisson 
characterizes argumentative discourse: discourse that “follows a rational order (regardless of how 
reason is defined).”67  While it is true that Brisson also understands argumentative discourse to be 
“constructed on the model of mathematics, according to rules aiming to make the conclusion 
necessary,” no form of discourse could meet such a requirement when its subject-matter is beyond 
the realm of human knowledge. This does not mean that myth cannot be argumentative, but rather 
that no form of discourse about the soul will have a necessary conclusion deduced with the rigor 
of mathematics. If the myth in Phaedo, for example, is inherently non-argumentative discourse, 
then so are the propositional arguments that precede it. But if the propositional arguments about 
the immortality of the soul can rightly be called ‘arguments,’ Brisson has yet to provide a reason 
for thinking the myth can’t also be an argument. 
Now, what can properly be called an ‘argument’ is largely field- and context-dependent. 
The types of premises and conclusions permitted in an ethical argument, for instance, will 
generally not be of the same sort that are permitted in mathematics, or in casual conversation with 
a friend. Regardless of context, however, there are two basic elements that characterize something 
as an argument: an assertion (or conclusion) and reasons for making that assertion (or premises).68 
I will take these to be the minimum requirements for an argument regardless of context, and will 
return to this characterization of an argument for further refinement in Section 1.1.3 below. 
                                                 
67 Brisson (1996 [2004]) 25. 
68 McKeon 2019. 
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Many other scholars, following Brisson, have also argued that myth cannot be 
argumentative discourse. For instance, Morgan sees Plato’s myths as based on axiomata that are 
provided in dialectical or rigorous philosophical inquiry, yet she thinks these myths are 
complementary to arguments rather than arguments in themselves.69 She characterizes Plato’s 
myths as “a kind of philosophical shorthand and the discourse which represents philosophy’s 
culmination.”70 Similarly, Johnson sees the Myth of Er in particular as a conclusion to the 
argument of Republic, but not as an argument on its own. Rowe gives a bit more credit to Plato’s 
myths because he thinks they re-state Socrates’ dialectic arguments in rhetorically different ways. 
He believes that while a perfectly rational soul—not that there could be such a thing—might not 
need any rhetorical strategies to fully comprehend dialectical arguments, Plato’s myths help our 
imperfect souls to understand them by presenting the same information in another way.71 While I 
believe these scholars are right to view Plato’s myths as related to his dialectical arguments, I 
intend to show that the way they are related is by creating their own arguments based on hypotheses 
provided by propositional arguments. 
Burnyeat alone seems to understand Plato’s myths as discrete arguments, but this is not the 
focus of his study, so he does not give an explicit account of how to understand myth as argument. 
He calls myth an “argument” in passing, and he sometimes characterizes them as beginning from 
hypotheses.72 In addition, Burnyeat believes that Plato wanted myths to be judged in much the 
                                                 
69 Morgan (2000) 208, 239, 204, 209. 
70 Morgan (2000) 185. 
71 Rowe (2012) 144. Destrée (2012) has a similar view, that myths are “maybe primarily aimed at emotionally touching 
their audience, and therefore… primarily addressed to the irrational part of our soul. But contrary to most traditional 
interpretations that tend to oppose myths to arguments, I agree that myths are part and parcel of the whole argument 
that is also a sort of myth, because arguments are not intended solely for the sake of understanding” (111-2). 
72 For his use of “argument,” see 175. Characterizations of myths as beginning from hypotheses can be found at 175, 
177-8, 181, and 185. Burnyeat characterizes Timaeus’ μῦθος as “a number of statements standing to each other in 
some logical relation” that differs from necessary accounts in its “argumentative rigor” (176, ital. in original). 
Furthermore, Burnyeat claims that Timaeus’ account “aims to be appropriately argued” (177). 
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same way that one would judge the validity of an argument, saying that he “want[s] to celebrate 
Plato’s insight that reasoning which lacks the rigor of mathematical proof or Parmenidean logic 
may nonetheless have standards of its own by which it can be judged to succeed or fail.”73 A few 
scholars have also noted that, similar to basing an argument on a hypothesis, many of Plato’s myths 
are based on hypotheses that he has presented or argued for in propositional language such as 
dialectic (Morgan, Burnyeat, Trabattoni); however, these scholars tend to mention this fact only 
in passing, and have not sought to understand the full implications of this for the argumentative 
capacity of myths. Morgan, for instance, says that “Myth has … an association with the hypotheses 
that must be subjected to rational inquiry at the beginning of the philosophical enterprise,” but she 
does not investigate this ‘association’ further (239, emphasis mine).74 Trabattoni makes a similarly 
vague claim: “The truth of the myth is linked to the truth of the dialectic demonstration whence 
the myth draws its thrust, it being understood that this very truth is not completely beyond doubt” 
(321, emphasis mine). While these scholars seem to understand some of Plato’s myths as 
argumentative, none have yet to give an explicit account of how this is so and which myths might 
qualify. By examining the structure, demonstrative status, and persuasive function of Socrates’ 
myth in Phaedo, and through a brief comparison with other eschatological myths of his, I hope to 
make just such an account. 
 
                                                 
73 Burnyeat (2009) 177. 
74 Morgan perhaps shows a willingness to conceive of the Phaedo myth as an argument when she writes, “This account 
[the Phaedo myth], then, is introduced by a conditional that marks it as a consequence of belief in immortality” (2000, 
197). 
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1.2 Review of the Current Literature on Arguments in Phaedo 
1.2.1  Delineation of the Arguments 
When it comes to scholarly commentary on argumentation in the Phaedo, the vast majority 
of scholars are concerned only with the so-called Four Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul. 
These arguments are commonly delineated and titled in the following or in a similar fashion:75 
 
The Cyclical Argument (70c-72e): Argues that opposites come from opposites, 
thus there is a process of coming to be opposite. These processes must balance each 
other out, or else everything would be dead. Therefore, since dying and coming 
back to life are opposite processes, and not everything is dead, souls must come 
back to life. 
The Argument from Recollection (72e-78b): Argues that because when we see 
examples of so-called equal things in the world, we recollect The Equal Itself (i.e., 
the Form of Equal), we must have prior knowledge of The Equal Itself—which, 
because we did not gain this knowledge during life in the sensible world, must have 
been learned by us before we were born (i.e., the soul must exist prior to its 
embodiment). 
                                                 
75 I am here using the names and Stephanus numbers from a source widely available to even an inexpert audience, 
Connolly’s article on Phaedo from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. However, the same or quite similar names 
for these same arguments (with sometimes just slightly different Stephanus citations) can be found in, e.g., the 
commentaries of Bluck (1955), Hackforth (1955), Gallop (1975), Bostock (1986), and Rowe (1993), as well as in 
numerous articles on any of these arguments. 
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The Affinity Argument (78b-84b): Argues that there are two types of being: that 
of the Forms, and that of particulars in the sensible world. Because soul is more 
like the Forms in being invisible, non-composite, and always the same, it must also 
be like the Forms in being everlasting and deathless. 
The Final Argument (102b-107b): Argues that something that has an innate 
feature will always flee or be destroyed when the opposite of its innate feature 
approaches. Because an innate feature of soul is life, and the opposite of life is 
death, soul must flee or be destroyed upon the approach of death. However, soul 
cannot admit of death without ceasing to be soul (since one of its innate features is 
life), and what cannot admit of death is indestructible, therefore soul must be 
indestructible. 
 
Scholars are certainly not wrong to pick these four arguments out as the main arguments 
in Phaedo, nor are they wrong to say that these are all arguments for the immortality of the soul. 
However, as I will argue in Chapters 2 and 3, focusing on these arguments without also examining 
their relationship to the other arguments in the dialogue—those that do not argue for the 
immortality of the soul—does not allow one to fully understand the overall argumentative structure 
of the Phaedo. However, since this is the overwhelmingly prevailing approach to the 
argumentative structure of the dialogue,76 my discussion throughout Chapter 1 will follow this 
lead, until I can explain in Chapter 2 why I believe a more nuanced view is required. 
                                                 
76 Of course, commentators do not entirely ignore the sections of the dialogue beyond these four arguments for 
immortality. I mean only that when discussing “the arguments” of the dialogue, or when discussing its overall 
argumentative structure, what comes before and after these four arguments is largely ignored. For instance, the myth 
that follows the Final Argument is often discussed either on its own terms or in relation to the Final Argument alone, 
without reference to the earlier arguments (cite). In addition, there are two arguments that precede the four for 
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1.2.2  Issues Raised by The Arguments 
One of the main foci of modern commentators is the validity of Socrates’ arguments for 
immortality. This may well be because only one of the arguments in the dialogue, the Final 
Argument, is not refuted (or attempted to be refuted) by one or more of Socrates’ interlocutors. 
The question then naturally arises: why would Plato have Socrates voice three prior arguments that 
he knows full well are invalid? Methods to address this concern generally take either the approach 
of finding ways to read the arguments as valid,77 or at least stronger than Socrates’ interlocutors 
make them seem,78 or else claiming that the four arguments need not be valid, since Socrates’ four 
arguments are meant to work more on a rhetorical level than an intellectual one.79 The latter 
approach may be exemplified by Plass, who argues that “as a dialectician [Socrates] is perhaps 
more responsive to the practical needs of persuasion than to the demands of logic, and his 
reasoning especially in the earlier dialogues is often very informal.”80 However, determining 
                                                 
immortality: one arguing that one should not kill oneself (61d-2e), and one arguing that the philosopher should have 
great hope when faced with death, because he will gain true and full knowledge once he has reached the afterlife (63e-
67c). The first of these is generally characterized as mere “opening” or “preliminary” conversation (Bluck, Bostock, 
Gallop, Rowe), while the second is often called something like “Socrates’ Defense” (Bostock, Gallop), since Socrates 
jokes before the argument that he will try to give a better defense of the idea that the philosopher should not fear death 
than he did to the Athenian jury at his recent trial. Commentators have certainly raised interesting points regarding 
these two earlier arguments (see esp. Bostock’s discussion of the immortal soul, 21-41), but do not take them to have 
any bearing on the overall argumentative structure of the dialogue. 
77 E.g., Dorter (1977) for the Cyclical Argument; Osei (2001) for the Recollection Argument; Apolloni (1996) for the 
Affinity Argument, Denyer (2007) and Frede (1978) for the Final Argument. 
78 This approach is taken with the Affinity Argument in particular, because of it is an argument from analogy rather 
than a deductive argument—although Apolloni (1996) has recently argued that the argument can be understood as a 
deductive one. An in-depth discussion of approaches to this argument are given in Chapters 2.2.2 and 3.1.3. 
79 There is also the approach of Gallop, who argues that the four arguments are “a developing sequence” in which “the 
earlier arguments are criticized, refined, or superseded, until Socrates’ belief in immortality is finally vindicated” 
(103). 
80 Plass 1960, 107. 
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whether Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul are in any way valid is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, and has no implications for my thesis either way. 
The argument of Socrates’ that has the most implications for this dissertation—and the 
argument that is often taken to be, if not valid, at least his strongest—is the Final Argument. The 
Final Argument has attracted much scholarly attention over the years for a number of reasons. 
Socrates seems to believe the Final Argument is conclusive,81 because he claims to have proven 
with the argument that the soul is immortal (77c6-7, 77d5), and because he gives no more 
arguments afterward for the immortality of the soul. In addition, the Final Argument relies 
explicitly on the Hypothesis of the Forms, so Socrates’ introduction of the Forms and of the 
Method of Hypothesis82 in general, just prior to the Final Argument, seems to give readers a much 
richer context in which to interpret the Final Argument than we have for the prior arguments. 
Finally, the Final Argument is followed immediately by the myth in the dialogue, so many scholars 
have examined what connections there might be between the Final Argument and the Myth 
(discussed in section 1.2.3 below). Thus the position of the Final Argument in the dialogue, just 
after Socrates discusses the Method of Hypothesis and the Hypothesis of the Forms, and just before 
he tells a myth about what happens to the immortal soul in the afterlife, has attracted more scholarly 
attention than the validity of the argument. 
Socrates introduces the Method of Hypothesis by explaining that earlier in his life, he was 
searching for the “form of the cause” of things (τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος, 100b3-4). He then began 
hypothesizing that the Forms exist, and from there, supposed that each particular thing is made, 
                                                 
81 Cf. Frede 1978, 3. 
82 As I argue in Sections 2.3 and 3.2, each of Socrates’ four arguments for the immortality of the soul relies on the 
Hypothesis of the Forms, and thus on the Method of Hypothesis more generally. However, it is only in the Final 
Argument that Socrates gives his reasons for doing so. 
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e.g., beautiful because of the Beautiful Itself.83 There is much controversy over what Socrates 
means by αἰτία here,84 and over whether Socrates’ characterization of the Forms in Phaedo 
implicates them in the Third Man Argument.85 However, there does seem to be a prevailing 
consensus that, if nothing else, Socrates’ shift earlier in life to the Method of Hypothesis is a shift 
from explaining worldly phenomena via definitions to explaining them via reasons for their being 
the way they are, i.e., causes.86 This allows Socrates to argue, in the Final Argument, that it is the 
Form of Soul that causes life, and because it cannot admit of the opposite of life, death, the Form 
of Soul causes each individual soul to be ever-living and everlasting. This is the first of Socrates’ 
arguments for the immortality of the soul that relies on a notion of Forms as causes (the other 
arguments rely on other qualities of the Forms, but do not require them to be causes), so another 
reason that Socrates may think his Final Argument to be the most decisive is because he makes 
clear just before the argument how Forms are the only appropriate answer to the question of why 
things are the way they are.  
 
1.2.3  The Relationship between The Arguments and The Myth 
The relationship between Socrates’ myth and the four arguments for the immortality of the 
soul in Phaedo has long been a topic of debate. The main contention is between scholars who see 
the myth (or Socrates’ myths generally) as capable of having a function—on the intellectual 
                                                 
83 This is a very condensed explanation of Socrates’ story; a fuller discussion is given in Chapter 3.2. 
84 Most scholars attempt to map Socrates’ meaning of αἰτία here onto one or more of Aristotle’s Four Causes. See 
especially Vlastos (1989 [1969]), Taylor (1998 [1969]), and Sedley (1998). 
85 See in particular Sedley (1998). 
86 E.g., Matthews and Blackson (1989), Vlastos (1989 [1969]). 
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level—that Socrates’ arguments do not, and those who deny that this is possible. There is a general 
consensus that Socrates’ myth is intended to be persuasive, but some deny that this persuasion can 
work in a rational manner, on the level of the intellect.87 Rather, they believe that Plato’s myths 
are intended to work on the lower parts of the soul, similarly to how his rational arguments (i.e., 
dialectic) are intended to work on the higher, rational part of the soul. Hitchcock, along with 
Brisson, emphasizes the benefit of appealing to the lower parts of the soul as a way of reinforcing 
the knowledge one has gained through dialectic: “[Myths’] vivid presentation of a possible detailed 
working out of these principles [i.e., the implications of the soul’s immortality] acts as a charm or 
incantation for the soul, which supplements the charm exercised by rational argument. In this 
respect Platonic myth is not an independent access to reality but a means of reinforcing what 
Plato’s hearers have already been persuaded by argument to believe.”88 Edelstein makes a similar 
argument, claiming that both the rational and irrational parts of the soul are the purview of the 
philosopher: “the ethical myth [such as that in Phaedo] is rooted in man's irrational nature, and it 
cannot be banished from philosophy because both these parts of the human soul must be equally 
tended by the philosopher” (474). Somewhat similarly, Trabattoni believes that the function of 
myth is to vividly describe the metaphysical reality of something whose existence Socrates has 
argued for in propositional language, such as the immortal, discarnate soul. 
However, it is difficult to see how myth could be working only on a non-rational level, 
considering that Socrates occasionally characterizes myths as “proofs,”89 and that, as Rowe has 
argued, no type of discourse—even mythological discourse—can directly address the non-rational 
parts of the soul. It is true, as Hitchcock and others have noted, that Socrates refers to the Phaedo 
                                                 
87 E.g., Edelstein (1949), Hitchcock (1973), Brisson (2004 [1996]), and Trabattoni (2012). 
88 Hitchcock (1973) ii-iii. 
89 Phaedrus 245b-c; Phaedo 77c6-7, 77d5. 
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myth as a “charm,”90 but it is also true that mythological discourse is still discourse, and it would 
seem to need to be taken in through the intellect in some way in order to have a charming effect at 
all. This notion, and the idea that many of Plato’s myths have a philosophical character,91 motivate 
those such as Rowe (1999), as well as Partenie and Morgan, to claim that “a sense of the 
‘fictionality’ of human utterance, as provisional, inadequate, and at best approximating to the truth, 
will infect Platonic writing at its deepest level, below…the distinction between mythical and non-
mythical forms of discourse” (265). Whatever complications mythological discourse brings with 
it are not so different from the complications any other form of discourse brings. Philosophical 
discourse encourages reflection by its very nature, which, Morgan argues, is why philosophical 
myths are no less efficacious than other types of philosophical discourse: “philosophical myth 
achieves its intellectual power by encouraging methodological reflection and self-consciousness 
about the status of philosophical discourse” (164). Once we see this, Rowe argues, we will 
understand not “that ‘myth’ will fill in the gaps that reason leaves (though it might do that too, as 
well as serving special purposes for particular audiences), but that human reason itself ineradicably 
displays some of the features we characteristically associate with story-telling” (1999), 265-6. 
 
                                                 
90 This is discussed at length in section 4.4. 
91 Even some such as Edelstein admit to the philosophical importance of the myths: “Without the addition of a myth, 
some of the philosophical investigations would certainly not reach their goal” (1949, 466). 
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1.3 Definitions of Argument Types 
1.3.1  Argument 
Let us return momentarily to the rough definition of an argument that I gave in Section I 
for one further refinement. This definition was simply that an argument requires both a conclusion 
and one or more reasons for that conclusion (premises). Currently in the field of argument studies, 
one approach to refining this basic definition, which might be called a “pragmatic” approach, is to 
state specifically that the function of an argument is persuasion, so that a more complete definition 
of an argument would be: 
A collection of propositions is an argument if and only if there is a reasoner who 
puts forward some of them (the premises) as reasons in support of one of them (the 
conclusion) in order to rationally persuade92 an audience of the truth of the 
conclusion.93 
 
This definition has a two main advantages: it not only explains why arguments have the structure 
they do (that is, in order to persuade the audience), but it also helps to distinguish arguments from 
other types of discourse that may involve premises and conclusions, such as explanations and 
hypothetical investigations. It is the persuasive intent of an argument that differentiates it from 
these other types of discourse. 
One criticism of this definition, however, is that arguers may want to persuade their 
audiences to have, rather, any number of attitudes toward the conclusion of the argument, such as 
withholding assent from the conclusion (as in a reductio) or fearing that the conclusion is true. In 
                                                 
92 The motivation for saying “rationally persuade” is simply to rule out so-called non-rational persuasive forces, such 
as threats, from counting as arguments. 
93 McKeon (2019). 
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order to accommodate this seemingly valid criticism, I see no reason not to make a slight 
adaptation to the commonly accepted pragmatic definition:  
A collection of propositions is an argument if and only if there is a reasoner who 
puts forward some of them (the premises) as reasons in support of one of them (the 
conclusion) in order to rationally persuade an audience to have a certain attitude 
toward the conclusion. 
 
This refinement of the pragmatic definition retains its advantages while accommodating the idea 
that arguers are not always aiming to persuade their interlocutors to believe the conclusion to the 
argument at hand. 
 
1.3.2  Propositional Argument 
Using the definition of argument given just above in 1.3.1, I begin to argue in Section 2.4 
that the myth in Phaedo should be understood as an argument. In Sections 2.2.1 and 3.2, I also 
argue that one of the ‘preliminary’ arguments in Phaedo—one given before the four arguments for 
the immortality of the soul—must be taken into account in order to understand the overall 
argumentative structure of the Phaedo. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to all arguments given 
in non-mythological language, whether  one of the four for immortality or one of the ‘preliminary,’ 
as “propositional arguments.” By this, I simply mean that they are written in a form that is easily 
recognized as propositional, and I use the term merely to distinguish arguments written in 
propositional language from those written in mythological language.94 
                                                 
94 The term “propositional language” is, admittedly, not an ideal one, for myths, too, are written in language that is 
‘propositional,’ in at least one sense of the term. Most terms that one might be tempted to use to distinguish the 
language of Plato’s myths from that of his other arguments, such as ‘discursive’ or ‘argumentative,’ would be 
confusing in this context because one of my overall aims is to argue that Plato’s myths are argumentative, despite 
their mythological language. The terms “literal” and “non-literal” have also been suggested to mark the distinction 
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1.4 Structure of this Dissertation 
The fundamental aim of this dissertation is to show that the eschatological myths Socrates 
tells in Platonic dialogues, and the myth in Phaedo in particular, should not prima facie be 
dismissed as nonargumentative (and therefore inconsequential) to the argumentative structure of 
the dialogues. 
In Chapter 2, I make a case for understanding the myth of Phaedo as an argument by 
demonstrating its underlying argumentative structure. To do so, I use the Toulmin method of 
argument analysis, one that has become popular over the last fifty or so years in various fields for 
both constructing and analyzing informal arguments (2.2). I provide diagrams and outlines in 2.3 
of the propositions used both in the myth and in the other arguments of the Phaedo—including 
one of the ‘preliminary’ arguments. These diagrams make clear both the unproven assumptions 
underlying those premises and where Socrates expresses any level of probability or doubt about 
his arguments. I show in 2.4 that each argument in the dialogue leading up to the myth relies on 
the Hypothesis of the Forms, and then in 2.5, that because the myth uses the conclusion of the 
previous arguments—that the soul is immortal—as its hypothesis, the myth, too, ultimately rests 
on the Hypothesis of the Forms. 
Chapter 3 bolsters the argument begun in Chapter 2 by showing how the myth in Phaedo 
has a similar demonstrative status to some of the propositional arguments, strengthening the case 
that the myth should be thought of as an argument as well. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 argue that the 
demonstrative status Socrates assigns to each argument (including the myth) is determined by 
                                                 
between these types of discourse, but this, too, seems inadequate; Plato’s myths are literal to a great extent, even if 
they also involve elements that are non-literal, and this is something that distinguishes his myths from his allegories. 
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whether Socrates believes the argument can be proven, not by the type of discourse it uses (i.e., 
mythological or propositional). While two of the arguments in the dialogue are able to prove that 
the soul is immortal, at least according to Socrates, the other three contain details about what 
happens to the soul in the afterlife, details that cannot be proven. It is this feature, I argue, that 
determines whether discourse about the immortal soul can be proven: only the fact that the soul is 
immortal can be proven, while details about what happens to the soul after death are necessarily 
more speculative. The reason for this, discussed in 2.3 and 3.2, is that Socrates believes that the 
soul’s immortality follows directly from the Hypothesis of the Forms, his highest and most trusted 
Hypothesis. On the other hand, details about what happens to the soul after death follow from a 
lower Hypothesis, and thus cannot be considered proven. 
Having given reasons for understanding the Phaedo myth as an argument in terms of both 
its structure (Chapter 2) and its demonstrative abilities (Chapter 3), I turn in Chapter 4 to a 
discussion of the unique persuasive features of the myth that help to distinguish its function from 
those of the propositional arguments. While the myth shares some persuasive features with the 
propositional arguments (4.3), I argue that the myth persuades both in a rational way by giving 
greater reason to trust that the lower hypothesis that the soul is immortal, and also in a non-rational 
way by “charming away” the “fears” of those who hear it (4.4). Finally, section 4.5 examines why 
these persuasive functions are, within the dramatic setting of the dialogue, ultimately unsuccessful 
on Simmias and Cebes. 
Chapter 5 compares these findings briefly with myths of other Platonic dialogues, including 
the Myth of Er in Republic (5.1.1), the charioteer myth in Phaedrus (5.1.2), and the myth about 
the judgment of souls in Gorgias. While both the Myth of Er and the charioteer myth are largely 
consistent with my findings about the Phaedo myth, the myth in Gorgias has only some of the 
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thematic and argumentative features that can be found in the other eschatological myths (5.1.3). I 
suggest that one reason for this may be that the argumentative context of Gorgias differs from that 
of Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic because Socrates’ interlocutors are eager to disbelieve and 
refute him rather than take his arguments seriously. I conclude by suggesting that further study 
should be done into the argumentative functions of the myths in Phaedrus, Republic, and Gorgias, 
and that the results of such studies be used to generate a richer and more nuanced understanding 
of Socrates’ epistemological views.  
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Chapter 2 
In this chapter, I analyze the fundamental argumentative structure of each argument in 
Phaedo, as well as the fundamental argumentative structure of the myth. Using the Toulmin 
method of analysis, I provide diagrams that show the relationships among the propositions used in 
each argument, in order to call attention to the unproven assumptions, or hypotheses, underlying 
those premises (section 2.3). My analyses also make clear exactly where likelihood or probability 
enters each of Socrates’ arguments, which allows us to track the level of assurance Socrates claims 
to have in each proposition. In section 2.4, I show that each of Socrates’ arguments in the dialogue 
relies on the Hypothesis of the Forms as an unproven assumption, and I argue that each of Socrates’ 
arguments is meant to strengthen his interlocutors’ confidence not only in his claim that the soul 
is immortal, but also in the Hypothesis of the Forms itself. Finally (section 2.5), I provide a 
structural analysis of the myth in order to show the nuances of its relationship to Socrates’ other 
arguments and to the hypotheses on which it is based, in particular, the Hypothesis of the Forms. 
Throughout the chapter, I begin to elucidate both the rational, argumentative function of Socrates’ 
arguments and of the myth (discussed in depth in Chapter 3), as well as the persuasive functions 
of both types of argument (Chapter 4). 
2.1 A Note on Method: The Toulmin Model 
Since Aristotle’s time, philosophers and logicians have been analyzing arguments by 
classifying propositions as premises and conclusions, and by evaluating them as valid or invalid 
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based on certain criteria. For our present purposes, however, I want to focus not on the validity of 
Socrates’ arguments or on the mere identification and critique of their premises and conclusions; 
rather, the aim of this chapter is to analyze the relationships between Socrates’ various 
propositions (as well as their relationships to his conclusions), with particular attention to the 
unproven assumptions they rely on. This type of analysis will show that Socrates uses the 
hypothesis of the Form as an unproven assumption in each argument, and will elucidate where 
elements of likelihood or probability enter into each argument. Because my analyses will focus on 
the demonstrative status of each proposition and the dependence of various propositions on one 
another, I will be using the method of argument analysis first presented by Stephen E. Toulmin in 
1958 in The Uses of Argument. Although philosophers were initially resistant to this model when 
it was first introduced (Toulmin 2006), its success in other fields such as jurisprudence and 
psychology has, more recently, made those in other fields give it further consideration.95 An 
explanation of ‘The Toulmin Model’ is now “an obligatory chapter” in every textbook in speech 
communications, and in the sub-field of informal logic, Toulmin’s book has become “a post-war 
classic” (Hitchcock and Verheij 2006, 3). As I will show momentarily, the Toulmin Model has 
advantages over more traditional methods of argument analysis because it makes clearer both the 
relationships among premises and the types of justification that are necessary for accepting each 
premise. 
Toulmin’s method classifies the propositions of an argument into what he calls Claims, 
Data, and Warrants. A Claim is a conclusion, the Data are “the facts we appeal to as a foundation 
for the Claim,” while the Warrants are “general” statements that “can act as bridges” between Data 
                                                 
95 The Toulmin model has been used, e.g.,  to analyze multimodal arguments in scientific writing (Whithaus 2012), to 
teach “religious doubt” in the field of Theology (Horne 2008), and to analyze how people solve “ill-structured 
problems” (Voss 2006). 
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and Claims, so that we can say “‘Whenever [Data], one has found that [Claim]’ and ‘Whenever 
[Data], one may take it that [Claim].’”96 To take a rather classic example: 
 
Figure 1 
Here, the general proposition (Warrant) that “all men are mortal” allows us to infer, from the fact 
that Socrates is a man (Data), that he is also mortal (Claim). The Warrant acts as a bridge between 
the Data and the Claim, and it could do so for any number of other similar data and claims, such 
as bridging the Data that ‘Toulmin is a man’ and the Claim that ‘Toulmin is mortal.’ From this 
example alone, there doesn’t seem to be much difference between Toulmin’s method and 
Aristotelian syllogisms. However, the greater richness and precision of the Toulmin Model 
becomes clear once we include a fourth element in the analysis: the Backing, which justifies the 
Warrant. 
The Backing of a Warrant is meant to answer the question “But why do you think that?” 
(that is, Why do you think the Warrant is true?) (96). Toulmin hesitates to give a precise 
characterization of Backing because what is permissible as Backing will vary greatly between 
contexts.97 For instance, the basic syllogism above will have different Backings if it is given in a 
philosophical or scientific context. A philosopher might cite the Backing that it is the nature of 
                                                 
96 Toulmin (1958), 90-2. 
97 Toulmin believes that the Backing of arguments is what allows us to see how very field-dependent arguments are. 
Backings not only allow us to see in what field an argument is being made, but also help to define what counts as an 
actual argument in a given situation. Some unproven assumption(s) must be granted, but what exactly these are will 
depend on the context. As Shorey comments in the notes to his translation of a similar concept at Republic 510c: “Cf. 
the mediaeval ‘contra principium negantem non est disputandum.’ A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the 
psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is ‘real’” (1935 
[1970], 111). 
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man to be mortal, while a scientist might cite the Backing that the biology of the human body 
prohibits it from living forever. Toulmin’s structuring of these arguments would look like this:98 
Philosophical Context 
 
Figure 2 
Scientific Context 
 
Figure 3 
Backings are generally “categorical statements of fact” that “[lend] authority” to Warrants, and 
this is why they vary so greatly depending on context. What ‘lends authority to a Warrant’ depends 
                                                 
98 Those familiar with the Toulmin model will notice that I have inverted Toulmin’s traditional diagrams on the 
horizontal axis, so that the Warrants and Backings appear above the Data and Claims, rather than below. This will 
better reflect the relationships among propositions that Socrates uses in his arguments in Phaedo, particularly when it 
comes to ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ hypotheses. See also sections 2.3 and 3.2. 
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not only the field of the argument (e.g., philosophy, science, law), but also on what the arguer’s 
interlocutors or listeners are willing to accept. 
In Toulmin’s characterization of arguments, all of the aforementioned elements—Claim, 
Data, Warrant, and Backing—will be present in an argument, although not every element need be 
explicitly stated. Just as other methods of analysis allow us to identify hidden premises, or those 
which are not stated by the arguer but are required for the argument, Toulmin’s model also allows 
us to identify unstated premises, such as a hidden Claim or a hidden Backing.  
In conversation in particular, our arguments may not follow the pattern ‘Warrant and Data, 
therefore Claim.’ We might just as easily say ‘Backing and Data, therefore Claim,’ or even ‘Data, 
therefore Claim.’ In the following argument, for instance, normally only the Warrant or the 
Backing would be stated, since they would be somewhat redundant in casual conversation: 
 
Figure 4 
Even though we might cite either the Backing or the Warrant in our argument, only the form of 
the argument that includes the Warrant, Data, and Claim would be considered a formally valid 
argument. However, we would be remiss not to accept an argument that includes only the Backing, 
Data, and Claim as sufficient proof that in looking at this bear, we are looking at a mammal.99 The 
                                                 
99 Cf. Toulmin 1958; 111, 117. 
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fact that I might choose to cite precise rules of taxonomy in order to tell you why all bears are 
mammals does not in any way detract from my argument that all bears are mammals—rather, 
under many circumstances, we would think my cataloging of taxonomic knowledge to be a 
stronger argument than one that simply says that all bears are mammals without explaining why. 
This is a subtlety, however, that can be easily missed when using methods of argument analysis 
that focus on formal validity. 
Two further aspects of Toulmin’s method of analysis must be mentioned before explaining 
the full appeal of Toulmin’s method for philosophical contexts and for Socrates’ arguments in 
particular. Because Toulmin’s method is built for informal and conversational arguments in 
particular, the method recognizes the need to state Qualifications (by hedging Claims or other 
propositions with “probably,” “likely,” etc.), as well as the need to address Rebuttals, and these 
both receive their own place in his diagrams. For an example that includes both: 
 
Figure 5 
Toulmin’s permission of Qualifications is nothing novel, as these are included in many traditional 
methods of analysis. But there is a somewhat unique role that Rebuttals play in Toulmin analyses, 
since Rebuttals can be either counterarguments that the arguer herself addresses within the 
argument, or they can be reservations or counterarguments that are brought up by another speaker, 
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which are technically ‘outside’ of the argument. By using the Toulmin method to show the 
relationship between Rebuttals and the argument an arguer has made, we are better able to see the 
precise proposition that the Rebuttal contests, and therefore better able to see how fundamental an 
objection to the argument it may be. 
I hope I have made clear two of Toulmin’s main aims in developing this method of 
argument analysis: to better show the relationships among various propositions100 in an argument, 
and to highlight the different types of justification that are necessary for accepting Warrants in 
different contexts. These, however, are reasons for using the Toulmin method to analyze 
arguments in any field, and there are more reasons still for using this method in the context of 
scholarship on ancient philosophy, and on Plato’s texts in particular. First, Socrates’ arguments 
are decidedly colloquial: they often involve discussion with interlocutors, and because they are 
written in dialogue form, they have a temporal aspect as they play out in the dramatic conversation. 
Socrates’ arguments often—particularly in Phaedo—adapt in time to what his interlocutors are 
willing to accept at that moment, and thus have a more organic and adaptive ‘shape’ than a more 
formal argument. Thus Toulmin’s model, which makes literal room in the argument schema for 
including and addressing Rebuttals, provides a way to more fully reflect the dialogue form of 
Socrates’ arguments. Second, the type of argument that Socrates makes is precisely the type of 
argument that Toulmin’s method was created for, that is, informal arguments that aim to justify 
assertions in ways appropriate to a particular context, rather than by strictly valid means. 
Toulmin’s schema intentionally privileges the “reasonable” over the “rational” (i.e., the formally 
                                                 
100 Throughout this dissertation, the term “propositions” will be used to denote any of the premises or the conclusion 
to an argument, regardless of whether they are classed as Claims, Data, Warrants, etc.  This more general term will be 
useful because, in more complex arguments, one proposition can function in two or more roles within a (larger) 
argument—for instance, a proposition can be both the Claim of one sub-argument and a Warrant for another sub-
argument. 
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valid), and in doing so, is able to better accommodate the psychological factors that make 
arguments ‘seem reasonable’ and ‘seem good,’ even when they are not, strictly speaking, valid or 
sound.101 Plato’s characters don’t always make arguments that meet basic standards of validity, 
nor, does it seem, are they necessarily trying to. Because this model aims to accommodate ‘invalid’ 
reasoning that is still persuasive, its framework is necessarily a bit looser than traditional methods 
of argument analysis, but it is also better able to accommodate the complexity of arguing to another 
person in time, as well as the myriad factors that have an effect on the persuasiveness of an 
argument. In addition, the arguments that I analyze throughout this chapter—Socrates’ arguments 
regarding the nature of the soul and its fate after death—make claims about matters that are outside 
the realm of human knowledge. In making such arguments, we cannot appeal to a set of man-made 
laws or rules as the Backings for our claims (as we could in the fields of law or taxonomy, or when 
playing pool), nor can we appeal to discoverable laws of nature (as we could in the field of 
physics). Rather, the only Backings that Socrates can provide for his Warrants will be unproven 
and unprovable. These unprovable Backings are essential to understanding the overall 
argumentative structure of Phadeo, because they show the unproven hypotheses on which each 
argument is based. 
Finally, we should note that any formal method of argument analysis was, at least for the 
most part, developed after Plato’s time. Of course, it is reasonable to think that ideas about the 
underlying formal structures of logical arguments were percolating in the intellectual ether in 
Plato’s time, just as the concept of an axiomatic system had been percolating before Euclid wrote 
Elements. However, the systemization and codification of this was begun by Aristotle, one of 
                                                 
101 Cf. Hitchcock and Verheij 2006, 23; Woods 2006, 20-1. 
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Plato’s students, and would not have had nearly the same influence on Plato as it has on us today.102 
For all of these reasons, it will be fruitful to examine Socrates’ arguments about the soul in Phaedo 
using Toulmin’s method rather than more traditional methods that emphasize validity and 
soundness. For many years, scholars have performed more traditional analyses of these arguments, 
and have made enlightening observations about their structure and validity. However, the Toulmin 
Model has yet to be embraced by the field of Classical Studies, and I am unaware of any scholar 
who has used this model to analyze Plato’s arguments. I hope that by doing so, these analyses will 
bring to light new observations about the structures of the propositions in his arguments (in this 
Chapter), such as how various propositions build on one another or are recycled in later arguments, 
and how each argument in the dialogue is based on the hypothesis of the Forms.  
 
2.2 Analyses of the Arguments in Phaedo 
It is generally accepted that Phaedo contains four separate arguments for the immortality 
of the soul. However, as I will explain in this section, conceiving of the structure of the Phaedo in 
this way overlooks both the argument Socrates gives before these four arguments (which I call the 
Argument for Great Hope), as well as the fact that Socrates himself says that ‘two’ of these 
                                                 
102 In their classic The Development of Logic, Kneale and Kneale (1962) note that “in the Peripatetic tradition [of 
which Plato was a part], …logic never became a part of philosophy, a subject in its own right, but was treated as a 
capacity (δύναμις) which might be acquired or as an art (τέχνη) to be learnt” (14-5). They cite Aristotle himself as 
claiming “to be breaking entirely new ground” with his logical works, and though they note that Aristotle’s 
predecessors or contemporaries might have “tried to give principles as distinct from examples,” it is still true that 
“there was no systematic treatise on the subject of argument” before Aristotle (15). Plato’s contribution to logic, they 
claim, is that he tackled questions in the philosophy of logic, namely, questions of truth and falsehood, of necessary 
connections between thoughts (or perhaps necessary connections among the Forms, cf. 18-20), and of definition (17). 
 49 
arguments—commonly called the ‘Cyclical Argument’ and the ‘Recollection Argument’—are 
complementary sides to one argument for the immortality of the soul (77c). For these reasons, I 
will use a slightly different division of the arguments in Phaedo, as outlined in the chart below.103 
In this section, I diagram these arguments according to the Toulmin Model, in order to highlight 
the ways that various propositions depend on one another. These diagrams show which 
propositions are unproven (i.e., the “Backings” for the arguments), as well as which propositions 
introduce a degree of uncertainty or likelihood into the arguments, and how that uncertainty 
continues into other sub-arguments that depend on those uncertain propositions. In section 2.3, I 
show how Socrates characterizes each of his arguments as more likely to be true than the previous 
argument, and I argue that because each argument is based on the hypothesis of the Forms, these 
arguments serve not only to justify the Claim that the soul is immortal, but also to examine and 
justify the Backing of the hypothesis of the Forms itself. 
Argument for Great Hope (AGH) (63e-67e): AGH argues that a philosopher 
should not fear death because his soul will gain the greatest knowledge in the 
afterlife. 
Cyclical/Recollection Argument (CRA) (70c-72e and 73b-76e): CA argues that 
because opposites come from opposites, living beings come from dead beings. RA 
argues that the soul must exist before birth because we recollect knowledge we 
learned before birth. 
Affinity Argument (AA) (78b-84b):  AA argues for the immortality of the soul 
based on an analogy between the soul and objects in the realm of Forms.  
                                                 
103 Although I believe the breakdown of arguments listed here is fully justified by the text (discussed at greater length 
in the analysis of each argument throughout this Chapter, see esp. 2.2.2), my analysis of the myth as an argument itself 
(section 2.4) in no way depends on accepting this breakdown of the rest of the arguments. 
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Final Argument (FA) (102b-107a): FA argues for the immortality of the soul 
because the soul is the source of life and cannot admit death. 
The Myth (107c-115a): The Myth argues that one must pursue reason and virtue 
in life in order to have a pleasant and afterlife. 
 
2.2.1 The Argument for Great Hope (AGH) 
What I am here calling “The Argument for Great Hope” (AGH) is not one of the four 
arguments for the immortality of the soul. This argument comes before the other arguments, and 
rather than argue for the immortality of the soul, it assumes that the soul is immortal. Socrates 
gives the AGH when he is first trying to convince Simmias and Cebes that there is no reason to be 
saddened by his impending execution. Once Simmias agrees that death is the separation of soul 
and body (64c), Socrates aims to show him that the soul of a philosopher will finally attain true 
wisdom after death (66d-e). Socrates concludes that a philosopher facing death should be 
“hopeful” (εὔελπις, 64a1) when facing death, that there is “great hope” (πολλὴ ἐλπίς, 67b8) that 
his soul will gain knowledge in the afterlife, and that his “departure [into death] is accompanied 
by good hope” (ἀποδημία… μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος, 67c1). The following argument analysis, using 
the Toulmin model, shows how the various propositions Socrates provides rely on one another. 
Citations for each proposition are given just below, in the order they occur in the text.104 Because 
                                                 
104 The position of each proposition in the following diagrams does not follow the order in which the propositions are 
written in the text. This is partially because Plato’s dialogues are more linear than a Toulmin diagram, simply by the 
nature of how words are written on a page. However, the main reason for this is that Socrates often speaks his 
conclusions before his premises, or tentatively states a conclusion before providing more reasons for agreeing with 
that conclusion (more premises). In the lists below, propositions are listed by their first occurrence, and additional 
citations are provided if the proposition is later repeated. 
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the AGH is a more complex argument than, e.g., a syllogism, some propositions are used in 
multiple ways. For instance, the proposition that “knowledge is best acquired outside of the body” 
(proposition 5) is used as Backing for two other propositions, and it is also the Claim that concludes 
a sub-argument that the nature of the objects of knowledge requires that humans come to know 
them without the aid of the body. Because propositions can act in multiple ways in these 
arguments, I will refer to them as “propositions” unless speaking of their particular role as Backing, 
Warrant, Claim, etc. 
 
Figure 6 
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AGH Propositions 
1. “Do we believe that some ‘death’ exists? … Is it something other than the release of the soul 
from the body?” (ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; … ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ 
σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; 64c2, 4-5). 
2. This proposition is left unstated until quite close to the end of the argument, but it is suggested 
by Socrates’ discussions of how the philosopher rejects bodily pleasures (64d-65a), and how true 
knowledge cannot be acquired through the body (65d-66a). Cf. 67a: “And while we are living, in 
this way, it seems, we will be closest to knowledge: if we keep company as little as possible with 
the body, and we do not take part in it, except when it is entirely necessary” (καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, 
οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι 
μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, 67a2-4). 
3.  “The philosopher frees most of all the soul from association with the body, differently than 
other men.” (ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας 
διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, 65a1-2). 
4. “Indeed is it not in reasoning if anywhere that something of what is comes to be discovered by 
it [the soul]?” (ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν 
ὄντων; 65c2-3). 
5. E.g.,“[The soul] reasons most at that time when none of these [senses] trouble it in addition.” 
(λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, 65c5-6). 
6. “Now have you ever seen one of those [Forms] with your eyes?’ / ‘In no way,’ [Simias] said.” 
(‘ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες;’ ‘οὐδαμῶς,’ ἦ δ᾽ ὅς., 65d9-10). 
7. “Then that one might do this most purely who most of all goes through each thing in thought 
itself, neither placing some appearance next to his thinking nor dragging in some another 
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perception with his reasoning” (ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα 
αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην 
αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ… 65e7-66a1). 
8. “And then, it seems likely, that which we desire and of which we declare ourselves to be 
lovers—wisdom—will be for us, when we have died, as our argument shows, but not while we are 
living.” (καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, 
ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ, 66e1-4). Cf. 67a-b: “Having been 
cleansed and freed from the thoughtlessness of the body, we will be among things such as this, as 
is likely, and we will come to know through ourselves all things that are pure” καθαροὶ 
ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ 
γνωσόμεθα δι᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, 67a6-b1). 
9. “If indeed it is not possible to come to know clearly with the body, one of two things [is the 
case]: either it is possible for no one to attain [a state of] knowing, or [one does so only] having 
died.” (εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ 
ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν, 66e4-6). 
10. “Then if these things are true, [there is] great hope that, in having arrived where I am driven, 
likely there, if anywhere, I will acquire that which came to be a great occupation for me in my 
present life, so that that departure now commanded of me comes to be accompanied by good hope.” 
(οὐκοῦν, … εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, … πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που 
ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε 
ἥ γε ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται, 67b7-c2). 
11. This proposition is left unstated, but is not at all inconsistent with Socrates’ overall argument, 
e.g., “Only those philosophizing rightly are eager always and most of all to free [the soul], and this 
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very practice is of philosophers, the freeing and separating of the soul from the body.” (λύειν δέ 
γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ 
μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, 67d7-10). 
12. After Socrates give his argument, Cebes objects: “Those things about the soul give great 
disbelief to people that, whenever it is released from the body, it no longer still exists.” (τὰ δὲ περὶ 
τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μή, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ 
ἔτι ᾖ, 70a1-3). 
 
In the Argument for Great Hope, Socrates uses the idea that the Forms are the objects of 
true knowledge in order to argue that knowledge is not grasped through the senses, and so is best 
acquired outside of the body. Because death is the fullest separation of soul from body, it is likely 
that true knowledge is attainable only after death. And because the philosopher has ‘practiced for 
death’ by separating himself from bodily cares as much as possible in life, the philosopher has the 
best chance of acquiring knowledge after death. We should note that the proposition that the realm 
of Forms is invisible (proposition 6) is at the top of the Toulmin diagram, indicating that it is the 
highest Backing used in the argument, as this will come into play in my analysis of the overall 
argumentative structure of Phaedo. In addition, we should note that the proposition that death is 
the separation of the soul from the body (proposition 1) is used as a Backing, but not the highest 
Backing. This means that although it has no Backing of its own in this particular argument, it is 
still subordinate to the Backing about the realm of Forms. 
There are two Rebuttals to this argument (propositions 9 and 12), neither of which Socrates 
addresses within the argument itself. These Rebuttals are important because they show how 
Socrates adapts his later arguments for the immortality of the soul to Simmias’ and Cebes’ 
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objections. Simmias and Cebes do not raise proposition 9 (that knowledge is not attainable at all) 
as a Rebuttal, but they do raise proposition 12 (that the soul is not immortal) as a Rebutall to the 
AGH. Socrates thus does not need to address proposition 9 as a Rebuttal to proposition 5, because 
his interlocutors do not try to pursue it as an objection to the argument. Neither Socrates nor his 
interlocutors seem to want to claim that knowledge is actually not attainable at all, but Socrates is 
still careful to hedge the propositions he states after claiming that knowledge is attainable 
(proposition 5). For instance, Socrates says only that if we can attain knowledge, it is likely that 
this will happen after death: 
But in truth it has been shown to us that, if ever we are going to know something 
purely, it is necessary to withdraw from [the body] and to observe things in 
themselves, through the soul itself. And then, it seems likely, there will be for us 
that which we desire and of which we declare ourselves to be lovers—wisdom—
when we have died, as our argument shows, but not while we are living.  
ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, 
ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα: καὶ τότε, ὡς 
ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν 
τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ. (66d7-e4) 
 
It is possible, Socrates seems to say, that true knowledge may not be attainable for human beings, 
even in the afterlife. But he also does not seem to take this Rebuttal very seriously, because he 
gives no reason to disbelieve it—that is, he gives no reason to think that knowledge is attainable. 
Even though Socrates does not seem to consider the Rebuttal that knowledge is not 
attainable as an actual threat to his argument, it will be helpful to dwell for a moment on how much 
of this argument the Rebuttal, if correct, would affect. The Rebuttal that knowledge is not 
attainable at all (proposition 9) is a Qualification to proposition 5 that knowledge is best acquired 
outside of the body. If the Rebuttal is correct, then not only is proposition 5 incorrect, but every 
other part of the argument that follows from proposition 5 (propositions 9 and 10) are also 
incorrect. In the Toulmin diagrams, the propositions that follow from others can be easily seen 
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because they are either lower on the diagrams or to the right of those from which they follow. The 
Rebuttal in proposition 9, if it is correct, would ‘contaminate’ propositions 5, 8, and 10, as well as 
2 and 11, because it is a direct Rebuttal to proposition 5, which is a Backing for propositions 8 and 
2, which are in turn Warrants for propositions 10 and 11, respectively. Even though proposition 9 
does not seem to be taken seriously as a Rebuttal in this dialogue (as it is in Meno105), it serves as 
an example of how a Rebuttal can ‘contaminate’ other propositions in an argument, and how these 
can be located in the Toulmin diagrams. 
In contrast, the other Rebuttal to the AGH (proposition 12, that the soul is not immortal) 
does play an important role in the overall argumentative structure of Phaedo. This Rebuttal is 
raised by Cebes, shortly after Socrates has finished the AGH, so there is an exigency in the 
conversation for Socrates to address it. Cebes worries that, even if death is the separation of the 
soul from the body, the soul may be “destroyed and demolished” when it is separated from the 
body (διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται, 70a3-4). It seems that when Socrates says that death is the 
separation of the soul from the body (proposition 1),106 he means that the soul separates from the 
                                                 
105 When Meno brings up the ‘Learner’s Paradox’—that we cannot search for what we know, because we know it, but 
we also cannot search for what we do not know, because we will not recognize it when we find it (80d)—Socrates 
takes the time to challenge him: “Seeing that the soul is both deathless and has been born many times, and has seen 
all things both here and in Hades, there is nothing that it has not learned. And so there is nothing marvelous about the 
possibility of it recollecting about virtue and other things that it knew before” (ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ 
πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ μεμάθηκεν: 
ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο, 
81c). 
106 Throughout most of this argument, Socrates uses phrasing that suggests an emphasis on the release or separation 
of the soul from the body: “for the soul will be itself by itself, apart from the body” (γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ 
ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, 67b); “the separating the soul most of all from the body” (τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ 
σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, 67c); “then this is called ‘death,’ the release and separation of the soul from the body?” (οὐκοῦν 
τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; 67d); “the release and separation of the soul 
from the body” (λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, 67d). This seems to imply that the soul can exist without 
the body, without implying that the body can exist without the soul. It may be notable, however, that when Socrates 
first asks Cebes to assent to this definition of death, he begins in this same way, by asking about the “the release”—
or merely “the separation”—“of the soul from the body” (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν), but he then 
elaborates: “and is dying this—that the body itself by itself comes to be released [or “separated”] from the soul, while 
the soul itself by itself is released from the body?” (καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν 
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body in order to live on past the body’s death, while Cebes understands such a definition of death 
to commit one only to the idea that the soul leaves the body, and perhaps dissipates upon doing so. 
In the context of the Toulmin model, this means that Socrates and Cebes agree on this Backing 
proposition, but they disagree on the implications for its Warrant that knowledge is attainable only 
after death. Socrates takes the Backing definition of death (proposition 1) to support the Warrant 
that knowledge will be attainable after death (proposition 8), while Cebes takes the Backing to 
support the Warrant that knowledge would be attainable after death—as long as the soul lives 
beyond the body’s death. The AGH assumed that the soul was immortal, which we can see in 
Toulmin diagram by the fact that there is no Backing for the proposition that death is the separation 
of the soul from the body. Now that Cebes has questioned this assumption, however, Socrates will 
need to provide Backing for it, which he does by giving the subsequent arguments for the 
immortality of the soul.  
Probability or likelihood play a large role in this argument, even though Socrates is 
convinced that his Claim (conclusion) is completely true. Socrates does not claim to have provided 
an irrefutable argument in the AGH, saying instead that “it is necessary to say to one another and 
to believe these things” about knowledge being possible in the afterlife (τοιαῦτα … ἀναγκαῖον 
εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν, 67b2-3). Even though Socrates wants his interlocutors 
to believe his argument, there are a number of propositions in the argument that are only “likely” 
or “seemingly so.”  Some form of probability or likelihood is introduced just before propositions 
5, 8, and 10, which spreads to a number of other propositions that depend on those three as 
Warrants or Backings: propositions 2, 11, 8, and 10. All of these propositions that depend on 
                                                 
αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶναι; 
64c). 
 58 
“likely” propositions can be only “likely” themselves; thus the AGH has a rather pervasive sense 
of (mere) likelihood or probability. Even though Socrates believes that the highest Backing he uses 
for the argument (proposition 6, regarding the nature of the realm of Forms) leads felicitously to 
the Claim that the philosopher will acquire knowledge after death (proposition 10), Simmias and 
Cebes do not see this, and they will require an explicit argument for the immortality of the soul. 
 
2.2.2 The Affinity Argument (AA) 
In order to show Simmias and Cebes that the soul is immortal, Socrates next provides what 
are often called the Cyclical Argument and the Recollection Argument. Socrates says after giving 
the arguments that if they are combined, they provide a “proof” for the immortality of the soul.107 
Although the analysis of this “proof” is left out of this chapter for brevity’s sake, a Toulmin 
diagram and textual citations can be found in Appendix A, and its demonstrative status is discussed 
at length in section 3.1.2. Even after this Cyclical/Recollection Argument (CRA), Simmias and 
Cebes are still “afraid” that the soul may somehow dissipate when the body dies.108 Here Simmias 
and Cebes do not have a specific objection to Socrates’ argument; unlike when they objected to 
the AGH that the soul may not be immortal, they are here at a loss for an objection based in 
                                                 
107 Socrates says that the immortality of the soul “has been proven … even now, if you are willing to put this argument 
together with the same one on which we agreed before this one… In fact the very thing which you say has even now 
been proven” (ἀποδέδεικται μέν …καὶ νῦν, εἰ 'θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου 
ὡμολογήσαμεν… ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν, 77c6-7, 77d5). 
108 Cebes asks Socrates to “try to change the persuasion of this [child within] so that he does not fear death just as he 
does hobgoblins” (τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια, 77e7-8). See 
section 4.4 for a full discussion of the role of fear throughout the dialogue. 
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argument. Perhaps this is why Socrates’ next argument for the immortality of the soul takes on an 
entirely different structure, that of an analogy. 
In the Affinity Argument (AA), Socrates compares the soul with both the realm of the 
Forms and the realm of particulars. Things in the realm of Forms are invisible, noncomposite, and 
unchanging, he says, while those in the realm of particulars are visible, composite, and changing. 
Since the soul is invisible and noncomposite, and more like what is unchanging, the soul is ‘most 
equal to’ things in the realm of Forms; and because what is noncomposite and unchanging is not 
likely to be scattered or otherwise destroyed, the soul is likely to be immortal. My analysis, along 
with quotations for each proposition, are below: 
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Figure 7 
AA Propositions 
1. Forms are invisible: “But these such things are unseen and not visible?” (ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; 79a4). Forms are noncomposite: “Then aren’t those things that are always 
in accordance with themselves and which remain in the same way likely most of all to be 
noncomposite? (οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ 
ἀσύνθετα, 78c6-8). Forms are unchanging: “Or does each of these that is, uniform, itself by itself, 
remain just so in accordance with themselves, and never in any way admit any difference?” (ἢ ἀεὶ 
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αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε 
οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; 78d5-7). 
2. Socrates: “Does the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, and each thing itself that is—the reality—
never accept any change whatsoever?” Cebes: “It is necessarily this way for each of these things” 
(Socrates: αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ 
ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; Cebes: ὡσαύτως … ἀνάγκη … κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, 78d2-5, 8). 
3.  “What of the many beautiful things… are they entirely opposite to those [Forms] and not the 
same as themselves, neither in relation to one another nor even among themselves?” (τί δὲ τῶν 
πολλῶν καλῶν… πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε… οὐδαμῶς 
κατὰ ταὐτά; 78d10, 78e2-4). 
4. Soul is invisible: “Then the soul is more like the unseen than the body, while the [body] [is more 
like] the visible” (ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ, 79b16-7). Soul 
is noncomposite and unchanging: “Whenever [the soul] examines [something] itself by itself, it 
goes to the other realm, into what is pure and what is always deathless and is always in the same 
state, and since it is akin to this…” (ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ 
καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ…,  79d1-3). 
5. “Consider…if, from all the things said, these things follow for us: that the soul is most equal to 
that which is divine and deathless and present to the mind and uniform and indissoluble and always 
remaining just so in accordance with itself” (σκόπει δή … εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν 
συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, 80a10-b3). 
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6. “Will the soul, as soon as it is released from the body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed? 
Far from it!” (ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα … ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ 
ἀπόλωλεν…; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ… 80d5, 9-10, 80e1). 
7. “This is nothing other than philosophizing rightly and, in fact, practicing dying readily” (τὸ δὲ 
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως: 80e6-81a1). 
8.  “Then holding itself in this way, the soul departs into what is like to itself—to the unseen, and 
the divine and the deathless and intelligible” (οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀιδὲς 
ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, 81a4-5). 
9. “[Souls] are bound, as is fitting, into the sorts of characters which they happen to have practiced 
in life” (ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν 
τῷ βίῳ, 81e2-4). 
10. “From such nourishment, there is no danger that one would fear … that [the soul] would be 
torn apart … and no longer be anywhere” (ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, 
… ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα … καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ, 84b3-5, 7). 
11. Simmias objects after Socrates’ argument that perhaps the soul is more like a harmony (85e-
86d), while Cebes suggests that the soul is to the body as a man is to the set of cloaks he wears out 
in his lifetime (87b-88b). 
 
In the AA, Socrates argues that the soul has a greater affinity with things in the realm of 
Forms than with things in the realm of particulars. This is because particulars are visible, changing, 
and dissolvable, while both Forms and the soul are invisible, unchanging, and noncomposite. The 
initial Claim of the argument is that because Forms are unchanging (and therefore ‘immortal’), 
souls must also be immortal (proposition 6). The AA goes on, however, past this initial Claim that 
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the soul is immortal, to then argue that the philosophical soul is drawn to the divine and unchanging 
when the body dies, and therefore the philosopher should not fear death (proposition 10). Just like 
the AGH and the CRA, the AA uses facts about the Forms as one of its highest Backings, and it 
concludes that the soul is immortal (proposition 6, its initial Claim). However, one thing that 
differentiates the AA from other arguments for immortality (CRA and FA in particular) is that it 
continues its argument even after it has concluded that the soul is immortal. It contains assertions 
about what sorts of things happen to the soul after the body’s death (propositions 7-10), in order 
to make a final Claim that the philosopher should not fear death (proposition 10). 
Just like the AGH and CRA, the AA has only a probable conclusion, but in this argument, 
the first instance of its probability comes from the analogous nature of the argument. The AA relies 
entirely on the idea that there is an affinity between the soul and things in the realm of Forms 
(proposition 5); if this is not true, then no true conclusions can be drawn from the argument. And 
it is precisely this affinity between the soul and the Forms that Simmias and Cebes object to. In 
fact, both of them use the same basic analogical structure to raise Rebuttals to the AA, by replacing 
Socrates’ analogy with their own. First, Simmias argues that the soul may be more like a harmony, 
in which case the soul would be destroyed upon the destruction of its instrument, the body109; then 
Cebes argues that if the soul is like a man and the body like his clothing, the soul may grow 
damaged over time and die, even if it has outlived many iterations of its clothing (88a-b). It thus 
seems that Simmias and Cebes object to the idea that the soul is most equal to things in the realm 
of Forms—that is, the Warrant to the initial Claim, proposition 5—rather than to Socrates’ 
                                                 
109 Simmias suggests: “Then if it happens that the soul is some harmony, it is clear that, whenever our body is slackened 
or tightened beyond proportion by sickness or other evils, it is necessary that the soul begin to be completely destroyed 
straightaway, even if it is most divine” (εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα 
ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ 
οὖσαν θειοτάτην, 86c3-6). 
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Backings for this Warrant (propositions 1, 3, and 4, which regard the nature of Forms, particulars, 
and the soul). In fact, Simmias, at least, agrees explicitly with the Backings for Socrates’ argument 
when making his own analogy of the soul as a harmony, agreeing that the soul is indeed more like 
something “invisible and bodiless and something entirely good and divine” (ἀόρατον καὶ 
ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ  θεῖόν, 85e5-86a1), while the body is more like something “bodily 
and material and composite and akin to the mortal” (σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ 
γεώδη … καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ, 86a2-3). In the AA, then, we see that at least one of Socrates’ 
interlocutors has come to agree on the Backings to Socrates’ argument, even if he does not yet 
agree that these Backings support the Claim that the soul is immortal. 
We should note, however, that Socrates does not believe Simmias’ and Cebes’ Rebuttals 
are correct. He gives explicit arguments against their conceptions of the soul just afterward, 
insisting that the analogies they provide are inadequate on various grounds. This means that for 
Socrates, the only part of the AA that seems probable is what comes after his initial Claim that the 
soul is immortal (propositions 7-10). Because Socrates does not see his initial Claim as probable, 
only his final Claim that the philosopher should not fear death is governed by probability, in his 
view. The propositions leading to this final Claim all make assertions about what the soul 
experiences after death, whereas his earlier propositions led to the initial Claim only that the soul 
is immortal. As we will see in sections 2.3 and 3.2, Socrates believes he can “prove” that the soul 
is immortal (the initial Claim of the AA), but he hesitates to make such strong claims about what 
the soul experiences after death (the final Claim of the AA). 
Still, by the end of the AA, Simmias, at least, is explicitly willing to accept the Backing 
about the nature of the Forms that Socrates uses here (and, in fact, in all of his arguments in 
Phaedo). It seems clear to Socrates that these facts about the Forms and about the soul lead one to 
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see an affinity between the two, but Simmias and Cebes still do not understand this. They accept 
what Socrates says about the nature of the Forms, yet they do not understand the nature of the soul 
well enough to see their similarity. Still, Socrates seems to have made some progress in persuading 
his interlocutors, because they are now readily accepting the nature of the Forms, the Backing to 
all of his arguments, and are even using it in their own arguments. 
 
2.2.3 The Final Argument (FA) 
In the Final Argument, Socrates again relies on the Forms as the Backing for his argument. 
He argues that things that have an opposite by nature can never admit of what is opposite to their 
nature, e.g., snow can never admit of heat because it is cold by nature, and cold the opposite of 
heat. Because of this, and because the soul is the source of life, the soul cannot admit of the 
opposite of life (death), so the soul must be immortal. Just like all of Socrates’ previous arguments, 
the FA has as its Backing facts about the existence and nature of the realm of Forms: the fact that 
Forms do not admit of their opposites serves as Backing for the Warrant that things which contain 
an opposite by their very nature will not admit of what is opposite to their natures.  
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Figure 8 
FA Propositions 
1. “Now [we are saying] that an opposite itself could not ever come to be opposite to itself” (νῦν 
δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, 103b4-5; cf. 103c, 104c). 
2. “It seems that not only those opposites do not admit of one another, but also those things which, 
[although] not being opposite one another, [nevertheless] always have the opposites…” (φαίνεται 
οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει 
ἀεὶ τἀναντία… 104b7-9; cf. 104c). 
3. Socrates: “Then whatever soul itself occupies, it always comes upon that thing bringing life?” 
Cebes: “Indeed it brings [life].” (ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα 
ζωήν; Cebes: ἥκει μέντοι, 105d3-4). 
4. Socrates: “Is there some opposite to life or none?” Cebes: “…Death.” (Socrates: πότερον δ᾽ ἔστι 
τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Cebes: …θάνατος, 105d6, 9). 
5. “Then the soul does not admit of death?” (οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; 105e4). 
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6. “Then also now about what is deathless—if it is agreed by us that it is also indestructible, the 
soul would be, from its deathlessness, also indestructible?” (οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ 
μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος: 
106c9-d1; cf. 106 d-e). 
7. “Rather the soul is deathless entirely and indestructible, and in reality our souls are in Hades” 
(παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, … ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν 
Ἅιδου, 106e8-107a1). 
 
In the Final Argument (FA), Socrates again begins with a Backing about the Forms, this 
time, that they do not admit their opposites (proposition 1). He uses it to derive the principle that 
some things that contain an opposite by their nature (for instance, the cold in snow that is the 
opposite of heat) also cannot admit what is opposite to their natures (proposition 2). Since soul is 
the source of life (proposition 3) and life is the opposite of death (proposition 4), the soul must be 
deathless and indestructible (propositions 5-7). In other words, even when a body dies, the soul 
attached to it is incapable of admitting what is its own opposite, death, and must flee from the 
death in the body. 
Compared to the other arguments in Phaedo, the FA is strikingly free of hedging, 
probability, or other forms of Rebuttal. Socrates takes it to be clearly true that if the nature of the 
Forms is as he claims—in particular, that they cannot admit their opposites—then the 
deathlessness, indestructability, and immortality of the soul follow quite quickly and clearly from 
this Backing (proposition 1). Socrates even gets Cebes to admit that Socrates has “proven” with 
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this argument that the soul is immortal,110 and both Simmias and Cebes acknowledge that they 
have no more logical objections to the argument. Despite this, Simmias still cannot bring himself 
to be persuaded: 
I myself do not still disbelieve in any way the things that have been argued: 
however, from the magnitude [of the topic] about which the arguments were, and 
not underestimating human weakness, I am forced still to hold disbelief by myself 
about the things that have been said. 
οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων: ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ 
ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν 
ἔτι ἔχειν παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. (107a8-3b) 
 
Even though Socrates has addressed all of Simmias’ and Cebes’ logical and argumentative 
objections to the soul’s immortality, his interlocutors remain unpersuaded. So Socrates decides to 
try to persuade them through less traditional means—by telling them a myth about the afterlife—
which is analyzed below in section 2.4. First, however, in order to see how Socrates constructs this 
myth out of the conclusions (Claims) to his previous arguments and how this myth follows a 
rational progression from those arguments, section 2.3 will analyze how Socrates has been Backing 
each of his arguments so far with an unproven “hypothesis” about the nature of the Forms. 
 
2.3 The Hypothesis of the Forms as Backing 
In each of the argument analyses above, either the existence of the Forms or some particular 
fact about the Forms is used as a Backing for the rest of the argument. This can be easily seen 
through the Toulmin analyses because these Backings are all located on the highest level of the 
                                                 
110 Socrates says: “Should we say it has been proven?” And Cebes agrees: “Quite sufficiently.” (Soc: ἀποδεδεῖχθαι 
φῶμεν; Cebes: καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς,105e8-9). 
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diagrams, and they are located to the left of any arrows indicating inference. This means that these 
Backings about the Forms are not justified by any higher Backings, and they are left unproven. Of 
course, it is no coincidence that facts about the Forms serve as Backing for each argument when 
analyzed through the Toulmin method, because Socrates states explicitly that he uses the Forms 
as a hypothesis on which to base his inquiries and arguments: 
…[H]aving hypothesized in each case the account which I judge to be strongest, 
those things which seem to me to be in harmony with this, I set down as true, both 
about causes and about all other things; while those which do not seem to be in 
harmony, I set down as not true. …[H]ypothesizing that there is some beautiful, 
itself by itself, and some good and some great and all the others… 
…ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι 
δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἁπάντων ὄντων, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. … ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ 
αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα… (100a3-6, 100b5-7) 
 
Socrates means that he uses the hypothesis that he has found to be “strongest” in order to judge 
the truth of other propositions: those that are in harmony with it, he will (at least tentatively) accept 
as true, while those that are not in harmony, he considers (at least tentatively) false. This 
“strongest” hypothesis is, he says, the hypothesis of the Forms, a hypothesis that he is most sure 
of, and one from which he cannot easily be swayed (cf. 100d, 101d). Because he is confident that 
the hypothesis of the Forms is correct, he believes also that arguments that are in harmony with 
this hypothesis are most likely correct. This is not to say that Socrates believes his interlocutors 
should accept this hypothesis without question; rather, he specifically encourages Simmias to 
continue to question the hypothesis of the Forms, even after he has given all of the arguments 
above: 
You say rightly that the first hypotheses, even if they are believable to us, 
nevertheless are to be examined more clearly: and if you divide them sufficiently, 
as I think, you will follow the argument, down as far as absolutely possible for a 
man to pursue: and should this very thing become sure, you would seek nothing 
further. 
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εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως 
ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον: καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε 
τῷ λόγῳ, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι: κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ 
σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. (107b5-9) 
 
The hypothesis of the Forms is so secure for Socrates, presumably because he has put it under 
scrutiny for many years, that he is confident that Simmias, too, will continue to accept the 
hypothesis even after he has scrutinized it for himself. In fact, all of the arguments for immortality 
in Phaedo are in some sense a ‘following down’ of what is in harmony with the Forms—
specifically, how the soul’s immortality is in harmony with them. Each of these arguments uses 
the hypothesis of the Forms as Backing to argue that the soul is immortal. It seems almost as 
though Socrates believes that the soul’s immortality is directly inferrable from facts about the 
nature of the Forms. Socrates himself sees this from the beginning of the dialogue, and thus his 
first argument, the AGH, does not specifically address the immortality of the soul, but rather 
assumes that the soul is immortal. And this makes sense for Socrates, because he sees many ways 
that if one ‘follows down’ an argument from the hypothesis of the Forms, this leads to the 
hypothesis that the soul is immortal. Only once Simmias and Cebes object that the soul might not 
be immortal does Socrates address the immortality of the soul directly.  
 If the arguments in Phaedo show what is in harmony with the Forms, they also examine 
the hypothesis of the Forms itself. Socrates says that hypotheses are to be “examined more clearly” 
by “follow[ing] the argument, down as far as absolutely possible for a man to pursue” (107b, qtd. 
in previous paragraph). In essence, that is what each of Socrates’ arguments for immortality does, 
because each demonstrates what propositions can follow from the hypothesis of the Forms. In fact, 
as Socrates progresses through his arguments in Phaedo, the ‘amount’ of likelihood or probability 
in each argument is slightly less (i.e., the level of certainty is greater) than in earlier arguments, 
which suggests that his interlocutors can be more and more assured of the truth of each argument. 
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Socrates’ first argument, the AGH, has three ‘points of entry’ of likelihood or probability 
(propositions 2, 8, and 10), while the CRA has two,111  the AA has one (proposition 9 in), and the 
FA has none.112 This suggests that each of Socrates’ arguments becomes—or at least should 
become, for those who are following the arguments rightly—more and more firm, as we can 
become more and more sure that these arguments are based on a well-examined hypothesis. In 
addition, the ‘entry points’ for probability show a general shift further to the right and further down 
in the Toulmin diagrams as Socrates progresses through his arguments, which indicates that the 
‘mere’ probability enters at a later stage of each argument. In other words, the probability of 
Socrates’ arguments moves further and further away from the hypothesis of the Forms as the 
dialogue progresses. Each argument demonstrates a different way that the immortality of the soul 
follows from the hypothesis of the Forms, giving greater and greater assurance in that hypothesis 
as the ‘mere likelihood’ of the hypothesis begins to disappear. As we ‘follow the argument[s] 
down’ to the Claim that the soul is immortal, we can be more sure both of this conclusion and of 
the hypothesis of the Forms that is its Backing. 
 
                                                 
111 These are at proposition 8 in both the CA and the RA diagrams. See Appendix A for the diagram and citations. 
112 I am here listing only instances of probability or Rebuttals that Socrates appears to take seriously, which means 
that I am excluding the idea that knowledge may not be attainable at all (AGH proposition 9), and Simmias’ and 
Cebes’ attempted Rebuttals to the affinity between the soul and the Forms (AA proposition 11). If I included these in 
the overall ‘tally’ of ‘likelihood’ for the arguments, the general pattern of the arguments becoming less and less 
probable and more and more sure would still hold, although admittedly, slightly less tidily in terms of numbers alone. 
 72 
2.4 The Argument in the Myth 
After all of these arguments for the immortality of the soul, Simmias and Cebes ought to 
be persuaded. They have examined the hypothesis of the Forms and found that in many different 
ways, it leads to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. Still, something not quite logical is 
holding Simmias back. Since Simmias has no more logical objections, Socrates can no longer try 
to persuade him using propositional arguments; instead, he gives a myth that, while making a 
rational progression, also is intended to address Simmias’ fears and reservations about the fate of 
the soul after death. He describes how souls are judged, purged of their wickedness, and rewarded 
for their virtues. It is a hopeful myth, which Socrates emphasizes at the end (114c-e), both for 
Socrates’ present situation and for his friends, if they are inspired to live their lives pursuing 
wisdom and virtue. 
Having shown the soul to be immortal through his previous arguments, Socrates now uses 
this proposition in the myth without further justification, in order to show that one should spend 
one’s life trying to become “as excellent and as prudent as possible” (ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ 
φρονιμωτάτην, 107d1-2). He introduces the myth by calling attention to the proposition on which 
it is based: “But it is just to keep this in mind, that, since indeed the soul is deathless, it is necessary 
to [give it] care not only for this time that we call living, but for all time…”  (proposition 3, below). 
In this way, Socrates makes clear that he is basing the myth on the Claim of the previous arguments 
(the conclusion that the soul is immortal), and that the myth does not argue for the immortality of 
the soul, but rather argues about what happens to souls in the afterlife—given that the soul is 
immortal:  
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Figure 9 
Propositions in the Myth 
1. Socrates’ three previous arguments (CRA, AA, and FA) argued that the soul is immortal. 
2. This is proposition 8 in the CA section of the CRA (72a6-8), quoted in full in Appendix A. 
3. Both the Claim from the previous arguments and the hypothesis that introduces the myth: “But 
it is just to keep this in mind, that, since indeed the soul is deathless, it is necessary to [give it] care 
not only for this time that we call living, but for all time…” (ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽… δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, 
ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ 
καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός…, 107c1-4). 
4. “…The soul goes to Hades…” (…εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται…, 107d3). 
5. Suggested by, e.g., “For the soul goes to Hades holding on to nothing other than its education 
and nurture, which are said most of all to aid or to harm immediately upon dying, in the beginning 
of the journey to that place” (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας 
τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς 
ἐκεῖσε πορείας, 107d2-5). 
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6. Regarding the judgment of souls: “…which are said most of all to aid or to harm immediately 
upon dying… ” (…ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς…, 
107d4-5); “It is said thus…” (λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, 107d5). Regarding the geography of Hades: “…as 
it is said” (ὡς λέγεται, 113b8); “…as the poets say…” (ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, 113c8-9). 
7. “It is necessary that they, having submitted themselves for judgment, be brought into Hades…” 
(δεῖ τοὺς … διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου πορεύεσθαι, 107d8-e1). 
8. “But on account of these things which we have recounted, it is necessary, Simmias, to do 
everything in order to have a share of virtue and wisdom in life: for the reward is beautiful and the 
hope vast” (ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ 
φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν: καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη, 114c6-9). 
 
It is perhaps notable that the ‘details’ in Socrates’ myth are not in the diagram, details such 
as the geography of Hades or the shape and colors of the earth. This is because these are not 
essential to the underlying argumentative structure of the myth, so they need not be included in a 
Toulmin analysis. More importantly, though, Socrates himself says that the myth is not be taken 
entirely literally,113 which suggests that these specific details may not be essential to the myth, or 
even accurate. He says explicitly that he will not be able to give a full account of what he will 
claim in the myth, nor that he will even be able to fully explain the truth of the matter.114 Knowing 
                                                 
113 The non-literal nature of the myth is of particular importance here. Socrates certainly seems to mean that souls live 
on after the body’s death, that they are judged after death, and that they are treated differently in the afterlife in 
accordance with this judgment. However, he does not seem to mean that Hades must have the specific number of 
paths or rivers he cites, or that the earth is necessarily divided into twelve differently colored regions. These details 
help make the myth persuasive and help to lend authority to the myth, so in terms of their persuasive function, they 
are of utmost importance (see section 4.4). However, these details could be replaced with other similar details, and 
the myth could still have the same or a quite similar meaning. I argue in 5.1.3 that this is the case with a few different 
eschatological myths that Socrates tells. See also 4.4 on how the details help to make myths persuasive. 
114 Socrates says: “It doesn’t seem to me to be [a matter for] the skill of Glaucus to fully describe what [the soul and 
the earth] are; to show that these things are true, though, appears to me to be more difficult than the skill of Glaucus. 
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the truth and giving a full account of the fate of the soul after death would require superhuman 
knowledge. Still, because the myth is based on his previous arguments—and thus based on the 
hypothesis of the Forms—he is confident that the basic argumentative structure of the myth will 
be no less worthy of belief than his prior arguments were: 
To affirm these things confidently in exactly the way I have explained is not proper 
to a man having reason; but indeed [to affirm] these things or such things about our 
souls… seems proper to me. 
τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν 
ἔχοντι ἀνδρί: ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν… τοῦτο 
καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ. (114d1-3, 4-5) 
 
Because the myth is built on a hypothesis that is firm and secure for Socrates, he is comfortable 
saying that it ‘seems proper’ ‘to affirm these things or such things.’ Socrates needn’t know the 
exact geography of Hades in order to be convinced that souls are treated variously in the afterlife, 
in accordance with their virtues and vices in life, nor does he need to know exactly how that 
judgment works in order to be convinced that one ought to pursue wisdom and virtue in life. The 
moral Claim (conclusion) that one must pursue wisdom and virtue in life will be true even if some 
of the details in the myth are not literally true. The myth has as its Backing the same hypothesis as 
all of Socrates’ other arguments, and thus has no less sure a foundation than the arguments Socrates 
states in propositional language. 115  
                                                 
And I might not be able to, but also, even if I knew, my life seems to be not sufficient in length for the account.” (οὐχ 
ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ᾽ ἐστίν: ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν 
Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ᾽ ἂν οἷός τε εἴην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός…τῷ 
μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν, 108d). This passage is discussed at length in 3.2.6. 
115 A few scholars have also noted that many of Plato’s myths are based on hypotheses that he has presented or argued 
for in propositional language such as dialectic (Morgan, Burnyeat, Trabattoni); however, these scholars tend to 
mention this fact only in passing. Morgan, for instance, says that “Myth has, therefore, an association with the 
hypotheses that must be subjected to rational inquiry at the beginning of the philosophical enterprise,” but she does 
not investigate this ‘association’ further (239, emphasis mine). Trabattoni makes a similarly vague claim: “The truth 
of the myth is linked to the truth of the dialectic demonstration whence the myth draws its thrust, it being understood 
that this very truth is not completely beyond doubt” (321, emphasis mine). I take him to here be referring to an 
unproven hypothesis or axiom. 
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This is not to say, however, that the myth argues nothing new in the context of the dialogue. 
It might be suspected that Socrates’ myth is a re-telling of the AGH, since they both make claims 
about the nature and journey of the soul after death without explicitly arguing for the immortality 
of the soul; however, the AGH and the myth focus on different aspects of the afterlife, and 
therefore draw different, though certainly compatible, conclusions. The AGH discusses the fate of 
the soul after death in terms of its intellectual capacities, claiming that true knowledge is most 
available to a discarnate soul in this state, and concluding that neither should the philosopher fear 
death, nor his friends mourn his death. The myth, on the other hand, focuses on the fate of the soul 
in terms of punishments and rewards for moral choices it made while living. Its conclusion is that 
not only should one pursue wisdom in life so that one is best prepared for death, but also that one 
should pursue virtue so that one can have the most pleasant experience after death: “But on account 
of those things we have detailed, it is necessary to do everything so as to share in virtue and wisdom 
in life; for the reward is beautiful, and the hope great” (ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν 
… πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν: καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς 
μεγάλη, 114c6-9). The myth, then, arrives at a different Claim (conclusion) from the other 
arguments in the dialogue, one with a uniquely moral character. It uses Socrates’ previous 
arguments as its Backing (and thus uses the hypothesis of the Forms as Backing), but its final 
Claim is distinct from what Socrates has previously argued: it makes a moral argument that one 
must pursue virtue and wisdom. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have aimed to show how throughout Phaedo, Socrates bases his arguments 
on the hypothesis of the Forms, and how he indicates that we can be more and more sure of his 
conclusions with each argument. With each new argument, Socrates gives fewer and fewer 
indications that the argument is merely ‘likely’ or ‘probable,’ suggesting that he believes his 
interlocutors should have more and more confidence in his arguments and his conclusions. 
Because Socrates uses the hypothesis of the Forms as the Backing for each of these arguments, 
each argument is not only an argument for the immortality of the soul but also an ‘examination,’ 
as Socrates says, of the hypothesis of the Forms itself. In giving each argument, Socrates invites 
his interlocutors to examine the hypothesis of Forms by following the hypothesis down to its 
consequences, which should allow them to develop greater trust in the hypothesis. Once Socrates’ 
interlocutors have no more logically-based objections to the hypothesis, yet they are still 
unpersuaded, Socrates uses the same hypothesis to develop a myth, which is intended both to 
function as a rational argument and to provide both rational and non-rational persuasive appeals.116 
In addition, its logical progression from the previous arguments, as well as its reliance on the 
Forms for its Backing,117 rules out the possibility that the myth is entirely non-rational, or that it is 
non-argumentative discourse. 
In the following chapters, I analyze these various functions of the myth and how they are 
similar or dissimilar to the functions of the arguments given in propositional language. Chapter 3 
                                                 
116 This claim is elaborated upon and argued for in 3.2, 4.3, and 4.4. 
117 The diagram does not include the full Backing for the myth, in order to make it most readable. However, as 
proposition 1 indicates, the myth uses the previous arguments for the immortality of the soul (CRA, AA, and FA) as 
one of its Warrants, and therefore uses all the propositions in those arguments as its Backings. The highest of these, 
in each argument, is the hypothesis of the Forms. 
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develops the preliminary argument from this Chapter that the myth is a rational argument, by 
comparing the demonstrative status Socrates affords it to those of the propositional arguments. 
And in Chapter 4, the rational and non-rational persuasive functions of the myth are analyzed in 
order to show which persuasive functions the myth shares with the propositional arguments and 
which are unique to the myth. 
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Chapter 3 
Chapter 2 argued for a somewhat novel approach to analyzing the arguments in Phaedo, 
both in terms of understanding the role of the Argument for Great Hope (AGH) in the progression 
of the arguments in the dialogue, and in terms of analyzing the arguments through the Toulmin 
model in order to better see the Backings of each argument. The following chapter builds on this 
analysis by drawing out the demonstrative status of each argument and the myth, as well as by 
showing that the arguments that use the proposition that the soul is immortal as a Backing have a 
lower demonstrative status than those that use it as a Claim (conclusion). 
My overall aim in the present chapter is to analyze the vocabulary Socrates uses to describe 
the ‘action’ of each of the arguments and the myth in Phaedo, such as whether the argument 
‘proves,’ ‘shows,’ or makes only ‘likely’ Claims, in order to determine what I will call the 
“demonstrative status” of each argument and of the myth. In Section 3.2, I argue that the 
discriminating feature for whether Socrates calls an argument a ‘proof’ is whether it argues only 
that the soul is immortal, or whether it elaborates on the details of what happens to the soul after 
death. Arguments that argue only that the soul is immortal (CRA and FA) are said to have ‘proven’ 
this fact, while arguments that elaborate on the fate of the soul after death (AGH, AA, the myth) 
cannot be considered proofs, because the fate of the soul after death cannot be known or proven. 
This means that the CRA and FA have the higher demonstrative status of a proof, while the AGH, 
AA, and myth have demonstrative statuses lower than that of a proof. However, because the AA 
has a unique structure (discussed in section 2.2.2), its demonstrative status is higher than the AGH 
and the myth. This creates a chiastic structure to the demonstrative statuses of the arguments, with 
the first and fifth arguments (AGH and myth) having the lowest status, the second and fourth 
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arguments (CRA and FA) having the highest status, and the middle argument (AA) having a status 
between the others. In section 3.2, I argue that the reason Socrates believes he can prove the 
immortality of the soul but not specifics about the afterlife is because he believes that the ‘highest’ 
hypothesis, the hypothesis of the Forms, provides grounds for proving that the soul is immortal. 
Arguments about what the soul experiences after the body’s death, however, are based on the 
‘lower’ hypothesis that the soul is immortal, so they cannot have the higher demonstrative status 
granted to arguments based on the higher hypothesis of the Forms. However, because this is a 
consistent pattern no matter what form Socrates’ arguments take—be they deductive, analogical, 
or mythological—there is no reason to think that the myth of the dialogue has a lower 
demonstrative status because of its mythological language. Rather, the myth has a lower 
demonstrative status only because it is based on the lower hypothesis that the soul is immortal. 
 
3.1 The Demonstrative Status of the Arguments 
Statements about the demonstrative status of each argument in Phaedo are complicated by 
the fact that Socrates and his interlocutors declare arguments to have been ‘shown’ or ‘proven’ at 
differing times, as well as the fact that Simmias and Cebes are still not convinced by some of 
Socrates’ arguments even once they themselves declare the arguments to have been proven. Some 
of these issues will be dealt with in Chapter 4, which focuses on the persuasive nature of the 
arguments. For now, my focus will be on the language Socrates uses to describe the demonstrative 
status of each argument—that is, what he says will be or has been proven, shown, demonstrated, 
and the like. Socrates uses a constellation of terminology to describe the demonstrative statuses of 
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his various aguments, and furthermore, he often uses a number of different terms to describe each 
argument individually, so it seems counterproductive to attempt to rank each term he uses in a 
rigid framework.  Instead, I will claim only that what Socrates says he “proves” (ἀποδείκνυμι) has 
the highest status, while other terms such as φράζω, δείκνυμι, and σημαίνω indicate somewhat 
lower statuses, and terms such as ἔοικα and its cognates even lower than those. In general, I will 
take each argument to have the status indicated by the ‘highest’ demonstrative term Socrates uses 
to describe it, unless there is a clear reason in the text to indicate another interpretation. 
 
3.1.1 The Argument for Great Hope (AGH) 
In the Argument for Great Hope (AGH), Socrates uses the hypothesis of the Forms as 
Backing to argue that because knowledge is best acquired without bodily distractions, he has “great 
hope” that he and others who practice philosophy rightly will gain knowledge after death. Even 
though Socrates’ argument is steeped in language of hopefulness, both this (mere) hopefulness and 
his repeated characterizations of the argument as “likely” or “fitting” suggest that the AGH has 
one of the lowest demonstrative statuses of any argument in the dialogue. 
Socrates introduces this argument in rather uncertain terms, suggesting immediately that 
the demonstrative status of the argument is rather low. Socrates cannot guarantee to his 
interlocutors that what he is about to tell them is true, he says, yet he is hopeful in the face of his 
own impending death: 
Well then, I should try to speak a more persuasive defense to you than to the judges. 
… Now, though, know well that I hope to arrive [at a place] among good men—
and this is not [something which] I would affirm entirely confidently—[but] know 
well that if indeed I would affirm confidently something else among such things, it 
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would be this: that I will be in the presence of gods, entirely good masters. …I am 
hopeful that there is something for those who have died… 
φέρε δή, …πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. 
… νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν 
οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην—ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, 
εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. …εὔελπίς εἰμι 
εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι… (63b4-5, b9-c6) 
 
Socrates is hopeful—he says twice—that there is something after death and that his soul will be 
among those of good men and gods, and he wants to persuade his interlocutors of the same. He 
does not say he will demonstrate or prove this, and in fact, he won’t even ‘affirm’ it ‘entirely 
confidently.’ Of course, Socrates would not be able to demonstrate or prove the AGH beyond a 
doubt, because the fate of the soul after death is beyond the realm of human knowledge. Still, this 
introduction to the argument suggests some confidence on Socrates’ part; he is willing to affirm 
confidently that he will be in the presence of gods when he dies, and he hopes to persuade his 
interlocutors of this: 
But to you, the judges, I wish now to deliver the account, how it seems to me fitting 
that a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy should be of good courage 
when he is about to die, and [how] he is hopeful that there, he will bear the greatest 
goods, when he has died. How in fact this should be so, I will attempt to show. 
ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται 
εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων 
ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ. 
πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοι, …ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι. (63e8-64a3) 
 
“It seems fitting,”118 Socrates says—and not a guarantee—that a philosopher should not fear death. 
But again, as in the passage above (63b-c), Socrates is hopeful: a philosopher should “be of good 
courage” (θαρρεῖν) and “hopeful” (εὔελπις) about the fate of his soul after death. The verb that 
Socrates uses when saying he will attempt “to show” (φράσαι) his conclusion generally means not 
                                                 
118 The term εἰκότως, an adverb formed from the perfect participle of ἔοικα, will remind readers familiar with Timaeus 
of the lively and still-active debates surrounding the interpretation of this and related terms. See in particular Brisson 
2012 and Burnyeat 2009. Here I translate this adverbial form in the sense of “suitably, fairly, reasonably,” or, when 
paired with ἔχει or δοκεῖ, “it is reasonable” or “it seems reasonable” (LSJ A). 
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to prove or demonstrate but to ‘point out,’ ‘show,’ ‘show the way to’ (LSJ A), or to ‘tell,’ ‘declare,’ 
‘explain,’ or ‘signify’ (LSJ A2). He strengthens this language, however, once he has finished 
presenting the argument, when he declares that “it has really been demonstrated” (τῷ ὄντι 
δέδεικται) that true knowledge comes only to souls unencumbered by bodies (66d7). The verb 
δείκνυμι already has a stronger connotation of demonstration than φράζω, typically meaning to 
‘bring to light’ or ‘show forth’ (LSJ A), and this particular use is glossed by LSJ as “it is clear” or 
even “it is proven” (A4). “It has really been demonstrated,” then, for Socrates, that souls thirsting 
for knowledge must separate themselves from concerns of the body as much as possible. 
The final conclusion to Socrates’ argument is given in slightly weaker terms, and though 
he continues to characterize the argument as “likely” or “fitting” throughout, he also continues to 
insist that he is right to be “hopeful.” Socrates declares that “the argument shows” (ὁ λόγος 
σημαίνει, 66e4) that knowledge can come only when a soul is not in a living body. Of course, 
σημαίνω can range in meaning from signaling to sail or attack (LSJ II.2), to how a word relates to 
its referent or a sentence to the proposition it expresses (III.3), to how the Delphic Oracle or an 
omen expresses its meaning (A3).119 It would thus seem that Socrates means his argument shows 
or signifies that the soul can gain knowledge after the body’s death, rather than that he has proven 
this. As he continues to discuss this conclusion to his argument, he characterizes it and its 
consequences as “fitting,” rather than as claims to truth or knowledge about the matter (ὡς ἔοικεν, 
66e1-2; ὡς ἔοικεν, 67a2; ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, 67a7). Again, he echoes the hopeful language he used earlier, 
saying that there is “great hope” (πολλὴ ἐλπὶς, 67b8) that his soul will gain knowledge in the 
                                                 
119 See Struck for an in-depth analysis of this term and related ones. Although his text focuses on other authors more 
than it does on Platonic texts, he does note that Plato in particular seems to struggle with the idea that all language is 
a mere σημεῖον, easily capable of distracting from what is and leading us astray (54). In this particular use, however, 
Plato does not seem to insinuate that the λόγος has led us astray, but rather pointed toward some truth that may not 
have been perfectly expressed by his language. 
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afterlife, and that his “departure is accompanied by good hope” (ἀποδημία… μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος 
γίγνεται, 67c1-2) because he has dedicated his life to philosophy. While Socrates’ language is 
certainly meant to be encouraging, he is not claiming that the AGH has a particularly high 
demonstrative status. Socrates is asking his interlocutors to believe his claims about the afterlife 
without proof, because he can give no proof. He closes his argument by reminding his interlocutors 
of this: 
Whether I have shown zeal rightly and we have accomplished anything, we will 
know the clear facts [only once] we have gone there [to Hades]… So then, I defend 
myself with these things, how it is fitting, when leaving you and the masters here, 
that I not take it with difficulty or be vexed… 
εἰ δ᾽ ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καί τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα… 
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐγώ, … ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε 
δεσπότας οὐχαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ᾽ ἀγανακτῶ… (69d4-6, d7-e1) 
 
We will “know the clear truth” about what happens to the soul after death, he says, only once we 
are dead. In the meantime, Socrates suggests, we can make only ‘fitting’ arguments and, believing 
them, be brave in the face of death. 
These arguments can be only fitting because their subject-matter is beyond the realm of 
human knowledge. Socrates has assumed throughout this argument that the soul is immortal 
(proposition 1),120 and he has been making claims based on this Backing about what sort of 
experiences the soul has after the body’s death. Socrates cannot know such things for sure, nor can 
he prove them. All he can do is give well-reasoned speculation about what the soul might 
experience in the afterlife. However, his interlocutors are ready to hear none of this, and Cebes 
objects that he finds it difficult to believe in the immortality of the soul (69a-70b). Socrates must 
                                                 
120 See the Toulmin diagram and accompanying citations for the argument in Section 2.2.1 for a complete list of the 
propositions in the argument and an analysis of how they are related. 
 85 
now give a Backing for the Backing that the soul is immortal, which leads Socrates to provide the 
next three arguments for the immortality of the soul. 
 
3.1.2 The Cyclical/Recollection Argument (CRA) 
Although Socrates introduces the CRA with language that sounds less than fully confident, 
it is clear by the end of the argument that Socrates believes he has ‘proven’ the immortality of the 
soul through the CRA. When Cebes objects to the AGH because he is worried that the soul might 
be “destroyed and demolished” upon death (διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται, 70a3-4), Socrates 
agrees that the immortality of the soul deserves further discussion: “you say … true things; …but 
what should we do? Or do you wish that we should tell a story121 about these very things, whether 
it is fitting that they should be thus or not?” (ἀληθῆ … λέγεις …: ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν 
τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; 70b5-7). It is notable that Socrates 
introduces the CRA—an argument that he will soon say ‘proves’ the immortality of the soul—
with a word connected to the idea of μῦθος, and also that he characterizes his investigation as one 
into what is εἰκός. This will stand out in particular to those familiar with the debates surrounding 
the interpretation of these terms in Timaeus. While this is not the place for a full discussion of 
these terms, I would like to note that even if Socrates speaks about the CRA as εἰκός before he 
                                                 
121 LSJ defines the use of διαμυθολογῶμεν in this particular passage as “tell a story” (A). Translators interpret it as 
“tell a more thorough story” (Brann et al.), “tell tales” (Burnet), “spin tales” (Morgan 2010, 73), “spend our 
conversation” (Sedley & Long), “discuss” (Grube). In any case, there does not seem to be too much import of the 
sense of telling a μῦθος, particularly since the argument is given in propositional rather than mythological language, 
and since Socrates calls the argument a ‘proof.’ Burnet suggests that “the word is specially appropriate as introducing” 
the εἰκὸς argument Socrates is about to give, but the idea that Socrates truly means the argument as (merely) εἰκὸς is 
also undermined by the fact that he calls it a ‘proof.’ 
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begins the argument, he concludes the argument in a way that indicates that he is very sure of his 
conclusion, and that he has even ‘proven’ the immortality of the soul. Socrates agrees that “it is 
necessary to examine well” whether this is true (χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι, 70c2-3), and suggests that 
they “examine” (σκεψώμεθα, 70c4) the matter by first determining whether the souls of the dead 
exist in Hades, which he says will be a “sufficient sign” (ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον, 70d2) that souls of the 
living come to be from the souls of the dead. To be sure, none of this language that Socrates uses 
to introduce the CRA makes the argument sound airtight. Socrates is ‘telling a story’ about what 
seems ‘fitting,’ and ‘examining’ the idea that the soul is immortal through ‘signs.’ However, when 
Socrates finishes the first half of the argument (the Cyclical Argument),122 he declares his 
conclusion in no uncertain terms: “Not being deceived do we agree with these things, but in reality 
returning to life exists, and the living come to be from those who have died, and the souls of the 
dead exist” (ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ 
ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι, 
72d7-10). This unhedged declaration makes Socrates sound quite sure of the conclusion to his 
argument, indicating that, now that he has produced the argument, it has a higher demonstrative 
status than was first suggested. 
After the Cyclical Argument, Socrates receives no objections from his interlocutors; 
instead, Cebes immediately shifts the conversation to the doctrine of recollection by noting that 
the immortality of the soul is also suggested by recollection. Socrates argues that sensible 
particulars lead us to recollect knowledge of the Forms, and that this indicates that our souls had 
knowledge of the Forms before we were born. Both Simmias and Cebes agree that Socrates has 
                                                 
122 Although many scholars divide the Cyclical Argument from the Recollection argument, Socrates indicates that 
they should be understood together as one proof for the immortality of the soul, as discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
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“proven” that the soul exists before birth, but they object that the soul may still dissipate upon 
death. But Socrates suggests that they combine the Recollection Argument with the Cyclical 
Argument, and says that the immortality of the soul “has been proven” by this combined argument: 
It has been proven … even now, if you are willing to put this argument together 
with the same one on which we agreed before this one… In fact the very thing 
which you say has even now been proven. 
ἀποδέδεικται μέν …καὶ νῦν, εἰ 'θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν 
καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν… ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. 
(77c6-7, 77d5) 
 
Socrates here makes a very strong claim, twice using ἀποδέδεικται to emphasize the rigor he sees 
in the combined argument. How exactly these arguments are to be combined, however, has been 
a matter of debate. Gallop notes that “it is usually supposed that whereas the Cyclical Argument 
is meant to prove the bare existence of the discarnate soul, the Recollection Argument meets 
Cebes’ further demand to be shown that it possesses ‘some power and wisdom’ (70b3-4)” (136); 
however, this would not answer the objection Simmias and Cebes have just made (77b-c) that the 
Recollection Argument does not show the soul to exist after death. A more likely interpretation, 
then, is that Socrates means that the Recollection Argument proves the existence of the soul before 
birth, while the Cyclical Argument proves the existence of the soul after death (cf. Gallop, 136).123 
Either way, Socrates’ commitment to the strength of the combined argument seems clear: he has 
proven, he thinks, the immortality of the soul. 
                                                 
123 A ‘combination’ of these two views might be that of Hackforth, who argues that Socrates uses the Recollection 
Argument in order to prove that “the soul as conceived in the ἀνάμνησις argument, the soul which apprehends the 
Forms, exists after death as well as before birth” (80, ital. in original). Such a view may have the advantage of 
accommodating the seeming fact that the Cyclical Argument seems to imply that the soul exists both after death and 
before birth, even if this is not made explicit. 
 88 
Socrates believes he has proven this proposition because he has appealed to a higher 
proposition, that of the existence of the Forms,124 than he did in the AGH. While Socrates described 
the demonstrative status of the AGH with terms like φράζω, δείκνυμι, and σημαίνω, Socrates 
claims in the CRA to “prove” (ἀποδείκνυμι) that the soul is immortal. This is because between the 
two arguments, Socrates ascends from a lower hypothesis (that the soul is immortal, used in the 
AGH) to the higher hypothesis of the Forms (used in the CRA). Socrates believes he can prove 
that the soul is immortal in the CRA precisely because of this ascent. By using the highest 
hypothesis of all as the Backing for the CRA, Socrates is able to develop an argument for the 
immortality of the soul that has the demonstrative status of a proof. 
 
3.1.3 The Affinity Argument (AA) 
Before Simmias and Cebes have a chance to object further to the CRA, Socrates directs 
their conversation toward a new argument, telling Cebes, “Nevertheless, you seem to me, you and 
Simmias, to pleasantly [want] to thoroughly examine the topic125 still more” (ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς 
σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, 77d5-7). 
Socrates’ next argument, the Affinity Argument, argues that the soul is more similar to the world 
of Forms than to the world of particulars, and is thus deathless and immortal. He says that his aim 
                                                 
124 Although only the Recollection section of the CRA explicitly uses the existence of the Forms as Backing, since the 
Recollection section is to be combined with the Cyclical section in order to make a full ‘proof,’ then the CRA as a 
whole uses the existence of the Forms as Backing. 
125 “The topic” is an unusual translation of the “τὸν λόγον” of this clause; more typically, we would expect “the 
argument.” However, Socrates does not discuss the same argument ‘still more,’ but instead gives a new argument on 
the same topic. 
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with the argument will be to consider what types of things are capable of being scattered, then to 
see whether the soul falls into this category: 
It is necessary … to question … to what sort of thing it belongs to undergo this 
experience, i.e., being scattered, and for what sort of thing should we fear this 
experience, and for what sort of thing not; and after this, to consider anew whether 
the soul is [of this sort]…” 
δεῖ … ἀνερέσθαι … τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ 
διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ 
οὔ: καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν… (78b4-8) 
 
Socrates follows through on the first part of his plan to establish ‘to what sort of thing it belongs’ 
to be scattered, concluding that ‘it belongs’ to composite and dissolvable things. But instead of 
questioning whether the soul is in fact of this sort, he claims only that the soul is “more alike” 
(ὁμοιότερον, 79b16, 79e1) and “more akin” (συγγενέστερον, 79e1) to what is not of that sort (i.e., 
Forms). Socrates strengthens this claim about likeness slightly when he says that the soul is “most 
alike”126 (ὁμοιότατον, 80b3) what is divine and deathless, but this seems to be undermined when 
he declares that “it belongs to soul to be altogether indissoluble, or something near127 to this” 
(προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου, 80b10-11). Apolloni argues 
that “the sense we get from the use of these increasingly stronger adjectives is that the Affinity 
Argument is an argument whose parts cumulatively support the conclusion”;128 but if Socrates’ 
aim is to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, merely claiming that it is ‘altogether indissoluble, 
or something near to this’ does not a strong argument make.  
                                                 
126 Gallop notes that this could also be translated as “very similar,” and that this carries a different connotation from 
“most similar” (i.e., more similar than anything else). “These interpretations of the superlative are logically distinct,” 
he says, and “on neither interpretation would it follow that the soul shares all the features of the forms” (142).  
127 It may also be appropriate to translate ἐγγύς here as “akin.” “Akin” might make Socrates’ claim sound stronger, 
i.e., soul has some sort of family resemblance to the Forms, rather than that soul is close to but short of the perfection 
of the Forms. (Cp. Gertz: “On the most natural reading of this phrase, the argument from affinity has only proved that 
the soul is longer-lasting than body, but not that it is immortal” (125)). Gallop, Gertz, and Brann et al. all translate 
“close”; Sedley & Long, and also Grube translate “nearly so.” Cp. Gallop: “On the other hand, ‘nearly indissoluble’ 
seems the more natural way of reading the present text” (142). 
128 Apolloni (1996) 12. 
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Many commentators consider the AA to be the weakest argument in the dialogue, with 
Elton going so far as to call it “an object lesson in how not to mount an argument” (315). Most of 
this criticism stems from both the seemingly weak conclusion that ‘it belongs to the soul to be 
altogether indissoluble, or something near to this,’ and the fact that the argument has an analogical 
structure. Bostock, for instance, claims that “Plato … knows well enough that analogies can never 
count as conclusive proofs… [A]nalogies can quite often be persuasive, … but the present 
analogies really are not.”129 
More recently, Apolloni has argued that the AA is, in fact, a “deductive” and “ingenious 
argument—one having philosophical merit comparable to or greater than Plato's other immortality 
arguments (in the Phaedo, or at Phaedrus 245).”130 Whereas other scholars see the AA as 
somewhat bizarre because they believe it stands in stark contrast to the other, more felicitous 
arguments in the dialogue, Apolloni applies Socrates’ own advice against misology131 to his 
interpretation of the AA, reminding us that an argument’s “oddness indicates that we are not 
understanding the argument—not that we should take it as a weak argument from analogy” (10, 
cf. 90c-91a). The force of Apolloni’s interpretation comes from his argument that in positing two 
categories of things (Forms and particulars), Socrates means to have given an exhaustive list of 
thing-categories132; thus when soul is found to be invisible, unchanging, and divine, it is found to 
have “the defining characteristics” of the Form category, “and accordingly, [it] belongs to” the 
                                                 
129 Bostock (1986) 120. It is not clear what, exactly, the multiple analogies Bostock here refers to are. He may mean 
that one analogy is made between the soul and the world of particulars, while another one is made between the soul 
and the world of Forms. 
130 Apolloni (1996) 7, 13. 
131 Phaedo 90c-91d. 
132 Apolloni quickly rejects the idea that the soul might belong to some third kind of “immanent” being such as the 
largeness in Simmias, which is sensible and can pass away in relation to other things, but does not ever admit its 
opposite: “For even if immanent characters do constitute a third kind, Plato makes it quite clear … that the soul could 
not belong to such a kind because immanent characters are dependent upon their subjects for their existence, and the 
soul's ‘divinity rules this out, as does Socrates' response to the theory that the soul is a harmony (93ff.)” (13).  
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Form category133 (30, ital. mine). Apolloni is then able to call the AA “deductive”—and thus non-
analogical—by claiming that Socrates believes he has shown the soul to have sufficient conditions 
for belonging to the category of Forms. This, however, would seem to strip the Affinity Argument 
of affinity, and Socrates’ own language of the soul being ‘alike’ and ‘akin’ to the Forms to various 
degrees134 would indicate rather that he intends very much for the AA to be an argument from 
analogy. In addition, Simmias and Cebes seem to interpret Socrates’ argument as analogical, 
because in their Rebuttals, they use the same analogical structure to suggest that the soul may be 
‘more like’ something other than the Forms. It thus seems best to interpret the AA as an argument 
in analogical form, without importing our more modern notions of sufficient conditions as 
Apolloni does. 135 
But the AA is also not an argument of mere probability, as Bluck claims (23). Like 
Apolloni, Bluck gives a more generous reading of the AA, calling it “attractive” and “likely to 
appeal to those who find rigid logic unsatisfying” (73).136 However, the language of probability or 
fittingness is completely absent from the argument until after Socrates has concluded that the soul 
is indissoluble. If we recall the Toulmin analysis of this argument from section 2.2.2, the AA has 
                                                 
133 Here Apolloni may more accurately, by his own measure, have qualified that the soul normatively belongs to the 
Form category, since he believes that “even though Socrates wishes to defend the idea that the soul is invisible, always 
the same, and divine—attributes antithetical to those of physical objects—he thinks that the soul can take on some of 
the nature of physical bodies if it is in communion with them to too great a degree” (11). But Apolloni’s interpretation 
is likely too literal. Socrates’ belief that the soul can become, shall we say, caught up in the physical realm does not 
seem to imply that the soul can ‘take on some of the nature of physical bodies.’ Cf. 81c, qtd. two paragraphs below. 
Even though, as Gallop notes, “Socrates does not consistently speak of [the soul] as immaterial” (143), most of the 
language of this sort is in contexts where Socrates can easily be understood to be speaking figuratively. Considering 
that immaterial beings cannot literally be located in space, Socrates’ language here must be figurative (cf. Hackforth 
186).  
134 Socrates describes the soul as “ὁμοιότερον,” 79b16, 79e1; “συγγενέστερον,” 79e1; and “ὁμοιότατον,” 80b; these 
are all quoted above in this section. 
135 The Toulmin diagram provided in section 2.3.4 analyzes the argument as one from analogy. 
136 It is notable that the AA is given in response to Simmias and Cebes’ “fears” that the soul dissipates upon the death 
of the body, rather than to logical objections to the previous argument (CRA). This point will be discussed at length 
in section 4.4.  
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both an initial Claim and a final Claim. Its initial Claim is that the soul is immortal, while its final 
Claim is that the philosopher should not fear death because he anticipates a pleasant afterlife. 
Socrates applies language of probability or fittingness only after his initial claim, meaning that 
such language applies only to his claims about what happens to souls in the afterlife.137 Socrates 
thus seems not to consider the initial Claim of the AA—that the soul is indissoluble—as a 
‘probable’ or ‘fitting’ conclusion, but something stronger than this.138  
After the initial Claim that the soul is indissoluble, Socrates continues to argue for the final 
Claim of the AA that the souls of those who have practiced philosophy rightly in life will be drawn 
to the true and divine in the afterlife. While doing so, he emphasizes that the soul of someone who 
has concerned himself greatly with bodily pleasures in his life will not have the same experience; 
rather it will be “tied up with a corporeal nature” (διειλημμένην … ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, 81c4), 
and may even appear as a ghost (81c-d). It is the philosophical soul in particular that can look 
forward to an afterlife in communion with the divine, and furthermore—a point which has gone 
unnoticed by most scholars—the philosophical soul will be aware that it can look forward to such 
an afterlife: “from such nurture, there is no danger that [the philosophical soul] should fear 
[dissipating upon the body’s death], having pursued these things” (ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς 
οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐπιτηδεύσασα, 84b2-4). Socrates is telling two men who fear 
that their souls will dissipate that they would not have these fear if they were living rightly; such 
fears are simply unknown to the philosophical soul. So while the AA is an argument for the 
                                                 
137 For instance, Socrates says that “[souls] are bound, as is fitting, into the sorts of characters which they happen to 
have practiced in life,” (ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ 
βίῳ, 81e2-4) and “it is fitting that these [political sorts of souls] should come back into a political sort and a tame 
stock, of bees or wasps or ants…” (ὅτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν καὶ ἥμερον 
γένος, ἤ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων…, 82b5-7). 
138 As I argued in section 2.2.2, Simmias and Cebes raise Rebuttals that, if true, would undermine even Socrates’ intial 
Claim that the soul is immortal. However, Socrates refutes these Rebuttals and does not himself use any language of 
probability or likelihood until after his initial Claim. 
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immortality of the soul, it is also an argument for living the philosophical life, which, it seems, 
Simmias and Cebes are not yet living well enough.139 
The demonstrative status of the AA is more nuanced than any other argument in the 
dialogue. While the CRA, and, as I will discuss in section 3.1.4, the Final Argument, are said to 
have ‘proven’ the immortality of the soul, Socrates makes no such claims about the AA. In fact, 
Socrates concedes after the argument that “there are still many points of suspicion and of attack, 
if someone intends to go through these things sufficiently” (πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ 
ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δή τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι, 84c6-8).140 There are, it seems, two reasons 
for this. One is that the analogical structure of the argument is not that of a proof, so the mere form 
of the argument will not permit the same demonstrative status that is afforded to the CRA and 
FA.141 The second reason is that throughout Phaedo, Socrates claims to have ‘proven’ only the 
bare fact of the immortality of the soul, while his arguments about how the soul spends its time 
after the body’s death are never ‘proven,’ but are hedged in various ways. Recall that the AA has 
both the initial Claim that the soul is immortal and the final Claim that the philosopher should not 
fear death because his afterlife will be pleasant. The language of what is ‘fitting’ or ‘likely’ enters 
the AA only after the initial Claim, when Socrates begins making statements about what the 
                                                 
139 It may be that Socrates suggests again that Simmias and Cebes have philosophical work to do when he argues 
against misology, saying that it would be a “pitiable affair” if, when confronted with an argument that is “true, certain, 
and able to be accepted,” someone should mistrust the argument (οἰκτρὸν … πάθος, …ὄντος δή … ἀληθοῦς καὶ 
βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, 90c8-d1). While Socrates doesn’t directly accuse his interlocutors of being 
misologists, it is difficult not to think that he may be doing so indirectly, since he has spent the morning making 
arguments to people who continue to mistrust them.  
140 The idea that the AA might not be fully ‘sufficient’ as stands occurs once more, when Socrates tells Simmias, 
“Perhaps … what appears to you is true; but say in what way exactly [the AA] was not sufficiently [stated]” (ἴσως γάρ 
… ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται: ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπῃ δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς, 85e). 
141 There are, of course, better and worse analogies, and analogies can be shown to be better or worse through deductive 
reasoning. Socrates gives an example of this when he refutes Simmias’ suggestion that the soul may be more like a 
harmony (85e-6d) and Cebes’ suggestion that the soul may be like a cloak (87a-8b). The fact that Socrates examines 
and evaluates these counter-analogies through deductive argument may suggest that Socrates gives more credit to 
argument from analogy generally than modern commentators do. After all, even deductive arguments and proofs are, 
for Socrates, still to be examined thoroughly through further deductive argument. 
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afterlife and reincarnation might be like, meaning that only the final Claim to the argument—that 
the philosopher should not fear death—is subject to such qualifications.142 The initial Claim, 
however, stating merely that the soul is immortal, is not subject to these qualifications, and cannot 
be counted as a proof only because of the analogical argument structure. In this way, the AA has 
a demonstrative status between that of the arguments in Phaedo that argue only for the bare 
proposition of the immortality of the soul (CRA, FA) and those that describe the fate of the soul 
after the body’s death (AGH, Myth). 
 
3.1.4 The Final Argument (FA) 
In the Final Argument, Socrates argues only for the bare proposition of the immortality of 
the soul. He is thus able to say that this argument “proves” the immortality of the soul, and although 
he says that Simmias and Cebes may want to examine the hypotheses on which it is based, Socrates 
himself seems quite convinced that what he says in the FA is true. When Socrates asks if it “has 
been proven” that the soul is deathless, even Cebes agrees that it has been “very sufficiently 
proven.”143 Since what is deathless is by its very nature indestructible,144 Socrates declares quite 
firmly that “more than anything, the soul is deathless and indestructible, and in reality our souls 
                                                 
142 Similar language can be found in the AGH, qtd. above in section 3.2.2: ὡς ἔοικεν, 66e; ὡς ἔοικεν, 67a4; ὡς τὸ 
εἰκὸς, 67a8. 
143 Socrates: ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή. …τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; Cebes: καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς (105e6, 8-9). 
144 While a complete discussion of the legitimacy of this proposition does not fit within the scope of this chapter, I 
should note that understanding the proposition that ‘soul is deathless’ as saying merely that it is alive as long as it 
exists, as Bostock does (192), does not seem to be a charitable interpretation, and renders Socrates’ proposition that 
what is deathless is indestructible false. It seems preferable to take the interpretation of Bluck: “the point is that soul 
is not only incapable of admitting the contrary of its essential attribute (life), …it is also incapable of admitting its 
contradictory, destruction; it could not admit destruction without, incidentally, dying” (119, ital. in original). 
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are in Hades.”145 Socrates believes the FA has a very high demonstrative status; it “proves” that 
the soul is immortal and that “in reality” the souls of the dead are in Hades.146 Even Simmias and 
Cebes seem to agree, since neither of them can come up with a Rebuttal to the argument, and both 
say that they at least do not “disbelieve” Socrates’ arguments.147 Still, there is a difference between 
not disbelieving and actually believing, and Socrates wishes that Simmias and Cebes actually 
believe the argument. So he suggests that his interlocutors may want to examine further the 
hypotheses on which the argument is based: 
You say rightly that the first hypotheses, even if they are believable to us, 
nevertheless are to be examined more clearly: and if you divide them sufficiently, 
as I think, you will follow the argument, down as far as absolutely possible for a 
man to pursue: and should this very thing become sure, you would seek nothing 
further. 
εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως 
ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον: καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε 
τῷ λόγῳ, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι: κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ 
σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. (107b5-9) 
 
While Socrates suggests that his interlocutors may want to examine the first hypotheses, he implies 
that he has already done this work and has found for himself that the hypotheses are quite secure. 
148 His focus is on his interlocutors making these hypotheses secure for themselves as well, as 
                                                 
145 “Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, … ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδου” (106e8-
107a1). 
146 I have so far claimed that Socrates calls arguments ‘proven’ in this dialogue only when they argue for the mere fact 
of the immortality of the soul, yet here seems to be an example in which Socrates claims to have proven also that souls 
exist in Hades. I can say only that Socrates seems oddly insistent that souls exist somewhere even when discarnate 
(e.g., 81c-d), despite the fact that souls are incorporeal. If ‘in Hades’ can be taken to mean something like ‘in whatever 
way the souls of the dead exist,’ then It would follow more or less directly from the immortality of the soul that 
discarnate souls exist ‘in Hades’—whatever that may mean. 
147 Cebes says, “I at least…in no way have something else to say against these things, nor do I disbelieve the 
arguments” (οὔκουν ἔγωγε… ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πῃ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις, 107a2-3). Right after, 
Simmias comments similarly: “And I truly do not still hold disbelief in any way from these arguments” (ἀλλὰ μήν, … 
οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων, 107a8-9). 
148 What exactly the hypotheses referred to here are, as well as Socrates’ level of intellectual commitment to them is, 
is discussed at length in Section 3.2. These hypotheses include at least the hypothesis of the Forms, and perhaps more 
than one hypothesis about the nature of the Forms. This is suggested also by Socrates’ description of his intellectual 
history at 96a ff., in which Socrates declares the hypothesis of the Forms to be the most sure of his hypotheses. 
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shown through his use of second-person verbs: “if you divide them sufficiently” (ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς 
διέλητε), “you will follow the argument” (ἀκολουθήσετε), “you would seek nothing further” 
(οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω). Socrates wishes that his interlocutors do the same, dividing the 
hypotheses and following their arguments down until the hypotheses become secure for Simmias 
and Cebes as well. This process will take time, however, time that a man on his literal deathbed 
does not have, so Socrates now shifts the conversation to the myth, in order to elaborate on the fate 
of the soul after death. By doing so, he indicates that he finds the soul’s immortality to have been 
not only sufficiently proven, but sufficiently proven to his interlocutors’ satisfaction—even if they 
aren’t quite ready to believe it. 
 
3.1.5 The Myth 
In Chapter 2, I analyzed the myth in Phaedo as an argument using the Toulmin Model, in 
order to show that it uses the preceding propositional arguments for the immortality of the soul as 
Backing, to argue for the Claim that we must take care of our souls both before and after death. In 
this way, I showed how the myth has an argumentative function akin to that of the propositional 
arguments in the dialogue. The myth, just like the propositional arguments, constructs its argument 
from a hypothesis (Backing), in order to show what that hypothesis entails (i.e., what Claims it 
leads to). 
Here, I aim to show that the language Socrates uses to describe the demonstrative status of 
the myth is not so different from the language he uses to describe other arguments that elaborate 
on the fate of the soul after death (AGH and AA), and in particular the AGH. The myth cannot 
have the demonstrative status of a proof like the CRA and the FA, because it elaborates on the fate 
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of the soul after death, and Socrates is unwilling to aver such details about the fate of the soul after 
death. However, Socrates awards the myth a demonstrative status very similar to that of the AGH, 
which suggests that it is not the myth’s mythological language or imagery that gives it the status 
it has, but rather its subject matter. Socrates is no less certain about the claims of the myth than he 
is about any other claims about the fate of the soul, regardless of whether they are in mythological 
or propositional language. 
Some scholars believe that Socrates indicates that the claims he makes in the myth are to 
be taken less seriously than those he makes in propositional language, and thus that the myth has 
a lower demonstrative status than these propositional arguments.149 However, there are many 
indications that Socrates believes what he says in the myth, even if he cannot prove the claims he 
makes in the myth.150 One passage that is often taken to indicate that Socrates means the myth to 
be taken less seriously is his introduction to it: 
It doesn’t seem to me to be [a matter for] the skill of Glaucus to fully describe what 
[the soul and the earth] are;151 to show that these things are true, though, appears to 
me to be more difficult than the skill of Glaucus. And I might not be able to, but 
also, even if I knew, my life seems to be not sufficient in length for the account. 
οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ᾽ ἐστίν: ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, 
χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ᾽ 
ἂν οἷός τε εἴην,ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός…τῷ μήκει τοῦ 
λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. (108d4-9) 
                                                 
149 One of these passages is discussed at length in Chapter 4, which focuses on the persuasive nature of the arguments 
and the myth. That passage is 114d: “it is necessary to sing these things just as a charm to oneself, on account of which 
I extended my myth just now” (χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον, 
114d). 
150 More of these indications that Socrates believes what he says in the myth will be discussed in Chapter 4—namely, 
the many places that Socrates says he has been ‘persuaded’ of the contents of the myth. 
151 The beginning of this sentence—οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι—is somewhat difficult to 
render into English. Many translators render the phrase with an idea of necessity: “it doesn’t seem I’ll need the art of 
Glaucus” (Brann et al.), “I do not think it requires the skill of Glaucus” (Grube), “I don’t think that describing what 
they are…requires the skill of Glaucus (Sedley and Long). Those who find this necessity to be a stretch may be 
tempted to read the εἶναι as an indication of ability (“the skill of Glaucus does not seem to me to be able to fully 
describe [these things]”); however, this interpretation doesn’t leave much room for contrast with the second clause of 
the sentence, in which Socrates says that showing these things to be true would be more difficult than the skill of 
Glaucus. I am here following Rowe’s suggestion that the εἶναι be taken rather blandly (“to be”), even though this 
requires us to supply something along the lines of “a matter for” (1993, 270). 
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This is a strange and difficult passage, not least because Socrates casts himself in comparison with 
a figure not wholly known to us today.152 What Socrates seems to be saying is that although he is 
able to ‘fully describe’ what the soul and the earth ‘are’ (διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ᾽ ἐστίν), he will not be 
able to demonstrate (or “prove,” as Grube interprets the missing verb) that what he is saying is 
true.153 We have, therefore, a suggestion that the contents of the myth are describable but not 
demonstrable, which is consistent with the way Socrates speaks of his earlier arguments regarding 
the fate of the soul after death. After giving a description of the fate of the soul after death in the 
AGH, for instance, Socrates says that he cannot know whether these things are true until after he 
is dead: “Whether I have shown zeal rightly and we have accomplished anything, we will know 
the clear facts [only once] we have gone there [to Hades]” (εἰ δ᾽ ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καί τι 
ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, 69d4-6). In both the myth and the AGH, Socrates 
is willing to try to describe the fate of the soul after death, but he cannot prove, or even know for 
sure, whether what he is saying is true. 
The fact that Socrates cannot prove or know what he claims in the myth, however, does 
not mean that the myth should be disbelieved. After all, it is constructed in a rational manner with 
the hypothesis of immortality—a hypothesis that has been “proven”—as its Backing. After he tells 
the myth, he tells his interlocutors that it is, if nothing else, worthy of belief: 
                                                 
152 “The ‘skill of Glaucus’ is “a proverbial phrase for expertise. It may refer to Glaucus of Samos, who was said to be 
the inventor of welding” (Brann et al., 91 n. 27). Cf. Grube 146, n. 17. Geddes, however, notes that “it is somewhat 
remarkable that the Scholiasts and Paroemiographi do not connect the proverb with the prophetic craft of the other 
Glaucus, who was regarded as the wizard of the sea” (161, n. D). Sedley and Long give also a third option, a Glaucus 
who invented a harmonious instrument (105).  
153 A further difficulty in understanding this passage is posed when Socrates says εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην: the phrase as it 
stands is ambiguous between whether Socrates means knowing how or knowing that. In other words, it is unclear 
whether Socrates means ‘even if I knew how to give an account of these things, I would not have the time’ or ‘even 
if I knew that these things were true, I would not have time to give an account.’ LSJ indicates that either interpretation 
is plausible (A.I, c. infinitive, and A.II, c. accusative); since the clause lacks both an object and a complimentary 
infinitive, however, it remains ambiguous. Rowe suggests that “in the light of the counterfactual ‘if I did know how 
to,’ ἴσως probably does not indicate any real doubt about [Socrates’] lack of the relevant skill… [Socrates] will not, 
in any case, commit himself to the truth of the description” (1986, 270). 
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To affirm these things confidently in exactly the way I have explained is not proper 
to a man having reason; but indeed that these things or things such as these are true 
about our souls and their dwellings, since indeed the soul appears to be deathless, 
this seems to me proper and worth risking for one who believes these things are 
thus—for the risk is noble… 
τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν 
ἔχοντι ἀνδρί: ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς 
οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν154 μοι 
δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος… 
(114d1-6) 
 
Although it is not proper to believe each detail of what Socrates has said in the myth, it is 
nevertheless ‘proper’ to believe ‘that these things or things such as these are true about our souls’ 
(ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν)—that is, through some kind of 
process, souls migrate to new bodies to be born into a new life. It doesn’t matter, then, whether 
Socrates has gotten all of the details right; rather, since something along the lines of what he has 
said is worthy of belief, his conclusion that we must take care of our souls before and after death 
still holds true.155 Socrates says that he won’t “affirm entirely confidently” everything he has said 
(τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί), 
but this is precisely the verb he used to describe his confidence in the AGH as well: 
Now, though, know well that I hope to arrive [at a place] among good men—and 
this is not [something which] I would affirm entirely confidently—[but] know well 
that if indeed I would affirm confidently something else among such things, it would 
be this: that I will be in the presence of gods, entirely good masters. 
νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν 
πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην—ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε 
ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. (63b9-c4). 
 
                                                 
154 Translated in accordance with LSJ AIII, c. dat. pers. c. part.: “to be conspicuously fitting, beseem.”  
155 Hackforth notes that “there is no question of inaccuracy” in the myth because the language is figurative: “first, 
there are not and cannot be any οἰκήσεις for discarnate souls, since an immaterial being cannot occupy physical space: 
and secondly, there is no question of inaccuracy, of mistaken detail, in the myth; what the myth has done… is to 
present the immaterial in a material form, to suggest the invisible ‘world’ through the medium of language literally 
applicable only to the visible” (1955, 186, ital. in original). 
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Socrates seems quite confident in both cases that the soul is immortal, and that the philosophical 
soul is drawn toward the divine in some way upon the death of the body, even though further talk 
of how exactly this works or what exactly happens to the soul on its journey will be merely well-
reasoned speculation.156 Such speculation will still be well-reasoned, though, because it is born 
from a well-reasoned Backing—the hypothesis that the soul is immortal—which lends authority 
to it. 
It is important to speculate about what sorts of things the discarnate soul might experience 
because Socrates is aiming in both the AGH and the myth to show his interlocutors not merely 
that the soul is immortal, but what the consequences of the soul’s immortality are, i.e., what this 
fact tells them about how to live their lives and how to care for their souls. Neither the AGH nor 
the myth explicitly argue for the immortality of the soul157—the AGH because Socrates assumed 
the immortality of the soul, and the myth because Socrates has argued for (and even ‘proven’) the 
soul’s immortality earlier in the dialogue. The aim of both the AGH and the myth is rather to show 
that regardless of the exact shape of the earth, the exact geography of Hades, and the exact form 
of judgment after death, it is necessary to believe something along the lines of what Socrates says 
about the fate of the soul after death, and to live one’s life accordingly. It may still be a “risk” 
(κίνδυνος) to believe such things, but the risk is “beautiful” or “noble” (καλὸς).158 
Some might suspect that the AGH and the myth cannot share a similar demonstrative status 
because Socrates specifically calls the AGH a λόγος, whereas he calls the myth a μῦθος, which 
                                                 
156 In section 2.4, when I analyzed the fundamental argumentative structure of the myth through the Toulmin model, 
all such details were missing from the argument analysis. This is because the basic argumentative structure of the 
myth does not require any such details. With the myth, Socrates is not trying to argue that the earth or underworld 
have a particular geography, but instead that the hypothesis of the Forms (and also, therefore, what comes from the 
hypothesis of the Forms, namely, the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality) leads to the conclusion that one must pursue 
virtue and wisdom. 
157 In section 3.2, I will argue that the immortality of the soul plays the role of a hypothesis in both of these arguments.  
158 114d6, qtd. above in previous paragraph. 
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might seem to indicate discourse of different statuses. However, the difference between μῦθος and 
λόγος is not completely consistent in Plato, and whatever difference there may be, it is not 
necessarily one that indicates a difference in demonstrative status.159 The fact that Socrates calls 
the AGH a λόγος (66e3, 67c6) and the myth a μῦθος (114d8) could be explained simply by the 
fact that the former is in propositional language and the latter in mythological language. The 
μῦθος/λόγος distinction alone does not seem to be good reason for taking the AGH and the myth 
to have differing demonstrative statuses, particularly in the face of the indications that they do 
have similar demonstrative status that I have discussed in this section.  
I have argued throughout section 3.1 that the demonstrative status of each argument 
(including the myth) in Phaedo takes on a chiastic structure.160 The second and fourth arguments 
(CRA and FA) are said to have ‘proven’ the bare fact of the soul’s immortality, while the first and 
fifth (AGH and Myth) are specifically designated as not to be ‘affirmed entirely confidently’ 
because they discuss details about what happens in the afterlife. Between all of these, the middle 
argument (AA) has a more complex demonstrative status: its final Claim that the soul is immortal 
is stated in more certain terms (somewhat similarly to the CRA and FA, while still not being called 
a ‘proof’), while its preliminary Claim about what happens to the soul after death is stated in less 
certain terms. At the same time, nothing in the argument could be considered a ‘proof’ because of 
the analogical structure of the entire argument. One clear distinction arising from this pattern, 
however, is that Socrates says he has ‘proven’ only the simple fact of the immortality of the soul 
                                                 
159 See Section 1.1.1: A Brief History of Muthos. 
160 This is not to say that there is necessarily a poetic significance to this structure; rather, I mean “chiastic” as simply 
a shorthand for summarizing the similarities among the demonstrative status of the arguments in an A-B-C-B-A 
manner. We should note, however, that the arguments also follow this same chiastic structure thematically. The ‘A’ 
arguments (AGH and Myth) both make a moral case for pursuing the philosophical life; the ‘B’ arguments (CRA and 
FA) are both derived from facts about opposites (or more precisely, Forms of opposites); the ‘C’ argument (AA) 
derives its argument from the soul’s affinity with the Forms. 
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(CRA and FA), while he makes no such claims—and, in fact, hedges his claims—about what 
exactly happens to the soul after death. The myth falls into this latter category of arguments that 
are hedged, but this does not appear to be because of its mythological language. Rather, the myth 
seems to have a demonstrative status similar to that of the AGH, which is given in propositional 
language. Socrates does not wish to ‘affirm confidently’ (διισχυρίσασθαι, 63c2, 114d1) what he 
says in either of these cases, nor can he show that what he says in the myth is true (ὡς μέντοι 
ἀληθῆ, 108d5) or know the clear facts (τὸ σαφὲς, 69d5-6) about what he says in the AGH. But it 
is a ‘noble risk’ (καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος, 114d6) to believe what the myth says about the afterlife, 
and believing what he says in the AGH allows Socrates’ ‘departure [to be] accompanied by good 
hope” (ἀποδημία… μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται, 67c1-2). It is not because the myth is given in 
mythological language that Socrates cannot ‘affirm it confidently’ or show that is ‘true,’ but 
because of its subject-matter: there is no knowledge of the particulars of the afterlife available to 
human beings. 
It is striking that Socrates draws the line between what is provable and what is not where 
he does. Socrates seems to believe that one can, in fact, prove that the soul is immortal, even 
though it seems at least to modern readers that knowledge of even whether the soul is immortal is 
clearly beyond the scope of human knowledge. Understanding why Socrates believes he can 
‘prove’ the immortality of the soul will require examining the role of hypothesis throughout the 
dialogue, with particular emphasis on the hypothesis of the Forms, which is the Backing for each 
of Socrates’ arguments. 
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3.2 The Role of the Hypothesis of the Forms throughout Phaedo 
Just before the Final Argument, Socrates takes a moment to explain what is sometimes 
called his ‘intellectual history’ or ‘second sailing,’161 that is, his shift in the way he looks for the 
causes of things. The method that Socrates eventually adopted both for seeking causes and other 
things is the method of hypothesis. Many scholars read what Socrates says about hypotheses only 
in reference to its immediate surroundings, i.e., the hypothesis of the Forms that Socrates 
introduces and the Final Argument that follows. However, I argue in this section that Socrates’ 
comments about the method of hypothesis make much more sense when read in reference to all 
the arguments of the dialogue. I conclude that reading the hypothesis of the Forms as a ‘higher’ 
hypothesis and the hypothesis of the immortality of the soul as a ‘lower’ hypothesis derived from 
the ‘higher’ one allows us to read the full progression of arguments in Phaedo as an example of 
testing a hypothesis by examining its consequences. 
Just before Socrates gives the FA, he explains that in each investigation, he begins with the 
hypothesis of the Forms: 
I begin from those [Forms], hypothesizing that there is some Beautiful itself by 
itself and some Good and some Great and all the rest; if you grant these to me and 
allow that they are, I hope to show to you from these the cause and to derive how 
the soul is deathless. 
ἄρχομαι ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ 
μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα: ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ 
τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή. (100b5-9) 
 
                                                 
161 Some scholars read the phrase with which Socrates describes his new search for causes, δεύτερος πλοῦς (99d1), as 
the “second best” method (e.g., Bluck [1955], 166-7). However, the phrase can equally be translated “second sailing,” 
which “refers to the use of oars when the wind fails” (Brann et al.1998 , 79). The phrase need not indicate that the 
method of hypothesis Socrates is about to describe is somehow deficient. 
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Even though Socrates has used the hypothesis of Forms as Backing for each of his previous 
arguments, he has so far depended only on the idea that the Forms exist, or more explicitly, that 
there exist some entities that are invisible, noncomposite, and unchanging, which we call Forms.162 
So far, Socrates has made no claims about Forms as causes, nor has he relied on the Forms as 
causes in any of the previous arguments. Here Socrates makes this explicit by saying that if his 
interlocutors will grant that the Forms exist, he hopes to ‘show from these [Forms] the cause’ (ἐκ 
τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν, 100b8). In making the claim only that the Forms exist, Socrates says 
he is saying “nothing new, but the very thing I have never stopped saying both at other times and 
in the account that has just passed [i.e., the AA]” (οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ ἀεί τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν 
τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων, 100b1-3). Let us call this version of the hypothesis 
of the Forms the Hypothesis of Mere Existence.163 
However, Socrates goes on to say something new about these Forms immediately 
afterward. He says that the “next” (ἑξῆς, 100c3) thing to consider is whether the forms are also 
causes: “It seems to me, if there is something else beautiful—in addition to the Beautiful itself—
it is not on account of any other thing that it is beautiful except because it participates in that 
Beautiful, and I speak of all things in this way. Do you grant this sort of cause? (φαίνεται γάρ μοι, 
εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου 
τοῦ καλοῦ: καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς; 100c4-7). Socrates claims that 
declaring the Forms to be causes of particular instances is the “safe” and “safest” way to answer 
                                                 
162 Cf. Bluck 1955: “No doubt each hypothesis must imply an existential proposition, but such a proposition could not 
be meaningfully made unless it was accompanied by a notion of the nature of the Form concerned” (163). 
163 While many scholars accept this interpretation (e.g., Hackforth, Robinson), Bluck 1957 is somewhat unique in 
insisting that the hypothesis of the Forms cannot be the “general” one “that there are Forms,” but rather that “all this 
[100a-101d] is concerned with establishing notions of particular Form-causes” (23). However, Bluck’s interpretation 
of 100a-101d rests entirely on the ideas that (a) 100a and 101d describe different methods, the former Socratic and 
the latter Platonic, and that (b) 101d is merely a “preliminary matter necessary for the final proof of immortality” (25). 
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questions about cause (ἀσφαλής, 100e1; ἀσφαλέστατος, 100d8, ἀσφαλής, 101d2), capable of 
assuaging the “fear” (φόβος, 101b8) that arises from other sorts of explanations.164 Shortly 
afterward, he urges his interlocutors to answer questions about the causes of things by “clinging 
to the safety of the hypothesis” (ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, 101d2), which 
in this case, must be not the Hypothesis of Mere Existence, but a hypothesis that also includes the 
fact that Forms are causes. 
There has been much debate over what exactly the hypothesis of the Forms is, and in 
particular, whether it is something along the lines of the Hypothesis of Mere Existence, or whether 
it includes some notion of the Forms as causes. Those who argue that the hypothesis of the Forms 
does not include their causal nature still grant that their causal nature follows almost immediately 
from the Hypothesis of Mere Existence, but they believe Socrates does not count the idea of Forms 
as causes among those included in the hypothesis of the Forms. They cite, for instance, the fact 
that Socrates introduces the idea that Forms are causes separately from the idea that they exist, and 
that he separates his assertion that Forms are causes from his assertion that they exist with ἑξῆς 
(100c3). Others believe that what Socrates is here making explicit about the causal nature of the 
Forms was included in the ‘hypothesis of the Forms’ all along.165 For the present purpose, however, 
this debate can be sidestepped entirely, since I am claiming only that between 100b and 101d, there 
is a shift in how Socrates articulates the hypothesis of the Forms. Whether he is adding something 
new to the hypothesis of the Forms or simply making it more explicit when he says that Forms are 
                                                 
164 In the same vein, Socrates uses φοβέω (101a5, 101b5, 101c) to describe the feeling one gets from other sorts of 
explanations, as well as εὐλαβέομαι (101c1). 
165 I suspect that this is true; it is difficult to see what is meant by ‘there are Forms’ or even ‘there is a Form Bigness’ 
unless this includes the fact that the Forms are causes of particulars’ participation in them. 
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causes makes no difference here.166 Socrates did not rely on the causal aspect of the Forms in any 
of his previous arguments, but the causal aspect will be an important part of the hypothesis in 
Socrates’ Final Argument, so it is important for him to articulate this aspect of the Forms at this 
point. 
Socrates describes how a hypothesis such as the hypothesis of the Forms can help one 
discover the causes of various phenomena:  
Hypothesizing on each occasion the theory167 that I judge to be strongest,168 those 
things that seem to me to be in agreement with this, I put down as being true, both 
about causes and about all other things, while those things that do not [seem to me 
to be in agreement], [I put down] as being not true. 
ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ 
τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἁπάντων ὄντων, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. (100a3-7) 
 
This passage is vexing to scholars because it seems to raise more questions than it answers, but for 
the most part, we are concerned here only with what it means to be “in agreement with” a 
hypothesis, and whether Socrates is actually suggesting that ‘agreement’ with a hypothesis is 
enough reason for accepting propositions as true. The aim is to find a way of interpreting the idea 
of “being in agreement with” (συμφωνεῖν) that doesn’t make for, as Gallop puts it, “quite 
inadequate ground” for accepting propositions as true. Although there are two general approaches 
                                                 
166 Perhaps Socrates’ reference to multiple hypotheses at 107b would suggest that causality is a separate hypothesis. 
On the other hand, as Gallop notes, the idea of Forms as causes “is evidently inseparable from [the Hypothesis of 
Mere Existence], being integral to the Theory of Forms itself. And if it is taken to form part of ‘the strongest logos,’ 
it will explain why the logos is ‘strongest’” (179). Surely Gallop and others are right to claim that the Hypothesis of 
Mere Existence lacks the explanatory power that Socrates is here seeking. See also fn. 156. 
167 As for the nature of this λόγος, varying interpretations track how one interprets the hypothesis of the Forms.  Bluck, 
who believes the hypothesis of the Forms is not a general one but a collection of particular “Form-causes,” believes 
that these ‘Platonic’ hypotheses are meant to replace ‘Socratic’ definitions. He thus reads the λόγοι referred to here as 
Socratic definitions, while reading the hypotheses of 101d (qtd. in the following paragraph) as the Platonic hypotheses 
([1955] 165-6). This seems to be a rather difficult position to defend, however, considering that the object of 
ὑποθέμενος is λόγον, which connects rather than separates the two concepts. In addition, reading the hypotheses of 
100a as so vastly different from those referred to at 101d requires a fair bit of acrobatics, including allowing a system 
of Forms in which some are ‘causes’ of others (170). 
168 Alternatively, “most powerful” or “in the best health” (LSJ A). 
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to understanding συμφωνεῖν here—either to be ‘consistent’ with or to be ‘inferable from’—neither 
by itself solves the problem. For even if we take the stronger claim that being ‘in agreement’ means 
being ‘inferable from,’ this would still not provide adequate ground for claiming that whatever is 
inferable from any given hypothesis is true. If Socrates is not saying something quite illogical, 
then, there must be something special about the hypotheses Socrates is talking about, such that 
there is, in fact, good reason to take whatever is in agreement with them as true. Gallop notes that 
“‘hypotheses’ need not be hypotheses in the modern sense, i.e., explanatory theories as yet 
unconfirmed. Nor need they be ‘hypothetical’ in the sense of being conditional in form, though 
they may need to be supported by argument” (179). It also does not seem that the hypotheses 
Socrates speaks of here are the same sort as those the mathematicians are said in Republic to use, 
which are not given any account because they are thought to be “clear to all.”169 Rather, Socrates 
begins his explanation by saying that he hypothesizes “the theory that I judge to be strongest” 
(λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, 100a4), indicating that these hypotheses have already 
been through some level of scrutiny or examination. The example we are given is the hypothesis 
of the Forms, a hypothesis which Socrates often discusses, he says,170 and which he uses to 
demonstrate the truth of other propositions. Such hypotheses give good reason for believing the 
propositions that are in agreement with them precisely because those hypotheses have already been 
deemed ‘strongest.’ Plass suggests that such a hypothesis should be considered a “uniquely valid 
                                                 
169 Socrates says of the mathematicians’ method of hypothesis: “I think you know that those engaging in geometry 
and calculation and such things presuppose the odd and the even and the shapes and the three forms of angles and 
other things related to these in each investigation. Taking these things as though they are known, they make these into 
hypotheses, yet they think it worthy (ἀξιοῦσι) of giving no account of them either to themselves or others, as though 
these things are clear to all” (οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα 
πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων 
ἀδελφὰ καθ ̓ ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὑτοῖς οὔτε 
ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ ̓ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν 
ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι, Republic 510c-d) 
170 100b, qtd. above in section 3.2. 
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proposition which determines the truth or falsity of a wide range of other propositions” and “not 
tentative at all” (108). If there is good reason to believe such a hypothesis, there will be good 
reason also to believe what is in harmony with that hypothesis. 
Of course, even the strongest hypothesis is not guaranteed to be correct, and it must be 
subject to thorough examination. Still, Socrates says, there is some end to the examination that is 
required; once the content of a hypothesis has been ‘divided sufficiently’ and ‘followed down as 
far as possible,’ there is no reason to seek further justification for the hypothesis: 
You say rightly that the first hypotheses,171 even if they are believable to us, 
nevertheless are to be examined more clearly: and if you divide them sufficiently, 
as I think, you will follow the argument, down as far as absolutely possible for a 
man to pursue: and should this very thing become sure, you would seek nothing 
further. 
εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως 
ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον: καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε 
τῷ λόγῳ, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι: κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ 
σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. (107b5-9) 
 
It is notable that a hypothesis is to be examined by ‘dividing’ it and ‘following the argument down,’ 
since this presumably refers to what the hypothesis entails, or at least what was suggested at 100a5 
(qtd. in previous paragraph), what “is in agreement with” (συμφωνεῖν) the hypothesis. In order to 
examine a hypothesis, we are not to try to justify it through some higher hypothesis but through 
what is downstream from it.172 It is striking, too, that Socrates says so strongly that this descending 
examination is sufficient: “you would seek nothing further” if “this very thing should become 
sure.” There is a clear and final end to the examination, at which point no further justification for 
the hypothesis is required. 
                                                 
171 “‘Hypotheses’ (plural) could refer to the Theory [of Forms] alone, the positing of each Form being thought of as a 
separate hypothesis” (Gallop 1975, 222). See also fn. 151. 
172 Burnet notes: “The ὑπόθεσις is first tested by seeing whether it is verified or not in particular instances; the 
deduction of the ὑπόθεσις from a higher one is another matter, which must be kept distinct” (1911, 113). 
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The way that ‘following an argument down’ can help to justify the hypothesis on which 
the argument rests is somewhat clarified in the following passage. While Socrates said at 100a5 
that the propositions stemming from a hypothesis have to be ‘in agreement with’ the hypothesis 
itself, he also says they must be in agreement with one another (101d, qtd. below in this paragraph). 
The way to see whether such propositions are in agreement with one another is to ‘follow the 
argument down’ to what comes from it (ὁρμηθέντα) to see whether the these things agree or 
disagree with one another. If they do not agree, the hypothesis must be abandoned or revised in an 
attempt to find a true hypothesis that will not produce contradictory outcomes. This is the process 
for examining a hypothesis to see whether we should assent to it, Socrates says. On the other hand, 
if we must justify a hypothesis, we will need to ascend from our original hypothesis to a higher 
one: 
But if someone should withhold assent from173 the hypothesis itself, you would bid 
him goodbye and would not answer174 until you had examined what comes forth 
from it—if they seem to you to be in agreement or disagreement with one another. 
Then, were it necessary for you to give an account of the [hypothesis] itself, you 
would give it in the same way, hypothesizing another hypothesis—whichever 
among the higher ones seems best—until you should come to something 
sufficient… 
εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐῴης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν 
τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ: ἐπειδὴ 
δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν 
ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις… (101d3-
9) 
 
                                                 
173 Over the translation of ἔχοιτο  here much ink has been spilt. Rowe explains the issue nicely: “scholars have 
generally supposed the reference to be to an objector, and have therefore either taken ἔχεσθαι here in the sense of 
‘attack’ … or—since the change in meaning from d2 ἐχόμενος would be harsh—accepted the emendation ἔφοιτο, but 
without enthusiasm” (247). Some scholars have taken the approach of attempting to understand ἔχοιτο  in the passage 
in its more typical sense, translating with the likes of “hold fast to,” and they argue that a hypothesis is to be examined 
even if it is accepted by someone. While this is certainly true (cf. 107b), I believe it makes more sense in this particular 
context to interpret ἔχοιτο as some form of lack of assent, and have here translated it in accordance with LSJ II.10 (c. 
gen. rei), “keep back from” and II.11 “withhold.” 
174 Alternatively, “defend [it]” (LSJ IV.2). 
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This passage raises questions quite similar to those of 100a (qtd. and discussed earlier in this 
section), namely, how ‘what comes forth’ (ὁρμηθέντα) from a hypothesis might ‘agree’ 
(συμφωνέω) with one another, and in what way this agreement would help to guarantee the truth 
of the hypothesis. Presumably, ὁρμηθέντα that are in agreement with one another will indicate that 
the hypothesis is (so far, at least) felicitous, while if we find that the ὁρμηθέντα disagree, we will 
need to abandon or revise the original hypothesis.175 Here, just as in 107b (qtd. and discussed 
earlier in this section), it is clear that one must descend to examine ὁρμηθέντα of a hypothesis 
before answering to the truth of the hypothesis, and that such an examination would provide greater 
confidence in the hypothesis itself, if indeed the ὁρμηθέντα agree. At the same time, we can ascend 
from a hypothesis to a higher one in order to give an account of the lower hypothesis. 
When it comes to giving an account (λόγος) of a hypothesis, we are to give it ‘in the same 
way’ (ὡσαύτως), namely, by hypothesizing whichever of the higher hypotheses seems best, until 
we arrive at something ‘sufficient.’ If we are to turn to a ‘higher’ hypothesis and give an account 
‘in the same way,’ this must mean that our previous (‘lower’) hypothesis has now become one of 
the ὁρμηθέντα from the higher hypothesis that we are to examine. The previous, ‘lower’ hypothesis 
must now be examined both for agreement with other hypotheses on its same ‘level’ and for 
agreement with the ‘higher’ hypothesis. This is to be done “until you should come to something 
sufficient” (ἱκανόν)—and not, we should note, until we arrive at something ‘true,’ ‘sure,’ 
‘unhypothesized,’ or the like. Socrates is decidedly unspecific here, likely because what counts as 
“sufficient” will depend on the context. Since the immediate context is the hypothesis of the Forms, 
                                                 
175 Gallop believes that the latter scenario in which a hypothesis leads to disagreeing ὁρμηθέντα would be impossible: 
“If ‘accord’ and ‘discord’ here mean ‘consistency’ and ‘inconsistency,’ how could consequences springing from a 
single hypothesis fail to be ‘in accord’ with each other? For no single proposition can logically entail consequences 
that do, in fact, contradict each other” (1975, 189). However, it is precisely the realization that some ὁρμηθέντα are 
‘infelicitous’ that leads Socrates to embark on his ‘second sailing’ (cf. 99d1).  
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many commentators look to this hypothesis as an example of the process Socrates is describing, 
and they wonder what ‘higher’ hypothesis could help to give an account of the hypothesis of the 
Forms.176 But this leads to trouble. Bluck, for instance, laments that “it seems hard to find in the 
text, or to supply, any ‘higher’ hypothesis to which the [hypothesis of the Forms] is thus related” 
(190). I agree that it would be difficult to discern a ‘higher’ hypothesis than that of the Forms, and 
that the hypothesis of the Forms thus makes a lamentable example of the process Socrates is 
describing. A much more felicitous example, it seems, would come from taking the hypothesis of 
the Forms as the ‘higher’ hypothesis, the hypothesis that the soul is immortal as the ‘lower’ 
hypothesis, and the progression of arguments throughout the dialogue as a process of descent and 
ascent between these two hypotheses.177 
As I showed in chapter 2, the first argument of the dialogue, the AGH, uses the hypothesis 
of the Forms (proposition 6) to argue that the philosopher should not fear death. But the AGH also 
relies on the hypothesis that the soul is immortal (proposition 1)—and this is precisely what 
Simmias and Cebes object to. Since the hypothesis that the soul is immortal has been challenged, 
Socrates now finds himself needing to give an account of the hypothesis itself (ἐκείνης 
αὐτῆς…διδόναι λόγον). He does this by seeking a higher hypothesis (ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν 
ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, 101d7-8) that Simmias and Cebes do not object 
                                                 
176 One exception to this is Rowe, who notes that the hypothesis of the Forms was also used in the AA and to refute 
Simmias’ objection that the soul might be a harmony: “the form-hypothesis has already been applied in the 
recommended way, since it was used as the basis for accepting the theory of ἀνάμνησις and for rejecting the attunement 
theory” (Rowe 241). Rowe does not, however, discuss how Socrates has used the hypothesis of the Forms as the 
Backing for all of his arguments in the dialogue. 
177 Socrates does not specifically call the hypothesis that the soul is immortal a ὑπόθεσις. However, he does call a 
rather similar proposition a ὑπόθεσις when he is explaining to Simmias how the soul cannot be a harmony: 
contradictions follow “if the hypothesis were correct that the soul is a harmony” (εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν 
ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, 94b). Both grammatically and logically speaking, if the idea that ‘the soul is a harmony’ can be a 
hypothesis, it seems that the idea that the soul is of a different sort (i.e., immortal) could also be a hypothesis, 
particularly considering that ‘the soul is a harmony’ is metaphorical language. 
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to, and this is the hypothesis of the Forms. Throughout the next three arguments (CRA, AA, FA), 
Socrates demonstrates various ways that the hypothesis of the Forms leads to the hypothesis of 
immortality, and in so doing, he examines both ‘what is in agreement’ with the higher hypothesis 
of the Forms (cf. 100a) and whether the things that come from this hypothesis are in agreement 
with each other (cf. 101d). In this way, the entire dialogue can be seen to center around the 
hypothesis of the soul’s immortality: the framing arguments of the dialogue (AGH and myth) 
descend from this hypothesis to show its ὁρμηθέντα (i.e., the fate of the soul after death and the 
moral imperatives for life that come from this), while the middle arguments in the dialogue (CRA, 
AA, and FA) ascend from the hypothesis of immortality to give an account of it through the higher 
hypothesis of the Forms. This interpretation appears more felicitous than the more commonly held 
view (the view that Socrates is referring to a hypothesis higher than that of the Forms), both 
because we get to see Socrates’ entire process of accounting for a hypothesis, and because his 
account of the hypothesis of the Forms is, in the end, at least logically accepted by his interlocutors. 
Such a reading also gives further evidence that the AGH and the myth share a similar 
demonstrative status, and helps to explain why that status is lower than the proofs for the 
immortality of the soul. Even though the AGH and the myth have, at the highest level, the Backing 
of the hypothesis of the Forms, they also rely on the lower hypothesis of the immortality of the 
soul. These two arguments simply cannot have as high a demonstrative status as arguments that 
rely solely on a higher hypothesis. Higher hypotheses are necessarily more sure, thus the 
conclusions that are derivable from them are also more sure. The hypothesis of the immortality of 
the soul is directly derivable, Socrates thinks, from the hypothesis of the Forms. Thus Socrates can 
‘prove’ that the soul is immortal through many different arguments based on the hypothesis of the 
Forms. However, any argument based on the lower hypothesis of the immortality of the soul such 
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as the AGH or the myth will have a lower demonstrative status because its Backing is a lower 
hypothesis. This is why Socrates says he has ‘proven’ the bare fact that the soul is immortal, but 
he is unwilling to vouch for the details of the fate of the soul after death. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
The demonstrative status of the arguments in Phaedo follow a chiastic structure, with the 
first and fifth arguments (AGH and myth) having a lower status because of their reliance on the 
lower hypothesis that the soul is immortal. The second and fourth arguments (CRA and FA) have 
a higher demonstrative status because they rely only on the higher hypothesis of the Forms, and 
they are thus able to count as ‘proofs’ for the immortality of the soul. The third argument (AA) 
also relies on the higher hypothesis of the forms, but its discussion of the experiences of the soul 
after death (after its initial Claim) prohibits it from being a proof; its demonstrative status thus lies 
somewhere between the higher status of the CRA and FA and the lower status of the AGH and 
myth. What this means in terms of the contents of the arguments is that the bare proposition that 
the soul is immortal can be proven, but any details about the fate of the soul after death can be only 
well-reasoned speculation. This speculation is still well-reasoned, however, because all of 
Socrates’ assertions about the fate of the soul after death are based on the hypothesis of the soul’s 
immortality, which in turn uses the even higher hypothesis of the Forms as its Backing. As the 
arguments in the dialogue ascend and descend between these two hypotheses, we are not only 
given an account of the hypothesis of immortality through Socrates’ appeal to the higher 
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hypothesis of the Forms, but we are also able to gain greater confidence in both hypotheses by 
examining their ὁρμηθέντα for consistency. 
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Chapter 4 
 
In the preceding chapters, I argued that the myth of Phaedo can be understood as an 
argument, because it has an argumentative structure based on the hypothesis of the Forms (Chapter 
2), and it has a demonstrative status similar to that of some of the propositional arguments in the 
dialogue (Chapter 3). Throughout those chapters, I aimed to show overall that the myth has a 
‘lower’ demonstrative status—as compared to some of the other propositional arguments, namely, 
the CRA and the FA—because it elaborates on specific aspects of the afterlife, which cannot be 
known for sure, rather than because it is expressed in mythological language. No form of discourse 
that speaks of the specifics of the afterlife will be able to have  the ‘higher’ demonstrative status 
that Socrates affords to his proofs of the immortality of the soul, so there is no reason to 
automatically privilege the demonstrative status of propositional arguments over mythological 
arguments.  
However, all of this is not to say that the myth operates in exactly the same way as the 
propositional arguments. The way Socrates intends for his myth to persuade his interlocutors 
differs from the way Socrates intends for his propositional arguments to persuade. In this Chapter, 
I analyze the persuasive function of the myth and argue that although the myth shares one of its 
persuasive functions with the propositional arguments, it also has one of its own persuasive 
functions that cannot be brought about through literal, propositional language. After outlining the 
specific contents of the myth (section 4.1), I discuss the range of types of discourse Socrates says 
are capable of ‘persuading’ (4.2), in order to show that various types of persuasion can arise from 
different types of discourse, and that the persuasive nature of a myth need not be fully rational or 
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fully non-rational. In 4.3, I analyze how the myth is intended to persuade on a rational level by 
giving greater reason for trusting in the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality, and I argue in addition 
that its relationship to this hypothesis further distinguishes it from the other arguments in the 
dialogue. Section 4.4 analyzes, on the other hand, the non-rational persuasive function of the myth, 
namely, its ability to ‘charm away’ the ‘fears’ of its hearers, while 4.5 explains why these 
persuasive functions are, within the dramatic setting of the dialogue, ultimately unsuccessful on 
Simmias and Cebes. 
 
4.1 The Contents and The Character of the Myth 
The myth itself seems to begin at 108d, but Socrates gives a ‘prelude’ to it, which is 
something like a condensed version of it, from 107d-108c. The myth is prompted by Simmias 
asking Socrates to explain more about the character of the earth, since Simmias has heard “many 
things” about the earth, “but not those that persuade [Socrates]” (πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι 
ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει, 108d). The implication is that Simmias either has found none of the things he 
has previously heard persuasive, or else he believes they would not be persuasive to Socrates. 
Socrates uses the somewhat odd comparison to Glaucus, discussed in section 3.1.5,178 to say that 
he will not necessarily be able to speak the “truth” about what he is going to say, but he will do 
                                                 
178 Socrates says: “It doesn’t seem to me to be [a matter for] the skill of Glaucus to fully describe what [the soul and 
the earth] are; to show that these things are true, though, appears to me to be more difficult than the skill of Glaucus. 
And I might not be able to, but also, even if I knew, my life seems to be not sufficient in length for the account.” (οὐχ 
ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ᾽ ἐστίν: ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν 
Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ᾽ ἂν οἷός τε εἴην,ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός…τῷ 
μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν, 108d4-9). 
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his best to fully explain what he himself has been “persuaded” of. The content of the myth can be 
roughly divided into two parts; Socrates first gives a description of the shape and features of the 
earth, including Hades, which then leads to an explanation of how different souls with different 
characters fare in Hades. 
The earth, Socrates says, is spherical and held in perfect balance in the middle of the 
heavens. Common views about the earth are mistaken not only about its size, for it is much larger 
than people think, but also about where people are living on the earth. While we think we live on 
the surface of the earth, surrounded by air, followed by a layer of ether, followed by the heavens 
highest above, we in fact live in something like the divots of the earth (much like those in a golf 
ball, it seems). Those who live in Greece live in a divot near the ocean, while other divots have 
other sorts of characters commonly associated with the varying geographical features of the earth. 
The divots are all connected through rivers of cold or hot, fresh or salt water, or of mud, lava, or 
fire. Air, mist, water, and sediment settle into the divots, flowing in and out of each one, constantly 
circulating. The surface of the earth, on the other hand, is surrounded not by air or ether but directly 
by the heavens. 
The earth’s surface is multicolored, with each region displaying one particular color. 
Socrates likens this surface to a twelve-sided ball (δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, 110b6-7), which 
commentators unanimously interpret as a ball made of twelve pentagons of leather, sewn together 
to create a dodecahedron (though because the leather is flexible, it becomes more spherical), which 
was a common method for creating balls in Socrates’ time.179 Each region is not only colored 
differently from each other region, Socrates says, but is also colored in the most splendid and rich 
form of each color, the likes of which no human being has ever seen. These surface regions are so 
                                                 
179 Geddes (1885) 165, Burnet (1911) 131, Rowe (1993) 275.  
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splendid that their colors reflect and refract into the divots we inhabit, creating glimpses of these 
colors for us to see. On the surface are also precious metals, trees, animals, and even humans—all 
much healthier, more magnificent, and more perfect than those in the divots. The human beings 
living there are happier, healthier, and longer-living than we are, and they have direct, face-to-face 
communion with the gods, since they are living in the heavens. Who exactly these people are 
becomes clear only toward the end of the myth. 
Running through the earth from one side to another, as though a hole had been drilled 
straight through it, is the region of Tartarus. All of the rivers of water, air, mud, and lava that 
stretch into the divots flow in and out from this region, and they flow through Tartarus as though 
it were breathing them in and out. The most prominent rivers in Tartarus are the Ocean, which 
flows in a circle; the Acheron, which flows oppositely to the Ocean; the Pyriphlegethon, flowing 
throughout the region with fire, water and mud; the dark-blue Stygian with its lake called the Styx; 
and the Cocytus, which discharges into Tartarus opposite the Pyriphlegethon. 
When souls arrive in the underworld, they are judged for their actions in life, both vicious 
and virtuous ones, and are sent to one of four places to receive purification, punishments, or 
rewards. Those found to have lived “incurably” (ἀνιάτως ἔχειν, 113e2) are cast into the innermost 
regions of the underworld, never to escape. But most souls head to a region in which they might 
suffer just punishments for their actions and be purified through this process. Those who have 
shown a great amount of viciousness but are nevertheless curable are cast into Tartarus at first, but 
tossed back out one year later, whence they flow down either along Cocytus or Pyriphlegethon, in 
order to pass by the souls on the Acherousian lake. Here dwell the souls of those whom they have 
harmed, and the souls flowing past on the rivers must entreat and persuade them to permit their 
entry into the Acherousian lake. If they are at first unsuccessful, however, they are cast back into 
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Tartarus yet again, and the process begins anew. Those who lived “middlingly” (μέσως, 113d4) 
dwell on the Acherousian lake, where, once they are “purified” (καθαιρόμενοι, 113d7) and have 
“paid penalties for their unjust deeds,” (ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας, 113d7-8), they are released. 
Finally, those who lived life in accordance with what is “pious” (πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως,180 114b5) are 
immediately released from the underworld and led to dwell on the true surface of the earth, where 
they live in justice and happiness, and among the gods. 
The overall character of Socrates’ myth is hopeful and uplifting. The Underworld is 
characterized overall as purgative rather than punitive, since very few souls are judged to have 
been so wicked in life that they will never escape Tartarus. The majority, instead, are permitted to 
dwell on the Acherousian lake, either after they have paid a penalty and been “purified” 
(καθαιρόμενοι, 113d7), or after they have paid a longer-lasting penalty and persuaded those they 
have wronged to allow them to dwell on the lake (114a-b). Even those who have committed 
murder, including patricides and matricides, are not cast into Tartarus forever, but are instead 
allowed to entreat their victims for entry into the Acherousian lake (114a). Of course, the most 
hopeful of all fates is that of those who have lived in a “pious” way (ὁσίως, 114b5), who are 
allowed to dwell on the surface of the earth among gods for the rest of time (εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, 
114c4). This is the eternal life that we should be aspiring to, says Socrates: “But on account of 
those things we have detailed, it is necessary to do everything so as to share in virtue and wisdom 
in life; for the prize is beautiful, and the hope great” (ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν 
… πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν: καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς 
                                                 
180 A recent book by Saskia Peels (2016) explains the complex range of meanings and connotations of this and related 
terms. She notes that such words were common “evaluative” terms in Plato’s time (2), (and in fact, Plato’s Euthyphro 
centers around a discussion of what the term means), and argues that the core meaning of such terms is “what humans 
do to please the gods and to give them the τιμή they deserve” (255), including certain interpersonal actions that are 
governed in particular by the gods, such as honoring one’s parents or one’s guests (256). 
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μεγάλη, 114c6-9). Even if Socrates cannot know exactly what will happen to the soul after death, 
he nevertheless believes it ‘necessary’ to follow the path of virtue and wisdom in life, for the sake 
of ‘great hope’ about what will happen after death. If the soul is immortal, as Socrates has been 
trying to persuade Simmias and Cebes throughout the dialogue, the soul must ‘go’ somewhere and 
‘do’ something after the death of the body, and it seems natural to Socrates to think that the soul’s 
journey and activity after death will be dictated by the condition of the soul, the condition it is in 
because of the life it is accustomed to leading. For Socrates, accepting the immortality of the soul 
should lead one to question what sorts of things might happen to the soul after death, which should 
lead us to a conclusion somewhere along the lines of the myth he tells: “since indeed the appears 
to be deathless, this seems to me proper and worth risking for one who believes these things are 
thus—for the risk is noble…” (ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι 
δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος, 114d4-6). Indeed, 
Socrates has already pointed out that even if it is a ‘risk’ to believe in the immortality of the soul, 
nothing but good can come from believing this: if he is right, his soul will be well off, and if he is 
wrong, there will be no consequences for his soul whatsoever.181 The myth, then, has an overall 
hopeful and uplifting character. The point is not to fear punishments that might come after death, 
or to pursue virtue and wisdom only for the sake of a pleasant afterlife, but that a soul in the proper 
condition will be able to gracefully bear whatever happens to it, be it in life, in death, or in the next 
life.182 
                                                 
181 Socrates says, perhaps somewhat jokingly, that if his soul is about to die along with his body, no harm will come 
to him, but beliving that his soul will live on will make their current conversation much more pleasant: “If the things 
I am saying happen to be true, my being persuaded [of them] is good; and if there is nothing for one who has died, I 
will be less unpleasant in lamenting to those present in this very time before my death” (εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα 
ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι: εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ 
θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος, 91b2-5).  
182 Something quite similar is suggested by the Myth of Er in Republic. See Section 5.1.2. 
 121 
4.2 The Range of Rationality and Persuasiveness 
This section and the next will aim to more fully explain how the myth appeals in both 
rational and non-rational ways. A number of scholars have interpreted Plato’s myths as having 
only a non-rational persuasive function. They contend that myth is necessarily non-rational 
because it appeals to the lower parts of Plato’s tripartite soul, the parts concerned with passions 
and desires.183 These scholars tend to conceive of myths as a non-rational supplement to rational 
discourse, because they believe that myths help to move the lower parts of the soul, just as Plato’s 
rational arguments (i.e., dialectic) move the higher, rational part of the soul. Hitchcock and 
Brisson, for instance, emphasize the benefit of appealing to the lower parts of the soul as a way of 
reinforcing one’s true knowledge gained through dialectic. And Trabattoni believes that the 
function of myth is to vividly describe the metaphysical reality of something whose existence 
Socrates has argued for in propositional language, such as the immortal, discarnate soul. One large 
issue with conceiving of Socrates’ myths as non-rational, however, is that there is little to no 
evidence suggesting that Plato or his characters thought of myth as non-rational,184 and there is, in 
fact, evidence to suggest that Plato thought of myth as rational, such as Socrates’ occasional 
characterization of myths as ‘proofs’185 and Timaeus’ seeming equivocation in the way he 
characterizes his myth as an εἰκώς μῦθος and an εἰκώς λόγος in Timaeus. Furthermore, as Rowe 
has argued, myth cannot be intended to address the non-rational parts of the soul because those 
parts cannot be addressed through discourse of any type.186  
                                                 
183 See, e.g., Trabattoni (320), Edelstein (480), Hitchcock (iii), and Brisson (2004 [1996]), 19. 
184 See Section 4.4 for a discussion of how myth can persuade in a non-rational way, even though mythological 
discourse itself is not inherently non-rational. 
185 Cf. Phaedrus 245b-c. 
186 Rowe 2012,  136, 142-3. 
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A careful distinction must be made. I believe Rowe is completely correct to point out that 
non-rational parts of the soul cannot be directly addressed through any type of discourse. Even if 
we don’t want to make the stronger claim that discourse is itself inherently rational (unless, 
perhaps, someone is talking nonsense), it certainly seems true that argumentative discourse—a 
category into which I have been arguing the myth falls—is inherently rational. Yet Socrates’ 
suggestions throughout the dialogue that the myth is capable of ‘charming away’ the ‘childlike 
fears’ of Simmias and Cebes (discussed at length in section 4.5) would suggest that the myth is, in 
fact, capable of operating also in some non-rational way. Here lies the distinction I wish to make: 
while the myth itself is necessarily rational because it is presented in language, it has the capacity 
also to affect its hearers in a non-rational way. Its persuasive capacities are thus of two different 
types, both rational and non-rational. The myth shares with propositional arguments its rational 
persuasive appeal, but the non-rational persuasive appeal is unique to the myth. The reasons for 
making this distinction and the evidence for my claim will, I hope, become clear in sections 4.4 
and 4.5, which more fully analyze the rational persuasive function of the myth (4.4) and its non-
rational persuasive function (4.5). First, though, I wish to make a few more preliminary remarks 
about the myriad types of discourse that Socrates says can be ‘persuasive.’ 
Throughout the Platonic corpus, Socrates uses the verb “to persuade” (πείθειν) to describe 
the effect of myriad types of speech—both false and true statements (false: Republic 361b3, 391d6, 
414d3; true: Republic 476e1), speeches (“λόγος”; Phaedrus 260b1, 261a4, 271b4), rhetoric 
(Phaedrus 260c7), the poetry of Homer (Republic 391a5, 391c1), arguments and accounts 
(“λόγος”; Phaedo 84e1-2, Meno 81d), philosophy (Phaedo 83a5), and even education (“παιδεύω”; 
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Republic 548b7, cf. Laws 720d-e and Gorgias 453e-4a).187 While it’s true that Socrates sometimes 
uses πείθειν to describe the effects of non-argumentative speech (e.g., poetry), πείθειν also applies 
to many types of speech that are explicitly arguments or accounts, as well as to those that have a 
generally argumentative character (e.g., speeches, rhetoric). In Phaedo, Socrates speaks explicitly 
of the CA and AA in particular as capable of persuasion, as well as the myth188 (in each case, 
Socrates is either noting that he has not yet persuaded someone or is agnostic as to whether 
someone has been persuaded). Considering the wide range of speech-types that Socrates describes 
as capable of “persuading”—everything from false statements to proofs—the term does not appear 
to carry a connotation of truth or falsity, validity or invalidity, or anything else suggesting whether 
the discourse can be trusted. In other words, persuasion, for Socrates, is the effect of a number of 
very different ways of speaking, and should not necessarily be understood as an act of ‘mere 
persuasion’—as opposed to some better, truer, or more rigorous form of convincing. 
In Phaedo, Socrates says he himself has been persuaded of the myth four times. Socrates 
concludes the ‘preamble’ to the myth, which describes the general shape of the earth, by saying 
“as I have been persuaded by someone” (ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι, 108c7-8). When beginning 
the myth, he says that while he cannot give an account of what he will say, “nothing prevents me 
                                                 
187 A debt is owed here to Leonard Brandwood’s Word Index to Plato, without which my ability to compile this list 
would have been greatly decelerated. We should note also that Socrates claims in Gorgias that there are two general 
types of persuasion, one providing belief and one providing knowledge: “But both those who have learned have been 
persuaded, and those who have believed. …Do you wish, then, for us to lay out two forms of persuasion, one that 
provides believing without knowing, and one that provides knowing?” (ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι 
εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. …βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ᾽ 
ἐπιστήμην; Gorgias 454e). However, this distinction that Socrates draws in Gorgias need not be consistent with the 
treatment of persuasion in Phaedo or in any other dialogue. 
188 Socrates says that if the CA alone has not persuaded Simmias of the soul’s immortality, they should then discuss 
whether the soul exists before humans are born (i.e., the RA) (73b); after the AA, that it will be hard to persuade others 
if he cannot persuade Simmias that the soul is immortal (84d-e); that if he has persuaded Phaedo of the soul’s 
immortality, Phaedo will not mourn Socrates’ death the next day (89b); that if he has persuaded Simmias and Cebes, 
they will give little thought to his present situation and much more to the truth of the matter (91b-c); and finally, even 
after the myth, that he has not persuaded Crito that his soul will live on after death (115c). 
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from saying what sort of thing I have been persuaded the shape of the earth is, and its regions” 
(τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οἵαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν, 
108d9-e2). He continues: the first thing he “has been persuaded of” (πέπεισμαι, 108e4) is that if 
the earth is spherical and situated in the middle of the heavens, it needs nothing to hold it in place—
and he concludes his description of the location of the earth in the heavens by saying again that 
“this, then, is the first thing of which I have been persuaded” (πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν … τοῦτο 
πέπεισμαι, 109a7). This particular instance of “πέπεισμαι,” however, introduces an indirect 
statement lasting nearly an entire Stephanus page, concluding finally at 110a1. The upshot is that 
the entire beginning of the myth is steeped in reminders that Socrates is saying what he ’has been 
persuaded of.’ As I argued I Chapter 3, Socrates cannot know that what he is saying in the myth is 
true, because the myth describes the fate of the soul after death, which is something that cannot be 
known. But the myth has been constructed from a hypothesis that Socrates believes to be true and 
that he believes he has proven—not just to Simmias and Cebes, but more importantly, to 
himself.189 The myth is persuasive to Socrates, it seems, partly because it has this rational appeal; 
it is a well-reasoned argument that uses Socrates’ ‘most secure’ hypothesis—the hypothesis of the 
Forms—as Backing.190 
The fact that the myth is persuasive partially because it is based on a trustworthy hypothesis 
does nothing to distinguish it from the AGH, however, because the AGH is also based on the 
hypothesis that the soul is immortal. If there were no other way for the myth to be persuasive, it 
                                                 
189 Cf. 91a7-b1: “I will be eager that the things I am saying seem true not so much to those present, unless that be an 
addition, but that they seem true as much as possible to me myself” (οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει 
ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν). 
190 See Section 2.4, where a Toulmin analysis of the myth is given. This analysis shows how the argument of the myth 
is constructed from the hypothesis of the immortality of the soul, which itself was constructed from the hypothesis of 
the Forms. 
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might seem indistinguishable, at least in terms of its persuasive function, from arguments based 
on the same hypothesis that are made in propositional language. The additional persuasive function 
of the myth as capable of ‘charming away’ one’s ‘fears,’ however, gives it a second persuasive 
function that is unique, and which comes about only because of its mythological language. 
 
4.3 A Persuasive Function of the Myth: Examining the Lower Hypothesis 
In Section 3.2, I argued that Socrates gives a demonstration in the dialogue of the ascent 
from a lower to a higher hypothesis.191 Because Simmias and Cebes object to the hypothesis that 
the soul is immortal when Socrates assumes this in the AGH, he ascends to the higher hypothesis 
of the Forms in the RCA, AA, and FA, in order to prove the lower hypothesis that the soul is 
immortal. We are now ready to address the role that the myth plays in attempting to persuade 
Socrates’ interlocutors of the lower hypothesis that the soul is immortal. This likely sounds like a 
strange suggestion, that an argument (the myth) is intended to persuade its hearers of the very 
hypothesis on which the argument itself is grounded. At best, we might think, this would be an 
instance of begging the question. On the contrary, though, I intend to show that the myth does not 
argue for the hypothesis that the soul is immortal (this would indeed be begging the question, and 
furthermore, this task was completed by the CRA, AA, and FA), yet the myth is still intended to 
                                                 
191 Socrates explains this ascent: “were it necessary for you to give an account of the [hypothesis] itself, you would 
give it in the same way, hypothesizing another hypothesis—whichever among the higher ones seems best—until you 
should come to something sufficient…” (ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ 
ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις…, 101d-e). For a more in-depth 
discussion of the significance of this passage and how it relates to the propositional arguments throughout the dialogue, 
see section 3.2. 
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give its hearers greater confidence in the hypothesis. This does not create a tension for Socrates 
because the hypothesis of the immortality of the soul is particularly difficult to persuade oneself 
to believe,192 so even if it has been proven in previous arguments, it will still be useful to examine 
its outcomes. 
After all of the propositional arguments in the dialogue—that is, just before the myth—
Socrates agrees that Simmias may still want to examine their first hypotheses before accepting the 
arguments produced from them, but that once he has done so, he should be willing to believe the 
arguments: 
You say rightly that the first hypotheses, even if they are believable to us, 
nevertheless are to be examined more clearly: and if you divide them sufficiently, 
as I think, you will follow the argument, down as far as absolutely possible for a 
man to pursue: and should this very thing become sure, you would seek nothing 
further. 
εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως 
ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον: καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε 
τῷ λόγῳ, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι: κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ 
σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. (107b5-9) 
 
This passage is commonly understood to refer to examining the hypothesis of the Forms, and 
understandably so, because of its location in the dialogue. Socrates says this just after the FA, 
which, along with the two prior arguments, was based on the hypothesis of the Forms. So it makes 
a great deal of sense to think that when Socrates says we should examine the ‘first hypotheses,’ he 
means the hypothesis of the Forms (and any others on which the propositional arguments might 
be based). However, there seems to be no reason to think this same process would not apply to any 
other hypothesis that Socrates and his interlocutors are making use of, such as the hypothesis of 
the soul’s immortality. 
                                                 
192 In section 4.4, I explain that a ‘charm’ like the myth is necessary for someone to be persuaded of the soul’s 
immortality. And in 4.5, I discuss at length why Simmias and Cebes are still not persuaded by the end of the dialogue. 
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If this is correct, then the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality can also be ‘divided’ and 
‘followed down as far as absolutely possible.’ I argued in section 3.2 that this division must be 
into the various outcomes of a hypothesis (i.e., premises in arguments constructed from the 
hypothesis), and that this following-down must be a following of these outcomes or premises to a 
conclusion. If we do this rightly, Socrates says, the hypothesis should then ‘become sure’ to us, 
and we will ‘seek nothing further.’ In other words, if we follow the premises that a hypothesis 
generates to their conclusion, then, as long as the hypothesis was true to begin with, the hypothesis 
should eventually become sure (σαφής, 107b9)193 to us, sure enough that we will not seek any 
further justification for that hypothesis. Applying this principle to the myth, then, we find that one 
(at least intended194) function of the myth is to give its hearers greater confidence in the hypothesis 
of the immortality of the soul. The myth is an argument based on this hypothesis, but it is also, in 
the sense I have been describing, an ‘examination’ of that hypothesis—one that, as long as the 
hypothesis is true, is capable of making the hypothesis ‘sure’ for us. In this way, arguments based 
on hypotheses aren’t merely ‘examinations’ but also something like familiarizing techniques. By 
examining the outcomes of a hypothesis, we are able to better understand the hypothesis itself 
because we understand what sorts of premises it generates and what sorts of conclusions it leads 
to. 
I have now expanded the correlation I began drawing out in 3.2 between the relationship 
the myth has to the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality and the relationships the CRA, AA, and 
FA have to the hypothesis of the Forms. Each of these arguments (including the myth) is not only 
developed from its corresponding hypothesis, but each argument also functions as an examination 
                                                 
193 Here, σαφής could also be translated ‘manifest’ (LSJ A) or ‘unerring’ (LSJ A2). 
194 Of course, at the end of the myth, Cebes has still not been persuaded of this hypothesis, and Simmias may not be, 
either. Reasons for this are addressed in 4.5. 
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of that hypothesis, with the aim of giving its hearers greater assurance that the hypothesis is indeed 
true. And this is one reason that Socrates says Simmias and Cebes should repeat the myth or 
something like it to themselves each day195: such repetition helps to better familiarize them with 
the outcomes of the hypothesis of the immortality of the soul. Repetition of the myth need not be 
exact, literal, rote repetition, but would in fact be more like an exploration of the hypothesis of the 
soul’s immortality, which could take slightly different shapes each time it is repeated.196 In this 
way, the overall structure of the dialogue centers around the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality: 
the RCA, AA, and FA ascend from this hypothesis to the higher hypothesis of the Forms, while 
the AGH and myth descend from this hypothesis in order to explore its outcomes. 
The myth uses the hypothesis of the immortality of the soul to develop an argument that 
we must take care of our souls both in life and in death. If we recall the Toulmin analyses of each 
argument in Phaedo from Chapter 2, we find that Socrates’ very first argument, the Argument for 
Great Hope, also relied on the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality. It was only because Simmias 
and Cebes raised a Rebuttal this hypothesis following the AGH that Socrates gave the rest of the 
                                                 
195 Socrates tells Simmias and Cebes: “But it is necessary…to sing a charm to yourself each day until you have 
charmed away [such fears]” (ἀλλὰ χρή…ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε, 77e9-10). The reasons for 
this are discussed in sections 4.4 and 4.5. 
196 I hope I have shown in Chapter 2 that the fundamental argument underlying the Phaedo myth does not require the 
details of the myth to be accurate. In Section 5.1, I identify fundamental similarities between the eschatological myths 
of Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, and I argue that the similarities among these myths display a fairly consistent 
view of the afterlife—and, more importantly, of the ethical imperatives that follow from this view. At this point in 
Phaedo, however, the question of how to interpret two of Socrates’ assertions remains open: namely, the assertions 
that “it is necessary to sing such things just as a charm to oneself” (χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, 114d6-7), 
and also that it would be proper “to affirm confidently … that these things or things such as these are true about our 
souls and their dwellings” (διισχυρίσασθαι … ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς 
οἰκήσεις, 114d1-3). It is possible that Socrates is referring to “such myths” rather than “such details” when he says τὰ 
τοιαῦτα and ταῦτ᾽… ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽; however, I argue in 5.1.3 that Socrates presents a consistent view of immortality, the 
judgment of souls, and the ethical imperatives that such myths display. In light of this consistent view, I am 
comfortable claiming that the details of each of these myths are not important in terms of the argument of each myth, 
but they certainly have a role to play in the persuasive function of the myth. In fact, we can take τὰ τοιαῦτα and 
ταῦτ᾽… ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ as referring to either ‘such myths’ or ‘such details in this particular myth’ and still find a consistent 
view across dialogues that, through myth, Socrates intends to convey a certain understanding of the afterlife that  
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arguments for the immortality of the soul: the CRA, AA, and FA. The rhetorical context thus 
required Socrates to give reasons for believing the hypothesis of immortality before his 
interlocutors would be willing to hear what the outcomes of this hypothesis are, outcomes that 
Socrates attempts to describe again later in the myth. Had Simmias and Cebes not objected to the 
AGH that they were not yet convinced of the soul’s immortality, Socrates would not have needed 
to justify his use of that hypothesis by providing arguments for it; no justification need be given to 
an interlocutor who already believes a hypothesis. On the other hand, the myth logically requires 
the hypothesis of the immortality of the soul, since this is the hypothesis on which it is constructed. 
Here lies the distinction I wish to make: while the myth requires the use of the hypothesis of the 
soul’s immortality, it does not require the specific set of arguments, or any one of the arguments, 
Socrates provides in the dialogue. The hypothesis might be justified or proven in myriad ways (as 
Socrates does in Phaedo), or it might be accepted by an interlocutor without proof. Socrates argues 
for the hypothesis in the ways he does in Phaedo because of the particular rhetorical context in 
which he finds himself. In other words the myth is wholly independent from the particular 
propositional arguments Socrates gives prior to it, even though the myth requires the hypothesis 
of immortality as Backing. 
As I began to show in Chapter 2, both the AGH and the AA are similar to the myth in that 
they discuss details about what happens to the soul after death. In Chapter 3, I framed this same 
feature as a discussion of the outcomes of the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality—in other words, 
anything that we have to say about what happens to the soul after death will necessarily be 
exploring the outcomes that follow from the immortality of the soul. In this way, the content of 
the myth, of the AGH, and of the AA do overlap. Both the AGH and the AA aim to show that the 
philosopher will attain knowledge after death. The myth, however, goes further than either of these 
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prior arguments. It shows not only that the philosopher will attain knowledge after death, but also 
the fates of other souls, and how each winds up with the fate it does. But more importantly, the 
myth tells why each soul has the fate it does, and in doing so, it makes an argument for living the 
life of a philosopher. Socrates makes this quite clear in his conclusion to the myth: “But on account 
of those things we have detailed, it is necessary to do everything so as to share in virtue and wisdom 
in life; for the reward is beautiful, and the hope great” (ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν 
… πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν: καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς 
μεγάλη, 114c6-9). The whole point of the myth is for Socrates to urge his interlocutors to live a 
good life, a life of pursuing virtue and wisdom through philosophy, and this is something that was 
absent from his prior arguments. The AGH and the AA concerned only those who already live a 
philosophical life; those people, the arguments said, should not fear death. The myth goes beyond 
this in urging those who are not yet living philosophically to do so. The AGH and the AA merely 
explained the proper attitude of the philosopher toward death, while the myth says: be a 
philosopher. And in shifting the focus from those who are already philosophical to those who are 
not yet so, Socrates has also shifted the conversation from one about his own soul to one about his 
interlocutors’. In this way, the content of the myth is distinct from that of both the AGH and the 
AA. The myth contains a moral imperative to lead a philosophical life that was lacking in Socrates’ 
earlier arguments. 
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4.4 A Persuasive Function of The Myth: Charming Away Fears 
In addition to the rational persuasive function discussed in the previous section, the myth 
has also a non-rational persuasive function, namely, that of ‘charming away’ one’s fears. Socrates 
first mentions the idea of charming away one’s fears after giving the CRA. Both Simmias and 
Cebes have objected to the Recollection part of the argument because they believe Socrates has 
shown only that the soul existed before birth, but not that it exists before death. Socrates replies 
that the combination of the Cyclical Argument with the Recollection Argument (the CRA) proves 
the immortality of the soul both before and after death, but also that, even if Simmias and Cebes’ 
intellectual objections have been met, they nevertheless seem to have some childlike reservations: 
Nevertheless, you seem to me, you and Simmias, to pleasantly [want] to thoroughly 
examine this argument still more, and to fear the thing of children, that truly the 
wind disperses and scatters this [soul] as it passes out of the body, especially when 
by chance someone dies not in calm weather but in some great wind. 
ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι 
τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν 
ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ 
τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνῄσκων. (77d5-e3) 
 
Socrates is teasing Simmias and Cebes—indeed, Cebes laughs in response—but Socrates also 
means what he says. Simmias and Cebes do want to examine the argument more, but this is only 
because, after Socrates has just “proven” to them the immortality of the soul, their childlike fear 
remains. Their view is so absurd on the rational level, Socrates says, that the fate of the soul would 
seem to depend on the weather. Still, this is a fear that Socrates is willing to take somewhat 
seriously, because the greatest of all things is at stake. Cebes admits that their fear can rightly be 
called childlike, and he asks Socrates to  “try to change the persuasion of this [child within] so that 
he does not fear death just as he does hobgoblins” (τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν 
θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια, 77e7-8). To which Socrates responds not with logic or arguments 
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but with a surprising suggestion: “But it is necessary…to sing a charm to yourself each day until 
you have charmed away [such fears]” (ἀλλὰ χρή…ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν 
ἐξεπᾴσητε, 77e9-10). A child’s fears will not listen to reason, nor, apparently, will Simmias’ and 
Cebes’. Nor does Socrates then drop the subject and move on to the next argument; instead, he 
says they should be willing to search all of Greece to find a charmer to aid them in this, but that 
moreover, they may want to learn to charm themselves in this way (78a7-9). 
This is a rich exchange that begs for exposition. The fact that Socrates compares Simmias’ 
and Cebes’ fear to a child’s fear of a ‘hobgoblin’ (μορμολυκεῖον) seems to suggest that their fear 
is non-rational, just as a child’s fear of an imaginary creature is clearly not informed by reason. 
Their fear betrays a lack of mature, thoughtful consideration of the topic at hand. A child fears a 
hobgoblin because he has not put in the intellectual work to figure out that such things do not exist, 
or perhaps because his intellect is not yet developed enough to do such work. In a similar way, 
Socrates seems to be suggesting that if Simmias and Cebes were to apply themselves and learn to 
think rightly about the matter, they would no longer fear that the soul perishes upon the body’s 
death. Socrates does not, however, expect Simmias and Cebes to be able to be persuaded of the 
soul’s immortality within the span of this one conversation. He says that they must charm 
themselves “every day” (ἑκάστης ἡμέρας, 77e9-10) until they have charmed away their fears. The 
fear of death is not a specter that can be exorcised one morning, but a deep fear of what is unknown 
and seemingly unknowable.197 
                                                 
197  Cf. White: “The…implication is that the fear, although childish, is natural to the matter under scrutiny even when 
closely analyzed by adult minds of fine temper” (101). 
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In fact, the fear of death may be something that cannot be completely exorcised, although 
it can be reoriented in a more appropriate direction. Simmias and Cebes fear that the soul will 
dissipate and cease to exist, but the real fear, Socrates tells them, is that it won’t: 
Since indeed the soul is deathless, …the risk would now seem to be terrifying, if 
someone should neglect his [soul]… And now, since it is clear that the soul is 
deathless, it would have no other refuge from evils, nor any safety, except to 
become as excellent and as wise as possible. 
εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, …ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις 
αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει… νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ 
ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην 
γενέσθαι. (107c1…4, c9-d2) 
 
If the soul ceases to exist upon the death of the body, one’s own death is not a proper object of 
fear, since when we die, we would cease to feel or experience anything at all. What we ought, 
rather, to fear is the idea that our souls will continue living after the death of the body, and that our 
souls will not be judged worthy of the most pleasant experiences in the afterlife. At the same time, 
even this fear need not plague us terribly, since there is a clear—although not easy—path to 
avoiding such a fate. Just as Socrates said many times in the AGH that one should be hopeful about 
the fate of his soul, he reiterates this just after telling the myth: “But on account of these things, it 
is necessary for a man to be of good hope about his soul” (ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ 
τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα, 114d8-e1). Socrates would prefer that his interlocutors focus on the hope 
they can have for the fates of their souls after death, but if they cannot, they should at least 
remember that their fear of death should be directed not toward ceasing to exist, but toward living 
a life that does not pursue wisdom and virtue. While it is true that neither Socrates nor his 
interlocutors can know what the fate of the soul after death will be, there is safety and hope in 
believing that one will be better off in whatever afterlife there may be if one has pursued virtue 
and wisdom with all his might while living. Still, the conversation has breached the limits of human 
 134 
knowledge, and it seems that rational argument alone will not be enough to persuade Simmias and 
Cebes. If they truly want to be persuaded that the soul is immortal, they will need a charm. 
Just before the myth, Socrates has given three arguments for the immortality of the soul, 
and Simmias and Cebes have exhausted their rational objections to these arguments. Socrates has 
helped to rid them of their incorrect preconceived notions of the soul, yet they are still unable to 
convince themselves to believe that the soul is immortal. This is why Socrates now turns to a myth: 
Simmias and Cebes need something that will operate on their non-rational fears about the fate of 
the soul. At the end of the myth, Socrates declares that “it is necessary to sing such things just as 
a charm to oneself, on account of which I extended my myth just now” (χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ 
ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον, 114d6-8). Here Socrates makes clear 
that the things that ought to be sung to oneself as a charm are the myth he has just told, or things 
along those lines (τὰ τοιαῦτα), which is precisely why he has spent so long delivering the myth. 
Even though the myth is delivered in rational, argumentative language, it has the capacity still to 
affect the non-rational fears of its hearers. 
In order to better explain how the myth has both rational and non-rational persuasive 
appeals, an example would seem to be required. One aspect of the myth that seems particularly 
capable of persuading in rational and non-rational ways is Socrates’ description of the surface of 
the earth, which appeals to both the non-rational children within us and our rational, mature minds. 
Socrates likens the earth to a twelve-sided ball (δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, 110b6-7) made up of 
pentagonal pieces of leather. While such balls could certainly be used in sports for those of all 
ages, Socrates’ emphasis on the multicolored and bejeweled appearance of this particular ‘ball’ 
suggests the style of a child’s toy in particular. The true surface of earth is “divided in colors, of 
which those here [in the divots] are like [only] sample colors” (χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ 
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ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, 110b7); the surface is made “from [colors] still more bright 
and pure” than any we are familiar with (πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων, 110c2-3), 
colors “yet more numerous and beautiful than any we have ever seen” (ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων 
ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν, 110c6-7). These glorious colors are accented by the precious stones and 
metals visible on the surface of the earth, which are “more beautiful” (καλλίω, 110e2) than those 
we see, “bright-shining” (ἐκφανῆ, 111a1), and “great in number and huge and throughout the 
whole earth, so that the earth is a wonder to see for blessed gazers” (πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ 
πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν, 111a2-4). This description 
of the surface of the earth certainly appeals to the children within us; the surface is colorful, shiny, 
and like a toy. The earth sounds like something that would immediately catch a child’s eye and 
distract him from whatever might be ailing him at the moment. But our attraction to this ball is not 
like the base and misguided attraction to shiny objects that those in the cave in Republic are so 
easily distracted by. Rather, we are attracted to this ball in a rational way as well, since the surface 
of the earth is the dwelling place of true purity, goodness, and beauty. This aspect of the myth, 
then, can work both to free us from our childlike fears and to orient our more reasoned attention 
to what is real, true, and beautiful. We will be drawn to the surface of the earth in both rational and 
non-rational ways. 
If my analysis is correct that Socrates intends this myth to be a non-rational charm as well 
as a rational argument, it remains to be explained why Socrates does not tell the myth earlier in 
the dialogue, and in particular why he does not tell it when he first suggests that Simmias and 
Cebes will need to charm away their fears (77e9-10, just after the CRA). The most natural answer 
to this, of course, is that Simmias and Cebes are not yet ready for the myth after the CRA (78a), 
but the reasons for this deserve explanation. White 1989 agrees, claiming that “the first argument 
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[CRA] is not complete as it stands. Socrates does not want to attempt to placate fears of uncertainty 
[through myth] at this point in the discussion because he knows, or at least senses, that the 
discussion has a long way to travel” (103). Even this, though, does not give a full enough 
explanation. In what way is the CRA ‘not complete’? Why does their discussion have yet ‘a long 
way to travel’? The CRA seems complete at least in that it is a complete argument, and one sturdy 
enough to have ‘proven,’ says Socrates, that the soul is immortal. If there is indeed some way that 
their discussion is incomplete, it is not because the CRA lacks logical rigor, at least in Socrates’ 
view. Socrates senses that Simmias and Cebes want to “thoroughly examine this argument still 
more” (ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, 77d6-7, qtd. above in this 
section), even though they are not raising Rebuttals to any part of the argument. Still, Cebes and 
Simmias are willing to entertain the idea that fear is holding them back from assenting to what 
reason has told them, and Cebes at least seems to think that what they need is further argument of 
the type given in the CRA. After Socrates suggests that his interlocutors sing charms to the children 
within them, Cebes’ response implies that he believes the child within him can be charmed through 
further propositional argumentation: “then from where, … Socrates, will we find a good [charmer] 
of such things, since you are leaving us?” (πόθεν οὖν, … ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν 
ἐπῳδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ … ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; 78a1-2). The fact that Cebes asks how they are 
to find a charmer now that Socrates is about to die suggests that he believes Socrates to be such a 
charmer, and that he believes Socrates’ arguments to be such charms. Cebes and Simmias are not 
looking for a charm in the form of a myth; they are not ready to hear one. As long as they believe 
that only propositional argumentation can persuade them of the soul’s immortality, this will be the 
only type of argument they will be open to hearing. The CRA is, pace White, a ‘complete’ 
argument—it is just not yet convincing to the interlocutors in question. The only reason that ‘the 
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discussion has a long way to travel,’ then, is that Socrates must help these interlocutors get to a 
place where they are ready and willing to hear the myth, before it can have any meaningful effect 
on them.  
I may seem to be arguing in this section for a somewhat strange temporal progression to 
one’s acceptance of the immortality of the soul. I may seem to have argued that charming one’s 
fear’s away must be prior in time to one’s being ready to hear and believe propositional arguments 
for the immortality of the soul—and yet, we would think the dialogue progresses in quite the 
opposite direction, considering that all the propositional arguments precede the charm of the myth 
toward the end of the dialogue. Two clarifications are thus necessary. First, I maintain that the 
dialogue has the temporal progression it has, that is, propositional arguments before myth, because 
of its rhetorical context. The heart of the dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and his close 
friends, mostly Simmias and Cebes, in which Socrates is trying to persuade them not be saddened 
by his impending death. What Socrates says is meant for them, is in response to them and to their 
objections and fears. Presumably, were Socrates having a different conversation on the immortality 
of the soul in a different context (perhaps most saliently, were the such a conversation not taking 
place literally on Socrates’ deathbed), the conversation would go differently. Perhaps Socrates 
would begin with a myth, or perhaps he would speak no myth at all. Whatever Socrates might say 
in another context would depend on that context, would depend on what those interlocutors are 
ready to accept and what their notions of the soul are. Socrates speaks each argument in Phaedo 
as a response to a question, objection, hesitation, or fear of Simmias and Cebes. Even in this same 
context and in this same conversation, Socrates presumably would have argued differently, had 
his interlocutors raised different questions, objections, hesitations, or fears. The upshot, then, is 
that the ‘progression’ of arguments in Phaedo should not be taken to have some profound meaning 
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outside of the context of the conversation in the dialogue. The myth in Phaedo comes toward the 
end of the dialogue because that is where it belongs in the conversation Socrates is having. In this 
particular context, Socrates must first persuade Simmias and Cebes through propositional 
arguments that their preconceived notions about the soul are incorrect.198 Only then will they be 
ready to learn for themselves what the soul actually is, including how it is immortal. 
The second clarification needed about a possible temporal relationship between charms 
and propositional arguments is this: there are no decisive indications in Phaedo as to whether 
Simmias and Cebes must charm away their fears prior to being able to accept the immortality of 
the soul through propositional argument, or whether such a charm is meant to work simultaneously 
with propositional argument.199 There are, however, a few factors that suggest that a charm might 
work best when used simultaneously with propositional argument. First, there is the frequency 
with which Socrates says we should work to charm away our fears: the fact that we should do so 
“every day” (ἑκάστης ἡμέρας, 77e9-10) indicates that charming away one’s fears is not something 
that can be done once or quickly, but instead must be done consistently and constantly. If one had 
to charm away his fears before he were able to believe in the immortality of the soul, it seems he 
might never be able to believe it. Another reason to think that charming away fears and examining 
propositional arguments is best done in tandem is the fact that Socrates first suggests charming 
oneself before he is even finished giving propositional arguments to Simmias and Cebes. Even if 
                                                 
198 Attempting to rid interlocutors of their preconceived, incorrect notions is a move Socrates makes in many dialogues, 
e.g. Phaedrus, Meno, Republic. In this particular context, Socrates must rid Simmias of the notion that the soul might 
be a harmony, and he must rid Cebes of the notion that the soul might perish once it has ‘worn out.’ 
199 A third possibility is that a charm alone could persuade someone that the soul is immortal. On such a view, Socrates 
would have used the propositional arguments in Phaedo only to dissuade Simmias and Cebes of their incorrect 
preconceived notions about the soul, rather than to help construct a correct view about the nature of the soul. It may 
be that if Simmias’ and Cebes’ preconceived notions about the soul were influenced by myths they have heard 
throughout their lives, myth would be the most efficient method of helping them to construct a new, correct notion of 
the soul. 
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Simmias and Cebes are not yet ready at 77e to hear what can act as a charm for them, Socrates 
nevertheless primes them at that time for the idea that once their false, preconceived notions of 
what the soul is have been argued away, they may still need a daily charm to keep their fears away. 
Accepting the soul’s immortality is not a purely rational exercise, but one that involves also a 
constant struggle against doubt brought on by fear. It takes courage to believe that the soul is 
immortal, for to understand the soul as immortal is also to commit oneself to taking care of one’s 
soul in a certain sort of way.  
The myth is persuasive, then, in two different ways. On the rational level, it is persuasive 
because it follows a logical progression from a hypothesis that is relatively unshakable. Socrates 
has shown that what he says in the myth, even if he can’t confidently affirm each detail, is 
nevertheless at least approximately true, because the myth develops its argument from the 
hypothesis that the soul is immortal. This hypothesis in turn, as I argued in Chapter 3, follows from 
the hypothesis of the Forms, which Socrates has earlier claimed to be the most firm and unshakable 
hypothesis of all.200 However, this feature does not distinguish the persuasive appeal of the myth 
from those of the propositional arguments Socrates makes in the dialogue, because each of those 
arguments also follows from the hypothesis of the Forms. In this way, the myth shares one of its 
persuasive features with arguments stated in propositional language. But the myth has also a 
persuasive function that arguments stated in propositional form are incapable of providing, 
namely, its non-rational appeal. The myth works on a non-rational level as well because it draws 
the listener in through its hopeful message and playful delivery. It promises innumerable and 
incomprehensible goods for those who live rightly, and it entices us with the most beautiful 
                                                 
200 Cf. Section 2.4, which gives the Toulmin analysis of the myth’s argumentative structure. There, I showed how the 
imperative to pursue virtue and wisdom follows from the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality, which follows from 
the hypothesis of the Forms. 
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features of nature, the brightest of colors, and the most gleaming of precious metals and stones. In 
this way, the myth works to reorient our fears, in order to focus our attention and efforts on what 
is beautiful, good, and true. The unique persuasive feature of the myth is its ability to charm us in 
this way. 
 
4.5 The (Infelicitous) Persuasion of Simmias and Cebes 
Plenty of commentators have pointed out problems with the propositional arguments 
Socrates gives in Phaedo. At best, they are weak or unpersuasive; at worst, invalid or unsound. 
Those who wish to focus on such features of the arguments will not be at all surprised to find that 
Socrates has not managed to persuade Simmias and Cebes by the end of the dialogue. However, if 
we focus only on the weakness or formal structure of the arguments, we may lose sight of the fact 
that after the FA, Simmias and Cebes seem unable to come up with any logical objections to 
Socrates’ arguments. The question then naturally arises: why are Simmias and Cebes not 
persuaded by Socrates’ arguments? 
To answer this question, one final point about the exchange at 77d-e will require 
explication, and that is the idea that the best charmer one might find is oneself. Recall that when 
Socrates first suggests that Cebes should sing a charm to himself each day, and Cebes asks where 
to find such a charmer, Socrates replies: 
Greece is vast … in it, somewhere, there are good men, also there are many races 
of barbarians, all of whom it is necessary to search when seeking such a charmer, 
sparing neither money nor toil, since there is not anything more appropriate on 
which you might spend your money. It is necessary to seek also by yourselves, in 
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company with one another; for equally you might find no one more easily able to 
do this than yourselves. 
πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, … ἐν ᾗ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν 
βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπῳδόν, μήτε 
χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅτι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον 
ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων: ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ 
ῥᾳδίως εὕροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. (78a3-9) 
 
It is contestable how authentically Socrates means the first part of this statement, because of its 
references to barbarians and to money in particular.201 Even if, however, Socrates is serious in 
suggesting that one ought search all of Hellas and spare no expense looking for a proper charmer, 
this would demonstrate only the great importance of the task at hand.202 Regardless, Socrates gives 
the distinct impression that the latter part of his statement is truly to be heeded: he tells Simmias 
and Cebes to seek ‘by yourselves, in company with one another,’ since ‘you might find no one 
more easily able to do this than yourselves.’ It might seem ambiguous here as to whether Socrates 
is addressing Simmias and Cebes collectively or individually but at the same time, because each 
reference to them is in the plural (αὐτοὺς, ἀλλήλων, εὕροιτε, ὑμῶν, δυναμένους).203 This would 
have repercussions for the question as to whether Simmias and Cebes must look for a charmer in 
their individual selves alone, or whether they might look for a charmer in one another. We might 
be tempted to think Socrates is urging Simmias and Cebes to be charmers for one another because 
he says these things about where to find a charmer in response to Cebes’ insinuation that Socrates 
has been their charmer up until now (78a, qtd. above at 4.5). But it seems that Cebes is mistaken 
                                                 
201 While Burnet takes Socrates to here be referencing the Thracians and Phrygians in particular (64), Geddess does 
not see room for such a generous reading: “Notwithstanding this gleam of generosity toward the non-Hellenic nations, 
there is at the same time a feeling that there is from them small hope, and that the truth will either be found at Athens, 
or not at all” (66). Rowe sees little reason for taking the reference to barbarians with much sincerity because of the 
immediately following reference to money, noting that “Socrates has little regard for those who expect payment in 
return for their wisdom” (180). 
202 Cf. White, who claims that Socrates’ statement implies “a certain sameness of character…throughout all humanity” 
(103). 
203 Socrates references them in the plural also when he suggests they should charm the child within them each day 
“until you have charmed away [such fears]“ (ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε, 77e10, qtd. above in 4.4). 
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about Socrates’ role, and that Simmias and Cebes must play this role for themselves. The idea that 
Simmias and Cebes must seek a charmer αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων suggests that they can act only as 
their own individual charmer, even if this will be easier in one another’s company. And this is 
confirmed in the two instances where Socrates says directly that it is necessary to charm oneself: 
both times the “self” is singular (χρή, … ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε, 77e9-
10; χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, 114d6-7). One can use another to help charm himself 
into believing that the soul is immortal, but succeeding in charming oneself is the ultimate 
responsibility of each individual person. You could search all of Greece and all the barbarian lands, 
and still you will not be looking in the right place. 
One must be one’s own charmer about the fate of the soul after death because the subject 
matter at hand is beyond the realm of human knowledge. If Socrates’ only point were the bare fact 
of the immortality of the soul, he would have had no need for the myth, having proven this to 
Simmias and Cebes over and over again throughout the dialogue. But Socrates does not just want 
his interlocutors to believe that the soul is immortal, he wants them to understand what implications 
this has for how they should be living their lives. This is not something he can prove to them, nor 
is it something he can even claim to know. He has done for his interlocutors everything he can on 
the rational level by showing them how the hypothesis that the soul is immortal follows from the 
hypothesis of the Forms, and how certain ethical demands follow from the hypothesis that the soul 
is immortal. In order for them to trust this argument, however, and to truly believe it, they will 
have to want to believe it, and they will have to charm away whatever fears might be preventing 
them from doing so. It is one thing to form a belief about something because you trust someone 
else’s knowledge and account of the matter, it is quite another to form a belief based on someone 
else’s mere belief, when they can claim neither to have knowledge of the topic nor to be able to 
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give an account of the matter. The former would seem to invite a kind of deserved trust, while the 
latter does not. And when the subject under discussion is one that involves such a deep-seated fear 
for so many, it would be quite difficult for belief in someone else’s belief to be sufficient for even 
a remote level of confidence. One must be one’s own charmer because one’s own self is the only 
one who can hold fast to a belief in the face of fear, and the only one who can think through the 
rational justifications for that belief, since no proof can be given. 
Socrates knows perfectly well that Simmias, Cebes, and the rest of his interlocutors need 
to charm themselves into believing that the soul is immortal, so he does not expect to persuade 
them in this one conversation, or even that he has persuaded them in all their previous 
conversations. When Socrates is asked what his final wish for his interlocutors is, he replies: 
The very thing I am always saying, nothing rather new: that by caring for 
yourselves, you’ll be doing a favor to me and mine and to yourselves in whatever 
you do, even if you do not agree now. But if you do not care for yourselves and you 
are unwilling to live precisely according to this path about which we have spoken 
both now and before—even if you agree to many things presently and 
exceedingly—you will be doing absolutely nothing. 
ἅπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη … οὐδὲν καινότερον: ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ 
ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ᾽ ἂν ποιῆτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν 
ὁμολογήσητε: ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελῆτε καὶ μὴ 'θέλητε ὥσπερ κατ᾽ ἴχνη 
κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν πολλὰ 
ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. (115b5-c1)  
 
Like the postscript to so many of Socrates’ myths in other dialogues,204 this passage has the 
rhetorical force of an exhortation, even though it is not said in the imperative mood. Socrates is 
begging his friends one last time to take care of themselves and to live well. Here, after the myth, 
he is not so concerned that his friends accept the arguments he has given, or even that they agree 
to them, but rather that they live in the way that believing the myth would lead them to live—
“even if [they] do not agree now.” Socrates says that this is not the first conversation he has had 
                                                 
204 E.g., Phaedrus 257a4-b8, Republic 621c-d, Gorgias 526d-527e. 
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with these particular interlocutors regarding the fate of the soul after death: he asks them to do “the 
very thing [he is] always saying,” “about which [they] have spoken both now and before.” Again 
we have the suggestion that persuading oneself that the soul is immortal can be a slow and arduous 
task. Socrates does not care at all what his friends agree to at the moment, as long as they learn to 
take care of their souls, as long as they live their lives in accordance with such arguments. Socrates 
cannot force his interlocutors to believe any of the arguments he has given in this conversation or 
previous ones. Rather, if they are to believe the arguments Socrates has given, they must rid 
themselves of false conceptions of the soul, and they must every day work to charm themselves 
into believing the arguments, in the face of fear, doubt, and competing arguments. All Socrates 
can do is give them a charm, and hope that he has convinced them to use it for themselves. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the myth in Phaedo has both rational and non-rational 
persuasive functions. It has a rational persuasive function because it is based on a well-grounded 
hypothesis—that of the immortality of the soul—which Socrates has already proven to his 
interlocutors. And although the myth itself is a form of rational and argumentative discourse, it 
nevertheless has also the non-rational persuasive function of addressing and reorienting fears about 
the fate of the soul after death. It does this by attracting the soul in the way that a bright, shiny 
object attracts a child; the soul has something of a visceral reaction to the imagery of the myth that 
directs its attention toward what is pure, beautiful, true, and real. In this way, the myth has also a 
unique persuasive function that cannot be performed by the propositional arguments in the 
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dialogue. Even though Simmias and Cebes are ultimately not persuaded, this is because of “the 
magnitude [of the topic]” and their “human weakness.”205 That Socrates is unsuccessful in 
persuading them is not a sign that the myth is an unpersuasive argument but rather a sign that each 
person must charm himself into believing the conclusion of the myth on one’s own. The fate of 
the soul after death is unprovable and unknowable, making it imperative for each person to develop 
beliefs about the soul’s immortality on his own.  
                                                 
205 107a8, 108b1, qtd. in full in section 2.2.3. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The aim of this study so far has been to show how the myth in Phaedo should be seen as 
part of the overall argumentative structure of the dialogue. This can be difficult to see at first 
because the majority of Phaedo consists of clearly delineated arguments in propositional language 
that Socrates calls ‘arguments’ or ‘proofs,’ so the myth that concludes the discussion can come off 
as a last-ditch effort to persuade those present through non-rational means. Despite the initial 
difficulties in interpreting non-literal or semi-literal language generally, such discourse is still 
truth-evaluable because it can give an accurate (or not) likeness of its subject-matter. The myth in 
Phaedo contains both an underlying argumentative structure that can be translated into 
propositional language, and details about the soul’s experiences after death that help to make the 
myth a vivid image of what happens in the afterlife. It is this underlying argumentative structure, 
and the fact that that argument can be evaluated as sound (or not) even if the details are not 
completely accurate, that allows Socrates to call the myth “true,” and for us to call the myth both 
‘truth-evaluable’ and ‘argumentative.’ 
In Chapter 2, I analyzed each argument in Phaedo using the Toulmin method, in order to 
highlight both the hypotheses on which each argument is based, and where Socrates marks a 
particular proposition as “likely” or hedges it in some other way. The Toulmin method was more 
advantageous for this task than the common method of informal argument analysis because it 
shows the relationships among propositions more clearly, allowing us to see which serve as 
Backings or Warrants for others. These analyses showed that the hypothesis of the Forms is used 
as the highest Backing in every argument of the dialogue, including the myth. Drawing on 
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Socrates’ description of his general Method of Hypothesis, in which he says that we must examine 
the outcomes of hypotheses in order to be more sure of them (101d, 107b), I showed that each 
argument in Phaedo, because it is based on the hypothesis of the Forms, is also an examination of 
the outcomes of that hypothesis. And this is why, as the Toulmin diagrams show, the level of 
‘likelihood,’ ‘probability,’ or other forms of hedging becomes lesser and lesser with each 
propositional argument. As Socrates provides more and more arguments that examine the 
outcomes of the hypothesis of the Forms, our confidence in that hypothesis becomes stronger and 
stronger. Each time Socrates descends from the hypothesis of the Forms to the hypothesis that the 
soul is immortal, he gives not only an argument for the lower hypothesis of immortality, but also 
another reason to trust the hypothesis of the Forms. 
Chapter 3 examined the language Socrates uses to describe the demonstrative status of each 
argument, and argued that the Myth has a lower demonstrative status than some of the other 
arguments in the dialogue not because of its mythological language, but because of its subject-
matter. There is a pattern, I argued, in what Socrates calls a “proof” throughout the dialogue, and 
the pattern is that an argument can be a “proof” if it argues only that the soul is immortal, and an 
argument cannot be a proof if it addresses details about the afterlife. This pattern gives a chiastic 
structure to the demonstrative status of the arguments in the dialogue: the first and fifth (AGH and 
Myth) have the lowest demonstrative status because they discuss details about the afterlife, while 
the second and fourth (CRA and FA) have the highest status—they are called “proofs”—because 
they prove only that the soul is immortal, without elaborating on the discarnate soul’s experiences. 
The middle argument, the AA, has a mixed demonstrative status because it first proves that the 
soul is immortal, then elaborates on details of the afterlife. While it may seem strange that Socrates 
believes he can prove that the soul is immortal, there seems to be no question for Socrates that he 
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can, even if he cannot know for sure what sorts of experiences the immortal soul will have. This 
is because the hypothesis that the soul is immortal follows directly from the hypothesis of the 
Forms, which Socrates characterizes as the highest and more sure hypothesis of all. Arguments 
that are based on the hypothesis that the soul is immortal, however, are based on a lower 
hypothesis, and cannot be as sure. These are arguments such as the AGH and the Myth, which 
have a lower demonstrative status because they examine the outcomes of a lower hypothesis (i.e., 
they include details about the experiences of the immortal soul). Each of the arguments in Phaedo, 
then, including the Myth, has the demonstrative status that it has because of its relationships to the 
highest hypothesis, the hypothesis of the Forms, and to a lower hypothesis, the hypothesis that the 
soul is immortal. 
Chapter 4 examined the persuasive functions of myth, and in particular how it has both a 
rational and a non-rational persuasive function. The myth is intended to have a rational persuasive 
function because it is constructed from the hypothesis of the immortality of the soul. Even though 
this is a lower hypothesis than that of the Forms, Socrates has endeavored to “prove” it throughout 
the dialogue, so his interlocutors should have some trust in it. The myth, just like the AGH that 
began the dialogue, is a rational argument that shows the outcomes of the hypothesis of the 
immortality of the soul. Having shown the myth in Phaedo to hold a proper place in the overall 
argumentative structure of the dialogue, I sought to recover some of its unique features qua 
mythological discourse, namely, how it persuades through non-rational means as well. Socrates 
says that the myth is intended to help “charm away” the “fears” of its hearers, which it 
accomplishes through beautiful and inviting imagery. The myth promises that those who live well 
will be met with the pleasures of full knowledge and beauty in the afterlife, so it acts as an 
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exhortation to live well. One must charm oneself into believing the myth because it cannot be 
proven, nor can Socrates or anyone else know that it is true. 
The reading of Phaedo I have given here has two advantages over the prevailing views. 
First, it shows the proper place of the myth in the overall argumentative structure of the dialogue, 
where, by examining the outcomes of the hypothesis that the soul is immortal, it concludes with 
an ethical imperative to live well that is not seen in other arguments in the dialogue. It is thus an 
argument on its own, but still closely related to and based on the propositional arguments that 
precede it. Second, my reading makes sense of Socrates’ description of the Method of Hypothesis 
by understanding the hypothesis of the Forms to be the highest hypothesis, and the hypothesis of 
immortality to be a lower hypothesis. In this way, the dialogue as a whole comes into focus as an 
example of the Method of Hypothesis. Socrates begins by examining the outcomes of the lower 
hypothesis in the AGH, and when this hypothesis is challenged by his interlocutors, he ascends to 
the higher hypothesis of the Forms in order to prove the lower hypothesis. Once he has proven the 
lower hypothesis, he descends in the myth to examine the outcomes of the lower hypothesis once 
more. 
In the following section, I identify a number of both thematic and argumentative features 
present in the Phaedo myth that can be found in other eschatological myths that Socrates tells. 
Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 show striking similarities among the thematic and argumentative features 
of Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, while Section 5.1.3 begins to address why these features may 
not be as prominent in other eschatological myths. 
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5.1 Other Eschatological Myths 
I have argued that throughout Phaedo, a consistent pattern emerges in what Socrates 
believes can be proven and what can be claimed about the immortality of the soul: one can prove 
that the soul is immortal, but one cannot prove specific details about what happens to the soul after 
death. Socrates aims to prove or otherwise demonstrate that the soul is immortal in the CRA, AA, 
and FA, which use the hypothesis of the Forms in order to argue for the lower hypothesis that the 
soul is immortal. Once Socrates has proven that the soul is immortal, he uses this lower hypothesis 
to argue in the myth that a consequence of this hypothesis is that one must take care of his soul in 
both life and death. While a full analysis of whether this pattern is consistent throughout the 
Platonic corpus is outside the scope of the current investigation, some preliminary remarks about 
the eschatological myths found in other dialogues will help to show directions for further study. 
Let us call the two features of Phaedo mentioned above—(A1) that one can prove that the 
soul is immortal, but cannot prove details about the immortal soul’s experiences after death, and 
(A2) that proofs for the immortality of the soul are based on the hypothesis of the Forms, while 
the myth is based on the lower hypothesis that the soul is immortal—‘argumentative elements’ of 
the dialogue. And for this brief comparative study, let us add four more argumentative elements 
evident in Phaedo that are found also in full or for the most part in both Phaedrus and Republic: 
(A3) the myth follows one or more proofs or arguments for the immortality of the soul that are 
given in propositional language, (A4) Socrates describes the myth as “true” but qualifies this 
statement in some way, (A5) the myth is intended to be persuasive, and (A6) the myth concludes 
the discussion at hand, suggesting that it is some sort of appropriate ending to the discussion. 
In addition, we should note three elements about these myths that I will call ‘thematic 
elements.’ In each case, the myths in these dialogues describe (T1) the geography of the 
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underworld, (T2) how souls are judged after death and treated differently according to the virtues 
or vices they expressed in life, and (T3) how souls try in some way to better themselves through 
purification, knowledge, or some other means. Throughout the rest of this chapter, I discuss these 
six argumentative elements and these three thematic elements in Phaedrus (Section 5.1.1), 
Republic (Section 5.1.2), and other dialogues (5.1.3). I then draw some more general conclusions 
about the role of eschatological myths throughout the Platonic corpus, while identifying areas for 
further study (5.2). 
 
5.1.1 Other Eschatological Myths: Phaedrus 
To see the thematic elements I outlined above of the myth in Phaedrus, a brief description 
of the dialogue and the myth is required. The first half of Phaedrus consists of three speeches 
about love; the first is a speech of Lysias’, read aloud by Phaedrus, and the second is a speech of 
Socrates’, in which he tries to make the same point as Lysias, but in a less repetitive way. Socrates 
then realizes, however, that what both he and Lysias have argued is incorrect, so he composes a 
palinode to correct their previous speeches. Desire for another person is not, in fact, some awful 
form of madness, but instead an earthly expression of the soul’s desire for the divine, so Socrates 
begins to explain the nature of the soul and its desires. After a proof of the immortality of the soul 
(discussed at length later in this section), Socrates likens the soul to a charioteer and winged pair 
of horses, all of whom are good in the souls of gods (246a), but in human souls, the horses drag 
down the soul, making it unable to follow in the paths of the gods as well as the charioteer would 
like (248a). As the soul attempts to follow the gods in their revolutions around the colorless, 
shapeless, intangible heavens (247c), the unruly and appetitive horses knock into one another and 
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become maimed, and some even lose their wings (248b). Some souls are better able to follow the 
gods and are able to raise their heads high enough to catch glimpses of truth and beauty (248c), 
but souls that are in worse conditions are unable to do this, and are reincarnated as  gymnasts, 
seers, or poets (248d), while souls in the worst conditions are reincarnated as sophists and tyrants 
(248e) or animals (249b). After each life, souls are judged and either sent for correction before 
their next reincarnation, or lifted into the heavens to live out a just and happy existence (249a). 
The truth and beauty that these souls glimpse as they try to follow the gods are forgotten upon 
reincarnation, but imitations of truth and beauty in the material world will sometimes allow them 
to recollect them in part, and this the reason that human beings sometimes experience desire for 
the beauty of another: we see in others imitations of the true beauty that we have forgotten (251a 
ff.). All of the thematic elements found in the Phaedo myth are thus also found in the Phaedrus 
myth. The Phaedrus myth describes a basic geography of the underworld (T1), how souls are 
judged and punished or rewarded accordingly (T2), and how souls strive to catch glimpses of truth 
and beauty prior to their next reincarnation (T3). 
The myth in Phaedrus has also nearly every one of the argumentative elements found in 
Phaedo. The Phaedrus myth begins with a proof for the immortality of the soul (A3), which he 
introduces thus: 
We must prove the opposite [of what was said before]… and the proof will be 
disbelieved by the clever, but believed by the wise. It is necessary first to apprehend 
the nature of the soul, both divine and human, by beholding its experiences and 
deeds; the beginning of the proof is this: all soul is immortal… 
ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὖ τοὐναντίον… ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, 
σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή. δεῖ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης 
ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα τἀληθὲς νοῆσαι: ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε. ψυχὴ πᾶσα 
ἀθάνατος… (245b7-c5) 
 
Language of ‘proof’ permeates this brief passage (ἀποδεικτέον, b7; ἀπόδειξις, c1; ἀρχὴ δὲ 
ἀποδείξεως, c5), and what follows is an argument in propositional language that because the soul 
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itself is a first principle of motion, it can neither come into being nor be destroyed, and thus must 
be immortal (245c-246a). There is a clear indication, then, that argumentative element (A3) is 
present in the Phaedrus dialogue as well, since the myth follows a proof for the immortality of the 
soul. 
Before analyzing the other argumentative elements found in Phaedrus, a brief digression 
that examines more closely the relationship between the propositional proof for immortality and 
the myth is required. When Socrates introduces his proof of the immortality of the soul in 
Phaedrus, it is unclear whether his language of ‘proof’ is meant to refer to only the propositional 
argument that immediately follows, or whether it refers also to the myth that follows the 
propositional argument (ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε, 245c5). If Socrates is referring only to the 
propositional argument as a proof, we have found a treatment of proof and myth about the immortal 
soul that is consistent with that in Phaedo: Socrates ‘proves’ that the soul is immortal in 
propositional language, but uses mythological language to describe the details of the experience 
of the immortal soul when it is not embodied. However, if Socrates means that the myth is also 
part of his ‘proof’—so that his description of the experience of the discarnate soul is also part of 
this proof—we will have found a different conception of what can be ‘proven’ about the soul in 
Phaedrus than in Phaedo. 
A number of scholars206 believe that when Socrates says he will give a ‘proof,’ he is 
referring to both the propositional argument for the immortality of the soul and the myth that 
follows.207 They believe this because it seems to make the most sense out of Socrates’ first 
                                                 
206 E.g., de Vries (1969) 120, Ryan (2012) 179, Werner (2012) 48ff.  
207 One notable exceptions is Rowe (2000 [1986]), who says that Socrates’ speech “starts with” a proof, though “what 
follows is hardly a ‘proof’ in any strict sense” (173). 
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reference to ‘proof’ at 245b-c,208 when he says, “We must prove the opposite [of what was said 
before], that madness of this sort is given by the gods for the sake of the greatest good fortune” 
(ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὖ τοὐναντίον, ὡς ἐπ᾽ εὐτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία 
δίδοται, 245b6-7). Socrates says his ‘proof’ will regard a certain type of madness, and how it is 
god-given and for the sake of good, and his two other references to ‘proof’ in 245c are consistent 
with this. Since Socrates does not discuss madness and its nature in the propositional argument for 
immortality, but only in the myth, it does seem that Socrates means for the myth to be part of his 
proof, while the argument for the immortality of the soul is only the beginning of the proof (cf. 
ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε. ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος…, 245c4-5, qtd. above in this section). 
If the myth is part of the ‘proof,’ it may seem at first that there is a noteworthy difference 
between how details about the experiences of the discarnate soul are treated in Phaedo and 
Phaedrus: in Phaedo, Socrates indicates that one cannot prove details about the experiences of the 
soul, while in Phaedrus, Socrates seems to say he is ‘proving’ what the discarnate soul experiences. 
But a closer look at exactly what Socrates says he is proving suggests a different interpretation. 
The proof in Phaedo is a proof not of the experiences of a discarnate soul but of a certain 
experience in carnate souls, a god-given madness that manifests as desire (“we must prove…that 
madness of this sort is given by the gods for the sake of the greatest good fortune,” qtd. in previous 
paragraph). What Socrates is proving in Phaedrus, then, is that desire in human beings for human 
beings is an imitation of our bare souls’ desire for beauty and truth. The details of the myth—
whether our souls make 1000-year revolutions around the heavens, etc.—are incidental to this. 
Socrates is, after all, saying only what the soul “is like.” While there is not room enough here to 
                                                 
208 Werner also argues that this interpretation displays a concern with the status of language and of argument that is 
consistent with the latter half of the dialogue (2012, 51-4). 
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draw out my argument more fully, I hope to have given a plausible reading on which Socrates is 
not claiming in Phaedrus to prove details about the experiences of discarnate souls. Such a reading 
shows a way that the Phaedrus myth can be consistent both with the limits of human knowledge 
(Socrates cannot prove what he cannot know) and with the treatment of details about the soul’s 
experiences in Phaedo (A3). 
Let us return to the rest of the argumentative elements outlined above. Socrates does not 
directly refence the hypothesis of the Forms in the proof of immortality in Phaedrus, nor does he 
do so anywhere else in the dialogue, but he does make clear when beginning the myth that the 
claims he makes in the myth rest not only on the hypothesis that the soul is immortal (which he 
has just proven) (A2), but also on the form of the soul itself (a slightly weakened version of A2, 
one that requires only the Form of the soul rather than all Forms). Just after Socrates proves that 
the soul is immortal, he introduces the myth by saying he will describe what ‘the form of the soul’ 
‘is like’: 
About its deathlessness, enough; regarding the form of [the soul], it is to be said in 
this way. What sort of thing it is would be entirely and in every way godly and a 
long exposition, but [to say] to what it is like [would be] within human capability 
and shorter: let us then speak in this way. Let it be like the combined power of a 
charioteer and yoke of winged horses.  
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς: περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς ὧδε λεκτέον. οἷον 
μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης 
τε καὶ ἐλάττονος: ταύτῃ οὖν λέγωμεν. ἐοικέτω δὴ συμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου 
ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. (246a3-7)  
 
Socrates believes he has sufficiently proven that the soul is immortal (περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας 
αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς), and is now ready to give to Phaedrus a likeness of the Form of the soul. Socrates’ 
myth thus ascends from the hypothesis that the soul is immortal to a hypothesis about the Form of 
the soul. This ascent from the hypothesis of immortality to that of the Forms, as I argued in Section 
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3.2, is a way for Socrates to give Backing to the hypothesis of immortality to Phaedrus.209 
However, Socrates’ myth is not describing the Form of the soul directly, but only ‘to what it is 
like.’ Because Socrates is relying on a likeness or image of the soul for the myth, he cannot be 
completely sure of the details of the myth (A1), even though he is attempting to speak truly. 
Socrates states directly that he will describe the nature of the soul through its “experiences 
and deeds,” experiences that Socrates cannot be completely sure about (A1): “It is necessary first 
to apprehend the nature of the soul, both divine and human, by beholding its experiences and 
deeds” (δεῖ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα 
τἀληθὲς νοῆσαι, 245c2-4). Because Socrates intends to describe the immortal soul’s experiences, 
he will be speaking about things that he cannot know. However, in doing so, Socrates hopes that 
Phaedrus will be able to “apprehend the nature of the soul” and see the truth in the myth, even if 
each detail about the immortal soul’s experiences is not accurate. There is certainly something true 
in the myth, Socrates says: “the region of the upper heavens is as follows—for one must venture 
to speak the truth, otherwise and especially when speaking about the truth” (τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον 
τόπον … ἔχει δὲ ὧδε—τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας 
λέγοντα, 247c3-6).210 Socrates does not mean that the soul is composed of three parts like a 
charioteer and two horses—it is, after all, noncomposite211—but rather that it feels like the soul is 
pulled in different directions by its various passions. In other words, the details of the charioteer 
and horses description might not be accurate, but the general impression given by the myth is 
intended to be “truth.” Quite similarly to the myth in Phaedo, then, Socrates’ myth in Phaedrus 
                                                 
209 See also Section 3.2: The Hypothesis of the Forms as Backing. 
210 When Socrates references τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον, I take him to referring to not merely the geography or a 
physical description of the upper heavens, but also the things that take place there, such as the revolutions formerly 
human of souls as they attempt to follow the gods in their pursuit of truth and beauty. 
211 Phaedrus cite, cf. Phaedo cite, Rep. 611a-b. 
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does not aim to give a perfect description of the soul’s experiences after death (A1), but it does 
contain “truth” about the nature of the soul (A4). 
In terms of the myth’s persuasiveness (A5), there are two direct indications in Phaedrus 
that the myth is intended to be persuasive, and not merely an exculpatory exercise to keep Eros 
from smiting Socrates (cf. 257a). Approximately halfway through the myth, Socrates mentions 
that Phaedrus may not yet have been persuaded, but regardless, Socrates means to be telling him 
what is correct: “It is possible that you are persuaded by these things, it is possible you are not; 
nevertheless, the cause and the experience itself of lovers is this” (τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, 
ἔξεστιν δὲ μή: ὅμως δὲ ἥ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώντων τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν, 252c1-2). 
In addition, Socrates’ myth ends with a prayer to Eros that Lysias be turned to philosophy: 
Blaming Lysias as the begetter of the speech, stop [him from begetting] speeches 
of this sort, and, just as his brother Polemarchus has been turned, turn him toward 
philosophy, so that his lover here will be no longer torn as he is now, but will instead 
direct his life singlemindedly toward love accompanied by philosophical speeches. 
Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα αἰτιώμενος παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ 
φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὥσπερ ἁδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον, ἵνα καὶ ὁ 
ἐραστὴς ὅδε αὐτοῦ μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς πρὸς ἔρωτα 
μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῆται. (257b2-6) 
 
On the surface, Socrates’ prayer is for the benefit of Lysias. But Socrates makes clear that the 
prayer is actually “for the sake of” (ἵνα) Phaedrus’ own good. Lysias is not present for any of the 
discussions in Phaedrus, so he could not possibly be persuaded by Socrates’ myth. Phaedrus, on 
the other hand, is present and eager to learn. Socrates wishes to make Phaedrus “no longer torn” 
(μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ), but “singlemindedly” (ἁπλῶς) in pursuit of a philosophical life. The point 
of Socrates’ myth, then, is to persuade Phaedrus to turn from his love of pretty speeches to a life 
in pursuit of knowledge and virtue. 
Thus ends the discussion of desire in Phaedrus (A6), as Socrates and Phaedrus then begin 
discussing proper composition of speeches and the role of the written word. Just as in Phaedo, 
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Socrates’ myth incorporates all of the thematic elements I outlined in 5.1 (at least a basic 
geography of the underworld or of the heavens (T1), souls being judged, and punished or rewarded 
accordingly (T2), and souls striving to better themselves before their next reincarnation (T3)). In 
addition, the myth in Phaedrus has a similar relationship to the argumentative structure of the 
dialogue as the myth in Phaedo, since it has all of the argumentative features. In a future study, I 
hope to analyze the relationship between the argument for the immortality of the soul and the myth 
in Phaedrus using the same methods as the present study. This would allow us to compare the 
roles of myth, proof, and propositional argument in both dialogues in terms of their structures, 
demonstrative statuses, and persuasive forces. 
 
5.1.2 Other Eschatological Myths: Republic 
Another dialogue whose myth plays a similar role to that of Phaedrus is Republic. The 
great majority of Republic is a dialectical investigation of what justice is,212 followed by a proof 
of the immortality of the soul (608c-612a) and the Myth of Er that concludes the entire dialogue 
(614a-621d). In the myth, a man named Er dies, but instead of remaining dead, he sees for a few 
days what others experience in their afterlives, before he himself returns to the same body and the 
same life as before. In the afterlife, souls are judged upon arrival and sent either to the heavens, or 
to the underworld for punishment (614c-15a). After a period of time, all souls come to rest on a 
plane for a brief time before travelling to the spindle of Necessity in the middle of the heavens 
                                                 
212 For the sake of brevity, the discussion here must gloss over many subtleties of Republic, including its intriguing 
opening, the story of Gyges, the Cave Allegory (although see Section 1.1.4 for a brief discussion of why this is 
considered an allegory rather than a myth), the shift from seeking justice in the soul to ‘justice writ large’ in a city, 
and whether the ‘indulgent’ Kallipolis described throughout most of the dialogue is truly ‘ideal,’ according to Socrates. 
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(616b-17d). When they reach Lachesis, her attendant tells them to pick from any number of lives 
whose patterns are scattered before them to examine (617e-18b, 619b ff.) Er sees a number of 
different souls make their choice, including Orpheus, Ajax, and Agamemnon, whose residual 
bitterness toward human beings leads them to choose lives of animals, Odysseus, who chooses a 
quiet and happy life, and an unnamed soul who chooses the life of a tyrant too quickly, before it 
notices that the life includes many evils (620a-d, 619b-c). After this, the souls travel to Lethe to 
drink from the river and forget their discarnate experiences before entering their next life. Er, 
however, does not forget, and wakes up on his own funeral pyre to tell his story (621b). 
This mythological ending and the discussion just prior to it have vexed some scholars 
because it can seem to work against one of Socrates’ main points throughout the rest of the 
dialogue: Socrates aims to show throughout Republic that justice is good and choiceworthy in 
itself, not because of its consequences, but the mythological ending and surrounding discussion 
concern the consequences of justice and injustice. Socrates tells his interlocutors both in and after 
the myth that they must pursue justice and wisdom in life in order to do well both in their lives 
and in their afterlives (cf. 621c-d, discussed below in this section). This focus on the rewards for 
justice and virtue has led scholars such as Annas (1981) to conclude that Republic has a “lame and 
messy ending” that is “most very problematic” in light of the rest of the dialogue (353). It thus 
seems that there is an exigency for finding a way to understand how the Myth of Er connects to 
the rest of the dialogue that does not make the myth seem ‘lame,’ ‘messy,’ or ‘problematic.’ 
The Myth of Er and the myths in Phaedo and Phaedrus show thematic similarities: they 
all contain a geographic description of the underworld or the heavens (T1), they all describe souls 
being judged upon death and sent for punishments or rewards (T2), and they all show souls 
attempting to become better through purification or through rewards for having lived justly (T3). 
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In addition, the Myth of Er shows many argumentative similarities to these other myths. The Myth 
of Er follows shortly after a propositional argument for the immortality of the soul at 608d-611b 
(A3). In this argument, Socrates claims that if the particular badness for any particular thing cannot 
destroy it (as, say, disease can for the body, or corrosion can for iron), then nothing can destroy it. 
Since the particular badness of the soul, viciousness, does not destroy it, nothing can, so it must be 
immortal. As Socrates concludes his myth, he makes clear that the myth is based on this hypothesis 
that the soul is immortal; we will do well, he says, “if we believe that the soul is immortal” 
(νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν, 621c3) (A2). In this way, the Myth of Er also descends from the 
hypothesis of the immortality of the soul to the outcomes of that hypothesis. Of course, any 
discourse about the immortal soul will be based on the hypothesis that the soul is immortal, so the 
interesting question about argumentative element (A2)—that proofs for the immortality of the soul 
are based on the hypothesis of the Forms, while the myth is based on the lower hypothesis that the 
soul is immortal—is whether Socrates’ argument for immortality is, in turn, based on the 
hypothesis of the Forms. Here, the evidence is much weaker than in Phaedo, but a more in-depth 
analysis would likely be able to show that Socrates’ argument for immortality is indeed based on 
the hypothesis of the Forms. In this argument, Socrates is concerned with the “natural badness and 
disease for each thing” (σύμφυτον ἑκάστῳ κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα, 609a3-4), and it seems that we 
could not determine what is naturally bad for an individual thing without at least being familiar 
with its naturally good state, i.e., the Form of it. Even if, however, we cannot make the case that 
Socrates’ argument for immortality requires the hypothesis of the Forms, we have still a weakened 
form of (A2) in Republic, in which Socrates specifically states that the myth is based on the 
hypothesis that the soul is immortal. 
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Unlike in Phaedo and Phaedrus, Socrates does not claim in Republic to have ‘proven’ that 
the soul is immortal (A1). The closest he comes to this is saying that they ought to believe that the 
soul is immortal “until someone should prove” the opposite (πρὶν ἄν τις ἀποδείξῃ, 610b4). Still, 
his argument for the immortality of the soul has a propositional structure quite similar to the proofs 
he gives in Phaedo and Phaedrus, and Socrates does not break in Republic the general pattern I 
outlined in these dialogues. Argumentative element (A1) states only that one can prove the soul is 
immortal, but cannot prove details about the experiences of the discarnate soul. This does not mean 
that Socrates must prove that the soul is immortal before describing the soul’s experiences in each 
case, nor does it mean that Socrates must state that an argument for the soul’s immortality is a 
‘proof’ even if he believes it to be one. 
Similarly to the myths of Phaedo and Phaedrus, Socrates indicates that what he will say in 
the Myth of Er is somehow ‘true,’ even if he will not claim that all of the details are accurate (A4). 
Socrates could not, in fact, claim that the details are accurate, because the Myth of Er is the story 
of another person’s experiences. Socrates was not there to see the experiences of discarnate souls, 
nor does he say whence he heard Er’s story. Still, Socrates insists, the Myth of Er allows us to see 
the truth about the soul. Between his argument for the immortality of the soul and the myth, 
Socrates explains that the soul should not be examined while carnate, but while discarnate: 
Therefore, that the soul is immortal, both the present account213 and others would 
force [us to say]; but the sort of thing the soul is in truth must be seen when it is not 
mutilated by its association with the body and with other evils, as we see it now. 
Rather, the sort of thing it is when pure [can] be examined sufficiently only through 
reason… And then one might see its true nature, whether it is multiform or uniform, 
and in what manner and in what respect it is thus. 
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχή, καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν: οἷον 
δ᾽ ἐστὶν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οὐ λελωβημένον δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι ὑπό τε τῆς τοῦ σώματος 
κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ οἷόν ἐστιν καθαρὸν 
γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἱκανῶς λογισμῷ διαθεατέον… καὶ τότ᾽ ἄν τις ἴδοι αὐτῆς τὴν 
                                                 
213 I.e., the argument for the immortality of the soul, 608d-611b. 
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ἀληθῆ φύσιν, εἴτε πολυειδὴς εἴτε μονοειδής, εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως. (611b9-c4, 
612a3-5) 
 
When Socrates says that one can see the true nature of the soul only by apprehending its discarnate 
form, there would seem to be no question that he is referencing the Myth of Er, because this is the 
only part of Republic that discusses the soul in its discarnate form. Thus the Myth of Er, like the 
myths in Phaedrus and Phaedo, is also intended to convey truth about the soul, even if its details 
are not accurate (A4). 
The Myth of Er, just like the myth in Phaedrus, concludes with an exhortation toward 
living a life of virtue (621c-d). In this exhortation, Socrates makes clear that he has tried to 
persuade his interlocutors through rational means to live well (A5), saying twice that if they are 
persuaded by the myth and by him, they will believe that the soul is immortal and they will act 
accordingly in leading just lives (ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ 621c1, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα, 621c3). It is 
notable, however, that Socrates also mentions non-rational means of persuasion, and in particular 
“charming oneself” in connection with the Myth of Er. Just as Socrates says in Phaedo that his 
interlocutors must “charm themselves” into believing what he says in the myth,214 Socrates uses 
the exact same verb in Republic to describe how he and his interlocutors must “charm themselves” 
(ἐπᾴδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, 608a3) through philosophical discourse rather than poetry, a comment he 
makes only moments before stating the myth. In this part of the dialogue, Socrates appears to be 
giving some sort of vindication to poetry, saying “we will be well-disposed to show [poetry] to be 
best and truest” (εὖνοι μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανῆναι αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, 608a1). 
However, he says, they must rely on philosophical discourse rather than poetry for “as long as it 
is not able to defend itself against such [charges brought up earlier]” (ἕως δ᾽ ἂν μὴ οἵα τ᾽ ᾖ 
                                                 
214 See Section 4.4. 
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ἀπολογήσασθαι, 608a2). Considering this, the Myth of Er may be something of an attempt to marry 
the merits of poetic discourse with the merits of philosophical discourse. The Myth of Er is 
“charming” and persuasive in a non-rational way, just as poetry can be, but it is also persuasive in 
a non-rational way because it contains a rational argument for living justly. 
The Myth of Er and Socrates’ final exhortation following it conclude Republic (A6), 
suggesting that there is good reason for ending the discussion, and the dialogue, with this myth. 
The Myth of Er addresses the consequences of living justly and unjustly, but these consequences 
need not be as ‘lame,’ ‘messy,’ and ‘problematic’ as they first seemed. The Myth of Er re-orients 
the discussion of justice from a metaphorical or allegorical description of justice in a city to one 
of justice in the soul. Just as Socrates shifts the conversation in Phaedo from the more ‘ideal’ soul 
of the philosopher to the souls of his actual interlocutors, in order to show them how to live their 
lives, Socrates here shifts the conversation from the ‘ideal’ of the just city again to the souls of his 
actual interlocutors. Once we recognize this, it is easy to account for why the consequences of 
justice and injustice re-enter the conversation: it makes the conversation exigent for Socrates’ 
interlocutors. If they cannot see the argumentative consequences of ‘justice writ large’ in the city, 
perhaps they will be able to see the actual consequences for their own lives of justice in their own 
souls.215 
 
                                                 
215 Between the argument for the immortality of the soul and the Myth of Er, Socrates suggests that justice cannot 
truly be separated from its consequences because a true understanding of justice will naturally include an 
understanding of the goods that follow from it (612a-614a). Cf. Bosanquet 1906: “the eternal consequences of right 
and of wrong-doing must be recognized, as to divorce seeming from being was only a (forced) hypothesis for the sake 
of argument” (409). Cf. also Morgan 2000 for an interesting discussion of how the Myth of Er repays “the debt owed 
by the argument” of the entire dialogue. 
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5.1.3 Other Eschatological Myths: A General Comparison 
Among these three myths—those from Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic—a number of 
similarities have arisen, both in how they relate to the overall structure of the arguments of the 
dialogues and in thematic terms. In terms of the argumentative structure of the dialogues, each 
myth follows a proof of the immortality of the soul given in propositional language, each is 
presented as in some way true and as intended to be persuasive,216 and each concludes the 
discussion of the topic at hand. The repetition of this pattern suggests that eschatological myth has 
a specific place and role in discussions about the soul for Socrates, regardless of the topic of the 
discussion (love, justice, the fear of death). The three myths display thematic similarities as well: 
each outlines at least the basic geography of where souls go after death, each discusses how souls 
are judged for their choices in life and treated accordingly, and each characterizes souls as needing 
to strive in some way in the afterlife in order to be reincarnated into a better rather than worse life. 
These thematic similarities suggest that Socrates expresses, in fact, a rather consistent conception 
of the soul’s experiences after death. Even though the details in the thematic elements of each myth 
are inconsistent with one another (geographies of the underworld or heavens, how souls are judged, 
how souls strive to better themselves), the basic ideas underlying each of these myths are the same. 
As I argued in Section 3.1.5, the details of such myths do not have to be perfectly accurate 
for a myth to be ‘true.’ The details of each myth are ‘filled in’ by the context of each 
conversation—whether Socrates is discussing love, justice, the fear of death, or whatever else. But 
this also does not mean that Socrates invents the details of the myths merely to fit the task at hand. 
                                                 
216 While Socrates does not use the word πειθώ in relation to the Phaedrus myth, it seems quite clear in this case that 
Socrates means the myth to be persuasive; the whole point of the speech is, after all, to persuade a beloved to grant 
favors to one who loves him, not one who doesn’t. 
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Non-literal or metaphorical language in general necessarily highlights some aspects of its true 
subject-matter while glossing over others.217 To take Max Black’s classic example, describing war 
in words generally used to describe a game, for instance, highlights only the commander’s 
experience, while glossing over the horrific consequences for the common soldier218. Extending 
the metaphor would fill in only those details about war that are, in fact, game-like, such as making 
strategic decisions or sacrifices and attempting to outsmart one’s opponent. It will still be true that 
some aspects of war may be game-like, but in describing war in terms of a game, we would 
certainly leave out much. In the same way, Socrates can describe the experiences of the discarnate 
soul by highlighting its desire for truth and beauty in the context of discussing love and desire, by 
highlighting its rewards for being just in life when discussing justice, by highlighting the wonderful 
existence it will have among the gods when discussing the fear of death—and none of those 
descriptions will obviate the others. When Socrates ‘fills in the details’ of the experiences of the 
discarnate soul in different contexts, he highlights some aspects of those experiences while 
glossing over others, in order to best fit the discussion at hand. In this way, the myths of Phaedo, 
Phaedrus, and Republic can be seen as consistent with one another, even though their specific 
details—which again, no one can even know—are not consistent. The details are filled in to suit 
the discussion at hand in each dialogue, and in each case, they highlight aspects of the immortal 
soul’s experiences that are most revelant to that discussion. 
Here it will be helpful to show in relief a couple of Platonic myths that do not fit this 
pattern, and to hazard to say why this is so. I said in Section 1.1.2 that the implications of my 
analysis of myth and argument in Phaedo could apply only to those other myths that are 
                                                 
217 Perelman 1982, 119. 
218 Black 1962, 42-5. 
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eschatological in nature, as opposed to ‘traditional’ or ‘historical’ myths, or even other myths about 
the soul. For instance, in Symposium, Aristophanes describes the origins of love by explaining that 
Zeus once severed human beings in half as punishment for their hubris and wickedness, so the 
feelings of desire we have today are of seeking the other half of what is properly ourselves. While 
Aristophanes’ myth regards the longing in the soul that human beings feel for others, it is not 
eschatological, and therefore has none of the structural or thematic elements outlined in 5.1. In 
addition, the context for this myth in Symposium is not a dialectical argument or philosophical 
discussion, but rather a jovial set of speeches at a drinking party that would make talk of 
eschatology quite unseemly.219  
Among myths that are eschatological, the one that seems to accord least strongly with the 
pattern I have outlined is that in Gorgias. Here Socrates tells Callicles that souls used to be judged 
just before people died, while their souls were still obscured by earthy goods and evils, so many 
souls were judged wrongly and were sent to the isles of the divinely blessed or to Tartarus wrongly 
(523a-d). In order to ensure that each soul goes is judged correctly, Zeus changes the process for 
judging souls entirely, having them be judged after death, once the souls have been freed from the 
body and are “bare” (γυμνός, 523e) (523d-524a). Souls are now properly judged and sent to the 
isles of the blessed or to Tartarus, and some are even put on display as “paradigms” (παραδείγματα, 
523e ff.) for others to learn from. This myth does not have strong examples of all of the thematic 
elements I outlined in 5.1, although they are not entirely missing, either. Socrates says that there 
                                                 
219 Socrates, too, tells a myth in this dialogue, but it regards neither the soul nor eschatology. It thus lacks all of 
thematic elements his eschatological myths share, speaking instead of the parentage of Eros. He is the son of Resource 
and Poverty, Socrates says, who was conceived at the feast celebrating the birth of Aphrodite (203b-e). Because of 
this, he pursues beauty, but lacks beauty and other resources himself, relying solely on his cleverness and courage to 
get by. Even though this is not an eschatological myth, it still has two of the argumentative functions that his 
eschatological myths have—namely, the myth follows a propositional argument that claims he lacks what he desires 
and so is neither beautiful nor good (199d-201e) (A3), and Socrates says that his speech (including the myth) will be 
“the truth” (τά γε ἀληθῆ, 199a8) (A4). 
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are various paths discarnate souls may take to get to the Isles or to Tartarus but does not describe 
their geography in detail (T1),220 and while he says that souls can become better through 
purification, this is described as a more passive act than in Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, where 
souls are striving in various ways to become better (T3).221  The only thematic element that the 
Gorgias myth contains integrally is the judgment of souls (T2), but it is interesting to note that, 
unlike in other dialogues, Socrates does not say that souls will be reincarnated after their rewards 
and punishments in the afterlife.222 
In terms of the argumentative elements of many of Socrates’ eschatological myths, the 
Gorgias myth again doesn’t make strong use of them, but nor are they wholly absent. Socrates 
characterizes the myth as “true,”223 but qualifies this by saying, “It would be nothing wonderous 
to look down on these things, if, by seeking, we should happen to discover better and truer things 
than these” (οὐδέν γ᾽ ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν 
βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν, 527a) (A4). The myth is also characterized as “persuasive”224 (A5), 
and it concludes the dialogue (A6), suggesting that the myth brings some sort of conclusion to the 
conversation. The argumentative elements most closely connected with proof and hypotheses, 
however, are absent in the Gorgias myth. Socrates does not try to prove that the soul is immortal 
(A3/A1),225 nor does he make any refences to hypotheses of immortality or of the Forms (A2). 
                                                 
220 The brief description Socrates gives concerns only the plane where souls are judged and the different roads they 
may be sent away from that plane on once they have been judged (524a). 
221 “It is fitting that everyone who is in punishment either come to be better and to be benefitted, or to come to be a 
paradigm for others” προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, …ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς 
ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι,525b). 
222 Annas 1982 gives an extended discussion of this (124 ff.). Cf. Arieti and Barrus 2007, 167, fn. 232. 
223 “These are things I have heard and believe to be true” (ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν… ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι:, 524a-
b). Cf. 523a1-2, qtd. in full later in this section, and 526d. 
224 Socrates says, “I have been persuaded by these accounts” (ὑπό τε τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, 526d). Cf. 527c, 
where Socrates urges Callicles also to be persuaded. 
225 Socrates does claim in the middle of the myth that death is the separation of the soul and the body (ὁ θάνατος 
τυγχάνει ὤν … διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, 524b), but he gives this definition without any argument as to 
why it is true. 
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Although a full analysis of why this eschatological myth does not more closely follow the pattern 
seen in those in Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic will have to wait for another occasion, one 
possible reason presents itself. 
Socrates’ interlocutors in Gorgias are decidedly antagonistic toward him and his ideas. 
Polus laughs when Socrates suggests that those who are vicious but go unpunished are the worst 
off of all (473e), and Callicles becomes so exasperated with Socrates at 505d that he exits himself 
from the conversation temporarily and tells Socrates to debate with himself. Before Socrates 
begins his myth, he says plainly that Callicles in particular will not believe it, even though Socrates 
intends for what he says to be true: “hear a very beautiful account, which you will believe to be a 
myth, as I suspect, but I believe to be an account, for the things I intend to say I will say to you as 
being true” (ἄκουε δή … μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον: 
ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, 523a1-2). If Socrates knows full well that Callicles 
will dismiss an argument given in mythological language, why would he bother to do so? It may 
be that Socrates has given up, for the time being, on persuading Callicles. Or it may be that Socrates 
is not mocking Callicles as much as he is daring him to believe what he will say in the myth: go 
ahead and dismiss what I say, but do so at your own peril. In either case, Socrates’ interactions 
with Callicles and others in Gorgias have quite a different character from those he has with 
interlocutors who are primed to believe him or at least to carefully consider his arguments. Whether 
this is a complete explanation of why Socrates’ myth in Gorgias also takes on a different character 
than those in Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, however, will have to be determined elsewhere. 
What I hope to have shown here is a general pattern that is present either in full or for the 
most part in a number of Platonic dialogues that contain eschatological myths, and to suggest that 
both myths that fit this pattern and those that do not are worthy of further study as to why. In such 
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studies, I would suggest that we consider carefully the roles of both the hypothesis of the Forms 
and the hypothesis of the soul’s immortality, as well as any other hypotheses that Socrates may be 
relying on to develop these myths. Analyzing how these hypotheses are argued for in propositional 
language and how they are used as hypotheses to develop the myths will provide a better 
understanding of each myth’s role in the argumentative structure of its dialogue. Once we have 
determined this, we will be better able to understand the persuasive function of each of these myths, 
and to ask whether Socrates’ eschatological myths play always the same or a similar function in 
each dialogue, or whether Socrates uses different myths in different dialogues to different 
persuasive ends. 
 
5.2 Final Remarks 
I have aimed throughout this dissertation to vindicate a certain class of Platonic myth based 
on its philosophical content and its argumentative capacity. Myths about the soul that are spoken 
by Socrates are generally arguments in themselves, based on hypotheses that Socrates has argued 
for in propositional language, that argue for a certain ethical imperative such as seeking 
knowledge, pursuing justice, or living philosophically. Such myths contribute the overall 
argumentative structure of the dialogues by showing the consequences after death of following (or 
not) the ethical imperatives for which they argue. In this way, these myths give an image or 
likeness of the soul’s experiences after death, even though the precise nature of these experiences 
is necessarily outside the realm of human experience and knowledge. Socrates gives us good 
reason to believe these myths, however, because they are constructed from hypotheses that he has 
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shown or even proven to be true through propositional arguments. The fact that he describes the 
method of judging souls and the method of purification inconsistently across dialogues should not 
make us question which myth, if any, expresses his true view, but should instead reinforce the idea 
that regardless of the details of each myth, Socrates means in each case to express a more general 
and fundamental truth. Souls are judged, purified, punished, and rewarded. Believing in the 
immortality of the soul should lead us all in some way to believe and to understand this. 
I would hope, too, that the conception of myth I have here argued for can help lead to a 
more nuanced grasp of how Socrates views epistemology. There is great temptation to vaunt the 
‘logical’ or ‘rational’ aspects of Platonic dialogues, and in particular Socrates’ methods of 
definition, dialectic, and collection and division. But we can appreciate the intellectual 
contributions that the historical Socrates, Plato’s literary Socrates, and Plato himself made in 
shifting the focus of philosophy from the sorts of causes the Presocratics sought to the sorts of 
definitions and causes Socrates and Plato sought—and still understand that for Plato’s literary 
Socrates, at least, myth, allegory, εἰρωνεία, and other forms of non-literal discourse hold an 
important place in the forming of reasoned opinion on unknowable topics. 
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Appendix A : Argument Diagrams and Citations 
A.1 Argument for Great Hope 
 
 
Figure 10 
1. “Do we believe that some ‘death’ exists? … Is it something other than the release of the soul 
from the body?” (ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; … ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ 
σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; 64c2, 4-5). 
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2. This proposition is left unstated until quite close to the end of the argument, but it is suggested 
by Socrates’ discussions of how the philosopher rejects bodily pleasures (64d-65a), and how true 
knowledge cannot be acquired through the body (65d-66a). Cf. 67a: “And while we are living, in 
this way, it seems, we will be closest to knowledge: if we keep company as little as possible with 
the body, and we do not take part in it, except when it is entirely necessary” (καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, 
οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι 
μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, 67a2-4). 
3.  “The philosopher frees most of all the soul from association with the body, differently than 
other men.” (ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας 
διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, 65a1-2). 
4. “Indeed is it not in reasoning if anywhere that something of what is comes to be discovered by 
it [the soul]?” (ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν 
ὄντων; 65c2-3). 
5. E.g.,“[The soul] reasons most at that time when none of these [senses] trouble it in addition.” 
(λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, 65c5-6). 
6. “Now have you ever seen one of those [Forms] with your eyes?’ / ‘In no way,’ [Simias] said.” 
(‘ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες;’ ‘οὐδαμῶς,’ ἦ δ᾽ ὅς., 65d9-10). 
7. “Then that one might do this most purely who most of all goes through each thing in thought 
itself, neither placing some appearance next to his thinking nor dragging in some another 
perception with his reasoning” (ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα 
αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην 
αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ… 65e7-66a1). 
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8. “And then, it seems likely, that which we desire and of which we declare ourselves to be 
lovers—wisdom—will be for us, when we have died, as our argument shows, but not while we are 
living.” (καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, 
ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ, 66e1-4). Cf. 67a-b: “Having been 
cleansed and freed from the thoughtlessness of the body, we will be among things such as this, as 
is likely, and we will come to know through ourselves all things that are pure” καθαροὶ 
ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ 
γνωσόμεθα δι᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, 67a6-b1). 
9. “If indeed it is not possible to come to know clearly with the body, one of two things [is the 
case]: either it is possible for no one to attain [a state of] knowing, or [one does so only] having 
died.” (εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ 
ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν, 66e4-6). 
10. “Then if these things are true, [there is] great hope that, in having arrived where I am driven, 
likely there, if anywhere, I will acquire that which came to be a great occupation for me in my 
present life, so that that departure now commanded of me comes to be accompanied by good hope.” 
(οὐκοῦν, … εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, … πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που 
ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε 
ἥ γε ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται, 67b7-c2). 
11. This proposition is left unstated, but is not at all inconsistent with Socrates’ overall argument, 
e.g., “Only those philosophizing rightly are eager always and most of all to free [the soul], and this 
very practice is of philosophers, the freeing and separating of the soul from the body.” (λύειν δέ 
γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ 
μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, 67d7-10). 
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12. After Socrates give his argument, Cebes objects: “Those things about the soul give great 
disbelief to people that, whenever it is released from the body, it no longer still exists.” (τὰ δὲ περὶ 
τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μή, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ 
ἔτι ᾖ, 70a1-3). 
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A.2 Cyclical Argument 
 
Figure 11 
1. “Do you wish for us to discuss about these things whether they are likely or not?” (ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν 
τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; 70b6-7). 
2. Opposites: “We have borne this out sufficiently, then, that all things come to be in this way, 
opposite things from opposites?” (ἱκανῶς οὖν … ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ 
ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; 71a9-10). Opposite processes: “Then don’t these [processes] also 
come to be from the others, if indeed they are opposites, and the sources are between the two 
[opposite] beings themselves?” (οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστιν, καὶ αἱ 
γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν; 71c6-7). 
3. “Would you not say that the opposite of to live is to die?” (οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ ζῆν τὸ 
τεθνάναι εἶναι; 71d6). 
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4. [Follows proposition 3]: “[And would you not say that to live and to die] come to be from one 
another?” (γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; 71d8). 
5. Socrates: “And what is the coming-to-be out of living?” Cebes: “Dying.” Socrates: “What [is 
the coming-to-be] out of dying?” Cebes: “…living” (Socrates: ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; 
Cebes: τὸ τεθνηκός. Socrates: τί δέ … ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος; Cebes: … τὸ ζῶν, 71d10-13). 
6. “And from things having died, living things and living beings come to be?” (ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων 
ἄρα …τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; 71d14-15).  
7. Socrates: “Or is it necessary to supply some source opposite to dying?” … Cebes: “Coming 
back to life” (ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; …τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, 
71e9-10, 13). 
8. “It seems to be a sufficient sign, anyway, that it is necessary that the souls of the dead are 
somewhere, from where they return to being” (ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον 
τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, 72a6-8; cf. 72e). 
9. “For if both comings-to-be did not always return to each other, do you know that all things, 
coming to an end, would have the same figure and would experience the same condition and would 
cease to come to be?” (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, … οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι 
πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα; 
72a12-b1). 
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A.3 Recollection Argument 
 
Figure 12 
1. “If anyone recollects something, it is necessary that he knew it at some prior point” (εἴ τίς τι 
ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι, 73c1-3). 
2. “Surely we agree also on this: whenever knowledge comes to be gained in this sort of way, it is 
recollection? …If someone, upon seeing or hearing or grasping another perception of something, 
should come to think of not only this, but also should come to reflect upon another thing, of which 
his knowledge is not the same, do we not speak rightly [in saying] that this is recollection?” (ἆρ᾽ 
οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; …ἐάν 
τίς τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
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ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλη, ἆρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι 
ἀνεμνήσθη, 73c5-10). 
3. “We say that there is some Equal, …the Equal itself” (φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, … αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, 
74a9-10, 12). 
4. “So long as, upon seeing one, you think of the other from the very sight, …it is necessary …that 
this comes to be recollection” (ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, 
…ἀναγκαῖον, …αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. 74c13-d2). 
5. “Whenever someone, seeing something, thinks, ‘the thing which I now am seeing wants to be 
of another sort of being, but it falls short and is not able to be of the sort that is equal to that sort—
rather, it is lower’—is it necessary for the one thinking this to somehow have prior knowledge of 
that thing?” (ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι 
τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἴσον οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, 
ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο… ; 74d9-e1). 
6. “It is necessary that we knew the Equal before that time when we first saw equal things [and] 
thought that all these things are grasping at the sort of thing the Equal [is], but they are deficient” 
(ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα 
ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως.74e9-75a2; cf. 
75b). 
7. “Having been born, immediately we were seeing and hearing and having the other perceptions?” 
(οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν; 75b10-11). 
8.  “It is necessary that, before these [sensations of particulars], we grasped knowledge of the 
Equal? …It is necessary, then, that before birth, as seems likely, we acquired this [knowledge] ” 
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(ἔδει δέ γε, …πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; …πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, 
ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. 75c1-2, 4-5). 
9. “I think that if, having grasped [knowledge] before we were born, then upon being born, we 
forgot, …wouldn’t that which we call learning be re-grasping the knowledge that is within us? 
And perhaps calling this ‘recollection,’ we would be speaking rightly?” (εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες 
πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, … ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην 
ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; 75e2-3, 5-7). 
10. “Either we were born knowing these things and we know them throughout our whole life, or, 
those whom we say are ‘learning’ [are in fact doing] nothing other than recollecting, and ‘learning’ 
would be recollection” (ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ 
ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις 
ἂν εἴη, 76a4-7). 
11. “Then they do not seem to you to know …all these things? …They are recollecting what they 
previously learned?” (οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, …πάντες αὐτά; …ἀναμιμνῄσκονται 
ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον; 76c1-2, 4). 
12. “When did our souls grasp knowledge of these [Forms]? Surely not after when we came to be 
human?” (πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ᾽ οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι 
γεγόναμεν, 76c6-7). 
13. “Then our souls existed even before they were in the form of a human, apart from our bodies, 
and they had knowledge” (ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου 
εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον, 76c11-12; cf. 77c). 
14. [See proposition 13, above.] 
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A.4 Affinity Argument 
 
Figure 13 
1. Forms are invisible: “But these such things are unseen and not visible?” (ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; 79a4). Forms are noncomposite: “Then aren’t those things that are always 
in accordance with themselves and which remain in the same way likely most of all to be 
noncomposite? (οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ 
ἀσύνθετα, 78c6-8). Forms are unchanging: “Or does each of these that is, uniform, itself by itself, 
remain just so in accordance with themselves, and never in any way admit any difference?” (ἢ ἀεὶ 
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αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε 
οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; 78d5-7). 
2. Socrates: “Does the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, and each thing itself that is—the reality—
never accept any change whatsoever?” Cebes: “It is necessarily this way for each of these things” 
(Socrates: αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ 
ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; Cebes: ὡσαύτως … ἀνάγκη … κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, 78d2-5, 8). 
3.  “What of the many beautiful things… are they entirely opposite to those [Forms] and not the 
same as themselves, neither in relation to one another nor even among themselves?” (τί δὲ τῶν 
πολλῶν καλῶν… πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε… οὐδαμῶς 
κατὰ ταὐτά; 78d10, 78e2-4). 
4. Soul is invisible: “Then the soul is more like the unseen than the body, while the [body] [is more 
like] the visible” (ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ, 79b16-7). Soul 
is noncomposite and unchanging: “Whenever [the soul] examines [something] itself by itself, it 
goes to the other realm, into what is pure and what is always deathless and is always in the same 
state, and since it is akin to this…” (ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ 
καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ…,  79d1-3). 
5. “Consider…if, from all the things said, these things follow for us: that the soul is most equal to 
that which is divine and deathless and present to the mind and uniform and indissoluble and always 
remaining just so in accordance with itself” (σκόπει δή … εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν 
συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, 80a10-b3). 
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6. “Will the soul, as soon as it is released from the body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed? 
Far from it!” (ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα … ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ 
ἀπόλωλεν…; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ… 80d5, 9-10, 80e1). 
7. “This is nothing other than philosophizing rightly and, in fact, practicing dying readily” (τὸ δὲ 
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως: 80e6-81a1). 
8.  “Then holding itself in this way, the soul departs into what is like to itself—to the unseen, and 
the divine and the deathless and intelligible” (οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀιδὲς 
ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, 81a4-5). 
9. “[Souls] are bound, as is fitting, into the sorts of characters which they happen to have practiced 
in life” (ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν 
τῷ βίῳ, 81e2-4). 
10. “From such nourishment, there is no danger that one would fear … that [the soul] would be 
torn apart … and no longer be anywhere” (ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, 
… ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα … καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ, 84b3-5, 7). 
11. Simmias objects after Socrates’ argument that perhaps the soul is more like a harmony (85e-
86d), while Cebes suggests that the soul is to the body as a man is to the set of cloaks he wears out 
in his lifetime (87b-88b). 
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A.5 Final Argument 
 
 
Figure 14 
1. “Now [we are saying] that an opposite itself could not ever come to be opposite to itself” (νῦν 
δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, 103b4-5; cf. 103c, 104c). 
2. “It seems that not only those opposites do not admit of one another, but also those things which, 
[although] not being opposite one another, [nevertheless] always have the opposites…” (φαίνεται 
οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει 
ἀεὶ τἀναντία… 104b7-9; cf. 104c). 
3. Socrates: “Then whatever soul itself occupies, it always comes upon that thing bringing life?” 
Cebes: “Indeed it brings [life].” (ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα 
ζωήν; Cebes: ἥκει μέντοι, 105d3-4). 
4. Socrates: “Is there some opposite to life or none?” Cebes: “…Death.” (Socrates: πότερον δ᾽ ἔστι 
τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Cebes: …θάνατος, 105d6, 9). 
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5. “Then the soul does not admit of death?” (οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; 105e4). 
6. “Then also now about what is deathless—if it is agreed by us that it is also indestructible, the 
soul would be, from its deathlessness, also indestructible?” (οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ 
μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος: 
106c9-d1; cf. 106 d-e). 
7. “Rather the soul is deathless entirely and indestructible, and in reality our souls are in Hades” 
(παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, … ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν 
Ἅιδου, 106e8-107a1). 
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A.6 The Myth 
 
 
Figure 15 
1. Socrates’ three previous arguments (CRA, AA, and FA) argued that the soul is immortal. 
2. This is proposition 8 in the CA section of the CRA (72a6-8), quoted in full in Appendix A. 
3. Both the Claim from the previous arguments and the hypothesis that introduces the myth: “But 
it is just to keep this in mind, that, since indeed the soul is deathless, it is necessary to [give it] care 
not only for this time that we call living, but for all time…” (ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽… δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, 
ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ 
καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός…, 107c1-4). 
4. “…The soul goes to Hades…” (…εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται…, 107d3). 
5. Suggested by, e.g., “For the soul goes to Hades holding on to nothing other than its education 
and nurture, which are said most of all to aid or to harm immediately upon dying, in the beginning 
of the journey to that place” (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας 
τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς 
ἐκεῖσε πορείας, 107d2-5). 
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6. Regarding the judgment of souls: “…which are said most of all to aid or to harm immediately 
upon dying… ” (…ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς…, 
107d4-5); “It is said thus…” (λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, 107d5). Regarding the geography of Hades: “…as 
it is said” (ὡς λέγεται, 113b8); “…as the poets say…” (ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, 113c8-9). 
7. “It is necessary that they, having submitted themselves for judgment, be brought into Hades…” 
(δεῖ τοὺς … διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου πορεύεσθαι, 107d8-e1). 
8. “But on account of these things which we have recounted, it is necessary, Simmias, to do 
everything in order to have a share of virtue and wisdom in life: for the reward is beautiful and the 
hope vast” (ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ 
φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν: καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη, 114c6-9). 
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